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Abstract 
 
Much of the first generation literature on counter terrorist financing made sweeping 
generalisations and observations regarding these interventions based on relatively limited 
case study data.  Given that the UK approach to counter terrorism clearly attests to the 
symbiosis between terrorism and money, this thesis evaluates the contemporary relevance 
of Cicero's aphorism that “the sinews of war are infinite money.” Drawing on a series of 
discussions and formal interviews with CTF practitioners into several of the most recent 
high profile terror attacks in the United Kingdom, it confirms a notable shift in terrorist 
financing methodology in recent years and underscores the trend towards increasing 
operational independence and financial autonomy. It thus considers the continuing 
centrality of money in the terrorism equation and has been framed specifically to examine 
the financing challenges posed by domestic terror cells in the UK, given the trend towards 
low cost terrorism with its emphasis on self sufficiency and the emergence of more discreet 
and ‘criminally sterile' funding methodologies. This thesis is primarily concerned with 
reviewing the efficacy of the UK counter terrorism-financing (CTF) model as perceived by 
practitioners, both in policy terms and in the context of operational outcomes.  
 
The increasing emphasis on new funding methodologies and the ensuing lack of visibility 
and opportunities for interdiction at the conspiracy phase of terrorist plots, further 
highlights the operational challenges posed for practitioners in confronting these ‘new’ 
threats.  As such, this research encourages several new perspectives, including a review of 
UK corporate knowledge on previous CTF interventions and consideration of military 
‘threat finance’ practice to deliver greater operational impact. In particular, it advocates a 
new focus on micro CTF interventions to address changes in the ‘economy of terror’. 
Finally, this thesis strongly attests to the continued relevance of finance or more 
specifically, the 'financial footprint' to inform and provide intelligence insight for counter 
terrorism responses generally. In doing so, it also considers the impact on privacy from 
increasingly intrusive financial and digital data collection and the trade-offs that inevitably 
emerge when liberty and security collide.  
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Glossary 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
UN – United Nations 
EU – European Union 
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Introduction and Thesis Outline 
 
“Cicero, money and the challenge of ‘new terrorism’: Is Counter Terrorist Financing 
(CTF) a critical inhibitor? Should the emphasis on finance interventions prevail?” 
 
Much of the first generation literature on counter terrorist financing made sweeping 
generalisations and observations regarding these interventions based on relatively limited 
case study data.1  Given that the UK approach to counter terrorism clearly attests to the 
symbiosis between terrorism and money,2 this thesis evaluates the contemporary relevance 
of Cicero's aphorism that “the sinews of war are infinite money.”3 It therefore considers the 
continuing centrality of money in the terrorism equation and has been framed specifically 
to examine the financing challenges posed by domestic terror cells in the UK and the trend 
towards low cost terrorism4 with its emphasis on self sufficiency and the emergence of 
more discreet and ‘criminally sterile' funding methodologies. This thesis is primarily 
concerned with reviewing the efficacy of the UK counter terrorism-financing (CTF) model, 
as perceived by practitioners and insider’s, both in policy terms and in the context of 
operational outcomes.  
 
'New Terrorism' in the context of the research question refers to the shift towards 
decentralised, networked and increasingly autonomous and financially independent terror 
cells. Recent changes in the structure of terrorist groups have triggered further changes in 
the funding methodologies now employed by these entities. Though commonly 
acknowledged that CTF interventions will at best merely constrict the operational 
environment for illicit actors and disrupt their activities,5 this thesis considers several of the 
most recent terror attacks in the UK to determine the implications of the shift towards 
greater financial efficiency and independence. The increasing reliance on sterile funds or 
                                                
1 Biersteker, T., J. & Eckert S., (Eds), ‘Countering the Financing of Terrorism’ Routledge Publishers, 2007, p301 
2 HM Government was central to the establishment of the multi agency RUC Terrorist Finance Unit in 1988 to combat 
the threat from various Irish paramilitary/terrorist groups. Interview with Ex-RUC Detective, March 2013  
3 Cicero, M. T.,  ‘Phillippics 1–6, Vol. XVa, Cicero Orations’ in ‘Loeb Classical Library 18’9, trans. and ed. D.R. 
Shackleton Bailey, revised by Ramsey, J. T. & Manuwald, G., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010, p. 
249 
4 Napoleoni, L., ‘The Evolution of Terrorist Financing Since 9/11: How the New Generation of Jihadists Fund 
Themselves’ p. 13 Chapter 1 ‘Terrornomic’s, Costigan, S. S, & Gold, D. (Eds.) 
5 Levitt M., & Jacobson, M.,  ‘The Money Trail: Finding Following and Freezing Terrorist Assets’, Policy Focus #89, 
November 2008, p5 
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personal debt defaulting6 and the ensuing lack of visibility and opportunities for 
interdiction at the conspiracy phase of terrorist operations further highlights the challenges 
posed. Given that terrorist finance indicators or 'flags' may in future be more difficult to 
discern, this thesis examines the extent to which CTF remains a viable intervention option 
to combat these emerging resourcing methodologies. Indeed, in light of these 
developments, new metrics may be required in the future to more accurately reflect success, 
beyond those that traditionally focus on funds seized or networks dismantled,  
 
The first three chapters provide the context for the thesis, extending the discussion by 
addressing the rationale behind current policy and operational choices. The framework for 
the field research in Chapter Four has been heavily influenced by the UK template to 
combat Irish Terrorist Group financing, advocating a counter terrorism approach based on 
“intelligence, joint working, combined strategies and legitimacy.”7 Finally this thesis has 
sought to elicit new ideas and perspectives to shape and inform future responses to terrorist 
financing.   
 
Globalisation, in this context, understood as the widening, deepening and speeding up of 
global interconnectedness,8  is central to any assessment of the efficacy of counter terrorist 
financing interventions. In Chapter One, the scale of global economic integration is 
acknowledged as well as the opportunities that have emerged for the concealment of 
criminal activity in the mass of legitimate financial data transacted digitally. It considers 
whether globalisation has forced terrorist organisations to react to a regime of enhanced 
regulation and scrutiny and by default, spawned changes in structural configuration, thus 
depriving CTF practitioners of the ease of targeting centralised monolithic structures and 
their respective finance silos.  
 
This chapter also provides context for those multilateral counter terrorist finance 
programmes that have evolved and considers their value at a 'macro' level in terms of 
international cooperation, financial governance and the impact of globalisation. The US and 
UK governments in particular, have developed multilateral and bilateral networks to 
                                                
6 See Thesis Chapter 5, regarding Operations ‘Crevice’, ‘Theseus’ and ’Overt’. 
7 House of Commons NIAC Report- ‘The Governments’ Response’ in The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ 
p28, para.86, Fourth Report Vol.1, July 2002 
8     Held, D,. &  McGrew, A.  ‘Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation; Beyond the Great Divide, p1, Polity Press, 2007 
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counter the threats posed by networked terrorism.  The UK response to CTF is therefore 
assessed in terms of multilateral engagement and specifically transatlantic cooperation and 
the “special relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States. The impact 
of broader transatlantic cooperation between the US and Europe in recent years is further 
examined. The desire to consolidate the role of Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGO's) 
such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the European Union and the United 
Nations in harnessing international acceptance of the AML/CTF regime9 and fostering 
greater cooperation across a range of sectors has been one of the most active fronts in the 
war on terrorist financing. As such, Chapter Two considers whether this 'regime' of 
financial governance has arrested some of the perceived asymmetrical advantages from 
'new' terrorist groups. 
 
Chapter Two considers the literature on the financial responses to terrorism.  It reflects on 
the primacy of anti money laundering techniques borrowed largely from efforts to combat 
organised crime and includes an assessment of their relevance for the purposes of CTF and 
whether their value has been overplayed. This Chapter thus provides context for current UK 
responses to terrorist financing, many of which have their origins in the chaos which 
followed the 9/11 attacks and considers whether a “parallel universe”10 emerged built on 
key assumptions that focused on addressing terrorism in the context of crime and which 
accounts for the UK policy emphasis on criminalising the financing of terror. Despite 
developing similarities in both phenomena, this chapter seeks to frame current operational 
choices and to determine whether policy makers and law enforcement should continue to 
borrow heavily from the financial crime tool kit, given recent changes in terror cell funding 
methodology.  
 
Organisational structure is considered in Chapter Three. Crucially, decisions around 
organisational design, adaptation and composition are often influenced and determined by 
the sources of funding for such groups. From a UK perspective, the core mandates 
governing CTF have acknowledged this and have focused primarily on targeting 
organisational infrastructure.11 Indeed, several commentators12 have elevated structural 
                                                
9     ‘AML’ refers to Anti Money Laundering measures employed by regulators and law enforcement agencies.  
10 Warde, I., ‘The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror’, University of California 2007, p.xv 
11 ‘UK Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ March 2009, Crown Copyright, p74, 
12    Sageman, M. “Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty First Century.” University of Pennsylvania Press, 
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composition, as a key variable in the construction of counter terrorism strategies and 
tactics. Thus any changes to how such entities are organised has significant implications for 
those seeking to combat the financing of terror. The extent to which structure is central to 
CTF is therefore explored in detail as this Chapter reflects on the social organisation of 
terrorism and reviews the literature on 'new terrorism' and recent changes in the economy 
of terror.  
 
UK terrorist finance efforts have therefore been framed on the basis of conventional 
assumptions regarding the nature and structure of terrorist organisations generally. It is 
precisely the structural organisation of 'new terrorism' that is most relevant to CTF 
assessments of efficacy. The shift towards, autonomous, financially independent cells and 
the emergence of new micro financing methodologies have changed the terrorist financing 
landscape. The ‘top-down/bottom–up’ debate which emerged between Sageman and 
Hoffman13 is discussed and assumes further significance when assessed in the context of 
CTF. Thus Chapter Three frames the key issue underpinning this thesis, namely the extent 
to which current approaches to CTF are ‘fit for purpose’ in addressing new terrorist 
structures and new patterns of terrorist group funding14 and particularly those employed by 
domestic jihadists groups in the UK. 
 
Chapter Four provides analysis of the outcome of the interview sessions with policy 
officials and practitioners. The research design acknowledges that CTF programmes 
typically comprise three distinct yet inter-related pillars15 and that effective CTF requires a 
coalition of different disciplines including intelligence gathering, financial regulation, law 
enforcement and private sector cooperation. This requires engagement at the 'macro' level 
in the form of strategic direction by the Executive and further government intervention in 
the shape of asset freezing, sanctions and financial regulations. The second pillar targets the 
use of financial data for intelligence purposes, through a coordinated system of collection, 
development and analysis with the role of private actors and institutions increasingly 
                                                                                                                                               
2007 and Shapiro, J., ‘Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations’, Stanford University, 23 
August 2005, Preliminary Draft, www.teachingterror.net/resources/shapiro accessed 1 July 2013. 
13  Sageman, M., Op. Cit. & Hoffman. B., ‘The Myths of Grass Roots Terrorism: Why Osama Bin Laden Still Matters’ 
www.foreignaffairs.org, May 2008 
14 Acharya, A., ‘Small Amounts for Big Bangs: Rethinking Responses to Low Cost Terrorism’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 12.3 2009, p286 
15 Buckley P. D., & Meese M. J., ‘The Financial Front in the Global war on Terrorism’ in Howard R & Sawyer R., 
(Eds) ‘Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment’, New York, McGraw Hill, 2004, p51-61 
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central to this function. The final component largely concentrates on exploiting financial 
crime through law enforcement activity and criminal prosecutions.  
  
Chapter Four focuses on these pillars and develops the theoretical framework on which this 
thesis is based by targeting four main areas of interest; ‘Structures, Policy and Strategy’, 
‘Operational Effectiveness’, ‘CTF Assets’ and ‘Future Challenges, Vulnerabilities and 
Opportunities’. The first, ‘Structures, Policy and Strategy' considers the structural and 
policy framework which shapes current UK CTF strategy and those structures, narratives 
and assumptions that dominate current public policy.  It focuses specifically on the choices 
that confront CTF practitioners and the merits of interdiction and disruption, when set 
against the 'follow the money' doctrine which has emerged as a dominant philosophical 
driver in recent years. The second, 'Operational Effectiveness' is addressed in the context of 
the former and specifically in terms of whether the government’s apparatus, tools and 
powers for intelligence, investigation and disruption can deliver impact both domestically 
and internationally. It looks at changes in the “economy of terror” and considers these in 
terms of the operational challenges emerging from home-grown groups in the UK in recent 
years. The third area focuses on evaluating key 'CTF Assets' and the contribution of 
public/private partnerships in combating the financing of terrorism and their perceived 
assumption of “proxy sovereign” status in discharging their role.16 Obvious questions 
emerge from these arrangements around notions of synergy implicit within these 
partnerships. The dynamics of multi-agency cooperation are assessed as the research seeks 
to determine the extent to which the involvement of multiple independent agencies 
enhances broader CTF efforts. Financial intelligence (FININT) receives particular 
attention, both in terms of evaluating its operational utility and also when set against the 
perceived challenges to personal liberty that emerge from new collection methodologies. 
The final sphere of research activity focuses on the “Future Challenges and 
Vulnerabilities” that are likely to dominate the CTF agenda in the years ahead. It considers 
the emerging international and domestic threats and the policy and operational balance of 
strategic and tactical interventions. Given the frugality and financial independence 
characteristic of recent attack cells, it considers where the operational balance should now 
lie in terms of macro and micro solutions.   
                                                
16 de Goede, M., ‘The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe’, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 14, No 1, March 2008, p161-179 
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Chapter Five reflects on the principal themes emerging from the fieldwork sessions. It 
considers the analysis highlighting the financing challenges posed by domestic attack cells 
in the UK and contemplates a scenario where operational impact from CTF may in the 
future be increasingly confined to financial intelligence dividends derived from post 
incident evaluations, rather than tactical interventions at the conspiracy phase.  In reviewing 
this theme, it contemplates whether new measures might be required in future to close 
down the operational space for home-grown extremists by evaluating several high profile 
terrorist finance investigations in the UK.  This includes an analysis of the funding 
methodologies employed by domestic attack cells to support Operation Crevice (2004) 
Theses (2005) Overt (2006) and Seagram (2007). This analysis further informs the second 
key theme from the empirical research; the implications of the shift towards legitimate 
personal funding and the primacy of greater financial independence and autonomy.  
 
Furthermore, new military perspectives on 'threat finance' operational practices are also 
considered and particularly new analytical tools for intelligence and insight purposes. This 
theme is addressed by evaluating 'Threat Finance' programmes to combat insurgent 
financing in Afghanistan specifically and whether as a result, new perspectives are likely to 
emerge from wider inter agency facilitation and integration to shape CTF Strategy in the 
UK. In addition, the potential parallels with Irish terrorist financing are also discussed in 
the context of the potential 'transferability' of CTF methodologies to impact the micro 
financing platforms used recently by domestic jihadist groups.   
 
This chapter also examines the increasing emphasis and reliance on financial intelligence as 
a result of developments in data surveillance and digital media. The extension of financial 
intelligence (FININT) collection by law enforcement and intelligence agencies however, 
has resulted in unintended consequences for the individual and their relationship with the 
state and this chapter considers the underlying challenges in reconciling liberty and security 
as a consequence of more intrusive data harvesting. 
 
In the final chapter, this thesis acknowledges CTF as a collective action issue requiring 
high levels of coordination and cooperation among different agencies at both national and 
international level. It addresses CTF in the broadest terms by considering the structures and 
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dominant narratives that have shaped UK policy and strategy and challenges the centrality 
of finance interventions to combat new international and domestic threats. It is primarily 
the discourse around these themes and ideas from the interview sessions that consolidates 
and contributes to our collective knowledge and understanding of CTF as an enduring and 
viable operational asset. It documents the flexibility and organic nature of CTF to respond 
to changes in the operational environment and to address new structural manifestations of 
terrorism through the continued use of strategic 'macro' interventions or 'micro' tactical 
measures, depending on the context. This thesis therefore highlights the investigative 
challenges posed by increasingly autonomous and financially independent terror cells and 
predicts the future emphasis on FININT as a core intelligence asset to impact counter 
terrorism generally. Above all it advocates 3 key areas for further development and 
research. 
 
• Enhanced understanding of potential micro financing methodologies and greater 
emphasis on micro financing interventions to address 'discreet' finance 
generation. 
• Greater consideration of military perspectives from 'Threat Finance Cell' 
modelling and greater use of both qualitative and quantitative tools for 
intelligence analysis and insight. 
• Continued emphasis on financial and digital data collection to provide visibility 
on future potential funding platforms and opportunities for wider counter 
terrorism targeting and application. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
“Shaping the UK Approach to Counter Terrorist Financing: International Cooperation, 
Financial Governance and Globalisation.” 
 
The United Kingdom is considered more vulnerable than at any time in her history and 
faces a myriad of threats from states and non-state actors; terrorists, home-grown or 
overseas; insurgents and criminals and all as a result of an increasingly networked global 
environment.17  As such, greater emphasis has been placed on multilateralism and 
international cooperation in recent years. The UK's National Security Strategy (2010) 
defines the international context in which Britain pursues its interests through a 
commitment to collective security. This is discharged through a rules based international 
system and key alliances, notably and primarily with the US and through reformed 
international institutions including NATO as the anchor of transatlantic security and also 
through its partnership with the European Union.18 The UK approach to CTF will therefore 
be considered within the context of these wider international efforts to prosecute the 
financial war on terror.  
 
This Chapter examines the value of counter terrorist financing interventions at a 'macro' 
level and specifically in terms of those instruments and assets that emerged from enhanced 
international cooperation and financial governance. It also reflects on the 'double-edged' 
impact of globalisation to simultaneously enhance and yet potentially inhibit CTF efforts. 
Indeed understanding CTF in these terms is essential to determine the value of finance 
interventions to deliver impact across the terrorism spectrum. It will specifically consider 
the current international CTF architecture which criminalises the financing of terrorism and 
its capacity and resilience to respond to enhanced global economic integration and changes 
in the dynamics of the criminal and terrorism economy as a result.  This Chapter will also 
examine whether globalisation has allowed terrorist organisations to take advantage of a 
highly regulated financial system by stimulating new discreet funding methodologies. 
Finally it considers emerging asymmetric security threats in the UK19 and questions the 
                                                
17  ‘The National Security Strategy’ October 2010, p3, HM Government, Crown Copyright 2010 
18  Ibid, p10 
19  Clarke M., & Soria, V., ‘Terrorism in the UK: Confirming its Modus Operandi’, RUSI Journal, Vol 154, Issue 3, 
June 2009 
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efficacy of those ‘macro’ CTF interventions, the product of trans-governmental consensus 
on financial governance, to impact the threat from ‘new terrorism’.  
 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the prevailing view that emerged was of Washington’s almost 
institutionalised predisposition for unilateralism and its corresponding disdain for 
multilateral processes and institutions.20 These events however, provided the catalyst for a 
new era of international cooperation. A new consensus emerged around the universal 
destruction of terrorist networks.21 This consensus was soon translated into diplomatic and 
military activity as Washington sought to establish a broad and indeed global coalition 
against terrorism. Thus by early 2003, there were 70 countries supporting the military “war 
on terror” in Afghanistan, 160 countries working to freeze terrorist funds and 90 states 
cooperating in law enforcement and intelligence sharing. Furthermore, virtually every 
multilateral institution – the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
G-7 and G-8 linked their own counter terrorism agenda's to this campaign.22  
 
Central to these developments were the measures introduced to combat the financing of 
terrorism.  Indeed, the genesis and centrality of counter terrorist financing as a concept 
gathered momentum following the passage of US Executive Order 13224 in September 
2001.  Much of subsequent UK, European and indeed policy on counter terrorism generally 
also reflects those templates framed in the US Executive Order 13224 was quickly followed 
by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 which required states to criminalise 
active or passive support for terrorists, freeze suspected terrorist funds, share operational 
information and provide technical assistance to enhance multilateral cooperation in 
countering the financing of terror.23 UNSCR 1373 also established the UN Counter 
Terrorism Committee to implement its provisions. The operational realisation of these 
mandates however, would be constrained by the limited capacity of some states to 
implement this new counter terrorism template. 
 
                                                
20 Luck E. C., ‘The US, Counterterrorism and the prospects for a Multilateral Alternative’p74,  Boulden, J. & Weiss, T. 
G. (Eds) ‘Terrorism and the UN: Before and After 9/11’ 2004, Indiana University Press 
21   This was spawned following the US Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2001. 
22 von Hippel, K., ‘Terrorism and the UN: Before and After 9/11’p102, Boulden, J. & Weiss, T. G. (Eds), Indiana UP 
2004 
23 Biersteker T. J.,  & Eckert S., (Eds), Op. Cit. p236 
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In the quest to acquire an understanding of the UK model for countering terrorist financing, 
an appropriate evaluation baseline is essential. As the principal ally of the United States, 
comparisons have inevitably been drawn between the panoply of measures introduced by 
the Bush administration and those enacted by the UK government. The UK had borrowed 
heavily from the US in shaping its public policy on counter terrorism. Indeed, the four 
separate pillars, which comprise ‘CONTEST’24 bear strong similarities to the Bush 
administration's 2003 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.” Thus any assessment 
of broader UK counter terrorism frameworks should be considered against those policy 
assumptions and programmes emerging from the US.  
 
Following 9/11, numerous governments have been forced to confront a reconfigured 
security landscape and to proffer revised strategies for domestic and international security. 
British foreign policy, which had for decades sought to strike a balance between the US and 
Europe, has since 9/11 seen a resurgence and redefinition of the US-UK 'special 
relationship'. Dumbrell25 cites various explanations for the longevity of this relationship, 
not least the subtle effects of a shared culture. Particular emphasis however, is accorded to 
the conscious decisions of a Blair government and the personal leadership style and 
convictions of the Prime Minister himself. In essence as homage to the 'special 
relationship', a harmonisation of language and action emerged around key aspects of 
Britain’s counter terrorism and security policy.  
 
Historians may conclude that 9/11 witnessed a renaissance in the ‘special relationship’ with 
the US. As the UK government sought to deal with the implications of the attacks, the 
introduction of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 consolidated CTF as a 
significant issue for UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies and embraced many of 
those key provisions in the US Patriot Act 2001.26  Many of these were controversial and 
soon accusations emerged that the UK government, in an effort to demonstrate solidarity 
with the US, was rushing through flawed and poorly drafted legislation that lacked the 
appropriate parliamentary scrutiny.27 Whilst a cursory assessment would indicate that the 
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scale and reach of those wider homeland security measures introduced in the US have not 
been replicated to the same extent on this side of the Atlantic, various factors are cited in 
defence of this stance. Crucially, the UK unlike their US counterparts was not starting from 
a zero baseline. Indeed, thirty years of dealing with Northern Irish related terrorism had 
conferred important advantages in reacting to the 'new terrorism’ that emerged post 9/11. 
Nowhere was this more apparent, than in understanding the centrality of counter terrorist 
finance measures to attack terrorist group infrastructure and military operations. It was 
naturally assumed that these principles and operational procedures could be readily applied 
to confront the emerging jihadist threat. As a result, there were no sweeping structural 
changes introduced to mimic those established in the US. Moreover, because of its 
extensive domestic experience in confronting Irish terrorism, the UK had acquired a 
comprehensive range of domestic terrorist legislation. This had recently been revised and 
reinforced with the Terrorism Act 2000 and included extensive measures targeting terrorist 
finances. By contrast, the US had never before faced a sustained terrorist threat of any 
significance either transnational or domestic. Not surprisingly therefore, the events of 
September 2001 prompted a paradigm shift in the US conception of national security and 
wider counter terrorism collaboration and it is against this backdrop, that the UK approach 
to counter terrorist financing should be examined.  
 
Towards a Regime of Financial Governance   
 
In the post 9/11 environments, several global initiatives and programmes were established 
to frustrate the endeavours of those committed to generating funds for the purpose of 
terrorism. These initiatives provided the basis for what some commentators observed as an 
evolving regime of global financial governance.28 The extent to which international 
cooperation contributed to this regime is difficult to assess given the dearth of academic 
literature on the matter. As such, an empirical and descriptive bias tends to predominate. 
 
Countering the threat from international terrorism brought a new dimension to transatlantic 
security cooperation, particularly in terms of establishing a common CTF agenda. For 
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some, the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK was subsumed within a broader 
US – EU partnership.  This cooperation however, has a rich heritage and is the product of 
sustained security collaboration since the Second World War. This relationship gathered 
further momentum during the Cold War period as a new security agenda emerged in 
response to new threats and challenges. These issues were largely non-military in nature 
and included transnational drug trafficking and most notably the threat from various 
European terrorist groups in the 1970’s and 80’s.  Significantly, these challenges 
transcended both domestic and foreign policy and blurred the hitherto relatively clear 
distinction between internal and external security. The transnational dimension to this 
criminality was particularly onerous, as nations had largely configured their state apparatus 
in accordance with a unitary jurisdictional template. These challenges now required a 
paradigm shift to reflect the transnational nature of the threat and required greater 
multinational law enforcement and judicial cooperation. 
 
This new security agenda was defined most by the nascent threat from international 
terrorism. The ensuing US declaration of a “war on terrorism” cemented this threat as a 
cornerstone of transatlantic security relations. For Rees29 this presented unique challenges 
to the transatlantic relationship, not least because terrorism straddled both domestic and 
foreign policy and illuminated the divergent historical experiences, threat perceptions and 
strategic cultures prevalent within the US and Europe.30  That said, transatlantic security 
cooperation doubtless benefited from the existence of a mature and established security 
regime in the UK and drew on shared experiences and institutional frameworks to bolster 
greater multilateralism in the fight against new international threats. The events of 9/11 
brought greater alignment in US and European approaches to counter terrorism policy than 
was previously the case. The quest for greater transatlantic consensus has been evident in 
recent years, not least with regard to counter terrorist financing policy and this was 
consolidated further with greater intelligence sharing and a commitment to more robust 
financial controls.  
 
Whilst this cooperation had developed within the structures of a pre-existing military 
alliance, it was further enhanced through the G8 and the US-EU apparatus. Such structures 
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30 Ibid, p9. 
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provided a forum to consolidate the message, manage friction and competition and ensure 
that reciprocity.31 More importantly however, they afforded the US a way to pursue the 
“war on terror” whilst simultaneously providing Europe with a means to influence, shape 
and constrain US influence in the region. Crucially, however, by demonstrating a united 
front, the US and its European allies represented a powerful and convincing bulwark to 
curb the excesses of jihadist terrorism and have sought to expand their influence globally to 
include other nation states. What has emerged then is a security relationship beyond the 
limitations of a formal military alliance, based largely on shared norms and values 
including a mutuality and interdependence in economic and political spheres. The US 
effectively undertook the role of patrician, consolidating its influence and desire for 
consensus through multilateral engagement.   
 
The quest for a global dimension to counter-terrorist cooperation has been a key feature of 
US foreign policy since the events of 9/11 elevated international terrorism to the top of the 
security agenda. Whereas the Cold War threat from the Soviet Bloc was essentially 
monolithic in nature, the challenge presented by 'new terrorism' with its affiliate status, 
diffuse network structures, criminally sterile modus operandi and greater financial 
independence, now demanded new perspectives. Indeed combating international terrorism 
requires sustained cooperation between multiple actors. Yet whilst transatlantic 
collaboration benefited from decades of diplomatic exertions, global cooperation on 
international terrorism was urgently required in light of these new security threats.  If 
properly nurtured, these alliances may indeed deliver results as they evolve and strengthen 
and national considerations give way to overarching multinational priorities. Ultimately, 
success will depend on whether the requisite trust will emerge from these relationships 
between diplomats, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and judicial authorities to 
transcend narrow national concerns. Arguably CTF as a doctrine is particularly suited to 
these alliances, given the non-military, technocratic nature of these interventions. 
 
The asymmetric nature of 'new terrorism' and its transnational profile thus provides a key 
test for multilateral cooperation. The desire to develop a formal regime of global financial 
governance 32  had been one of the most active fronts in the “war on terror”. Regime in this 
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context refers to “instruments of governance that enable states to engage in rule-based 
relationships in which there are expectations of reciprocal cooperation.”33  In the context 
of CTF, there is little doubt that the transatlantic relationship stimulated greater 
international engagement, cooperation and coercion and succeeded in establishing tighter 
regulation and controls around financial governance generally. Moreover, regimes naturally 
foster notions of mutuality, reciprocity and obligation and the ensuing financial architecture 
that emerged served to strengthen these commitments. Based on their shared norms and 
values the US and the UK have fostered an increasingly interdependent relationship in 
political, economic and security matters and this has been consolidated further through the 
structures of the European Union. There is little doubt that by any yardstick, a regime of 
financial governance was spawned primarily by the triumvirate of the US, UK and the 
European Union, inspired by the centrality accorded by the US to the interdiction of 
terrorist funds in the wider “war on terrorism.”  
 
International cooperation around CTF was thus formalised by establishing a consensus 
around principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that were effectively 
institutionalised within a multilateral framework.34 Such collaboration and the ensuing 
quest for structural alignment arguably constitute a regime in the broadest sense. Moreover, 
there is now a widespread acceptance that analysing and understanding money flows is 
central to effective CTF and that proscribed regulatory action and best practice around risk 
and compliance protocols, has now been implemented in multiple jurisdictions. Indeed, 
over 180 jurisdictions globally committed to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
Recommendations through the network of FATF Style Regional Bodies (FRSB's) and 
FATF membership.35  Underpinning these structures was a range of bilateral trans-
governmental networks and political coalitions that complemented this regime. Indeed, 
beyond the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global architecture and 
ensuing practices deployed to counter the financing of terror, has been a “central and highly 
touted indicator of progress in the war on terrorism.”36 Yet in spite of these developments, 
key questions have emerged regarding the impact of this global finance apparatus and the 
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'value added' as a result of these programmes. For Heng and McDonagh, (2008)37 the “war 
on terrorist finances” languished as a sideshow in the shadows of the parallel military 
campaigns and they contend that the real outcome was a softening in the US policy stance 
which now advocates international cooperation in foreign policy to counter the traditional 
criticisms of US unilateralism.  
 
Key criticisms of these measures have increasingly focused on the limitations of state 
capacity, member state fatigue, institutional lethargy, the abuse of due process and the 
impact of such measures on the formal financial sector.38 As indicated in Chapter One of 
this thesis, concerns emerged regarding the impact of CTF measures generally given the 
AML heritage of these programmes.  However from a Western perspective, CTF was a 
clarion call for robust counter action; a catalyst for wider international cooperation and 
consensus. Infrastructure enhancements were often required to strengthen coercive 
capacity, and to increase law enforcement capability and judicial cooperation. Moreover, on 
a policy level, these financial controls had a particular appeal as an exemplar of cross sector 
multi agency working.  
 
As a consequence of greater multilateral cooperation around CTF, the US recognised the 
need for greater international regulation and intelligence sharing to counterbalance the 
previous over reliance on a state centric paradigm that promoted individual state 
responsibility to combat terrorist financing.39 The emphasis accorded to the FATF in this 
new global consensus was perhaps the most obvious manifestation of harnessing and 
utilising existing international criminal finance platforms and enhancing multilateral 
cooperation in combating terrorist financing. As a product of the 1989 G7 summit, both the 
organisational and knowledge infrastructure was already in place, thus FATF was given a 
key role in progressing the development of standards central to the global CTF programme.  
Due to the complexity of the matter at hand and the requirement for uniformity of practice 
across a range of jurisdictions, FATF enhanced its mandate in October 2001 to include 
terrorist finance recommendations to complement the forty core recommendations 
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developed to target money laundering. 40 
 
There is little doubt that Inter-Governmental Organisations such as FATF, the European 
Union and the United Nations have all played a significant role in harnessing international 
acceptance of the AML/CTF regime and played a key role in fostering greater cooperation 
across a range of sectors. 41 As a result, FATF's influence and membership has grown in 
recent years. The growth of FSRB's to disseminate terrorist finance standards and provide 
guidance in respect of their implementation through self-evaluations and peer reviews and 
their advocacy of a risk-based approach has been significant.42 The application of a risk-
based approach to terrorist financing borrows heavily from FATF’s approach to AML. 
However, notably, the characteristics of terrorist financing mean that the risks are often 
more difficult to assess and implementation strategies more challenging, due to the 
relatively low value of transactions involved in terrorist financing or the fact that funds 
often originate from legitimate sources. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that without the 
necessary guidance on terrorist finance typologies or in the absence of specific intelligence, 
the ability of financial institutions to identify terrorist financing is significantly more 
challenging than is the case for money laundering or other forms of suspicious activity.43 
 
Using a broader theoretical international relations perspective however, Heng and 
McDonagh (2008) 44examine these interwoven, overlapping regional, national and global 
regulatory structures and the implications for notions of government, regulation, 
compliance and indeed sovereignty. They conclude that the “war on terrorist finance” 
floundered and lacked a common approach and the appropriate regulatory tools.45 
Moreover, they note the absence in much of the existing literature of what they describe as 
“second order analysis” to draw out some of the key theoretical implications of what 
appears to be a quite radical restructuring of international financial regulations at multiple 
levels. As such, they see FATF as an entity that is more concerned with grading 
performance rather than delivering impact, with CTF dominated by questionable metrics 
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and the routine activities of global governmentality and increasingly preoccupied with 
constructing benchmarks and disseminating best practice, rather than more tangible 
evidence of clear operational outcomes.46  
 
However one considers its contribution, FATF as part of a wider coalition of actors, 
contributes to global CTF architecture by targeting standards and procedures for 
international finance.47  It is clear that the similarities between money laundering and 
terrorist financing particularly around risk and compliance protocols justify a common 
institutional response.  In order to be effective, it is suggested that this requires a degree of 
flexibility to facilitate the implementation of national regulation and attain its universal 
application.48 Although exhibiting significant distinctions, money laundering and terrorist 
financing share common operational similarities that encourage a common response by 
national authorities.  As such, national regulators and officials are now increasingly 
working with their foreign counterparts to build collaborative responses to shared problems. 
It is in this context, that the role of FATF is best understood and its performance best 
assessed.  Whilst disagreements prevail on the utility of FATF's stewardship of the global 
CTF programme, it is difficult to discount its contribution in the dissemination of 
knowledge based technologies, benchmarking and best practice.49 Whilst acknowledging 
that these measures may lack the necessary ‘operational bite’, FATF's development, 
management and implementation of the ‘mutual evaluation process’ and the emphasis 
given to the significance of financial data and particularly the sharing of financial 
intelligence through the Egmont structures is further evidence of its contribution.50 
Ironically, whilst some commentators question whether an AML template can be applied to 
CTF51 the real impact from institutions such as FATF and Egmont may emerge in due 
course, as the constraints imposed via the formal financial sector enhance group 
vulnerability and increasingly encourage terror cells to focus on alternative methods to 
generate funds. 
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A further tier of activity on the part of relevant international organisations, most notably the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, illustrates global cooperation on CTF 
with the FATF recommendations on terrorist financing receiving formal endorsement. This 
has been supplemented with discretionary compliance by regulators in the banking, 
insurance and securities sector. The net assessment from these developments is that the 
rudimentary architecture established under the FATF regime has been expanded 
considerably to address the challenges posed by 'new terrorism'.  Thus, whilst existing 
AML structures and provisions provided a ready made platform to assess and respond to 
financial crime generally, there was nonetheless an increasing recognition, that such 
measures alone would be ineffectual in curbing terrorist financing. The emphasis on 'macro' 
interventions such as asset freezing designations and sanctions lists emerged as the key 
assets in the assault on terrorist finance. The evolving regime of global financial 
governance, bolstered by the politics of pre-emption, duly criminalised the financing of 
terror and provided a legal basis to freeze funds in the majority of UN Member states, 
without recourse to ponderous judicial proceedings. 
 
Whilst all policy initiatives inevitably plateau or suffer from inertia over time, several 
constraints have emerged in recent years to challenge the enduring impact of the various 
multilateral global projects and programmes developed to combat terrorist financing.  
Biersteker52 highlights several key challenges to continued multilateral CTF cooperation, 
most notably the on-going limitations regarding individual state capacity to upgrade 
national counter terrorism infrastructure, not least the implementation of those CTF 
standards advocated by FATF and the UN. These are often compounded by a lack of 
political will to drive forward these initiatives. Furthermore, tensions exist between the 
need from a European perspective, to reconcile due process values within wider counter 
terrorism public policy, particularly where the emphasis on crime control values tends to 
predominate. Thus the challenges posed by human rights violations around early 
designations for action on sanctions etc., have been particularly problematic. It is assessed 
that this has the potential to undermine state-to-state cooperation on intelligence sharing 
and other counter terrorist matters.53 
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One of the most significant aspects of seeking to develop a regime of financial governance 
has been the emphasis placed on the private financial sector to contribute to this vision. The 
enduring reliance on these institutions to play a full and active role in the implementation of 
global CTF standards will continue to challenge multilateral and multi-agency efforts in the 
years ahead. Indeed acute variations remain, both regionally and structurally regarding the 
capacity of the formal financial sector to implement agreed minimum standards around 
suspicious activity reporting and general CTF compliance. The pressures on financial 
institutions to service the increasing volume of requests from law enforcement and 
intelligence services remains a contentious issue, particularly so in light of the recent global 
economic downturn and the resourcing thresholds experienced by private institutions to 
maintain their risk and compliance mandates. Further changes in the economy of terror in 
recent years and the manner in which the current generation of jihadists secure 
finance,54will inevitably require new discourses on the value proposition of maintaining 
such complex bureaucratic AML and CTF architecture.  
 
International Frameworks and their Contribution to UK CTF 
 
Any understanding of the UK approach to counter terrorist financing thus requires an 
appreciation of the extent to which this emerged from wider diplomatic developments. 
Whilst several trans-governmental networks and institutions have been crucial to managing 
the process of enhanced multilateral engagement, most notably the UN and the G-855, it is 
arguably the relationship between the US and the European Union that has most influenced 
the current UK stance in addressing the terrorist threat. Whereas NATO provided the 
foundations for multilateral cooperation on matters of international security, its impact in 
combating  'new terrorism' has yet to be fully established. That said, NATO remains 
committed to discharging a counter terrorism role. 56 The use of UN structures was not 
initially favoured by the US as the Bush Administration preferred instead to concentrate on 
the muscularity of its military for global influence and leverage.  This initial rejection of 
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multilateralism was consolidated further with a new emphasis on the doctrine of 'pre-
emption'.57  It is clear that terrorist financing was widely inscribed with a precautionary 
function and that CTF best illustrated the politics of precaution.  
 
Whilst some commentators58 are critical of the use of pre Cold War security apparatus to 
address the threat from 'new terrorism', this ignores the extent to which these challenges 
remain linked to the military security agenda.  Though a relatively recent addition, the G-8 
has emerged from these arrangements as one of the most successful forums for 
international cooperation. Aside from seeking to disseminate specialist advice on CT 
matters generally, the G-8 has been particularly active in addressing terrorist financing and 
the vulnerabilities of the global banking system.  On a broader level, the G-8 has sought to 
proselytise on the merits of embracing a Western banking regulatory template and 
advocated universal compliance, again using FATF as the mechanism through which this 
goal should be achieved. Moreover, the widespread establishment of national Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIU's) coordinated through the Egmont structures59, provides testament 
to this cooperation and the value now attributed to financial data as a key source of 
intelligence generally.  
 
Thus the security regime that has evolved since the Cold War provided the building blocks 
for the transatlantic allies to refine and develop these structures to mitigate the emerging 
threat from 'new’ cell based and increasingly autonomous manifestations of terrorism. It is 
now commonly acknowledged that this threat was best addressed through global 
collaborative frameworks rather than narrow Western structures. Indeed, the Western 
policy template for counter terrorism might be viewed as a somewhat prescriptive, non-
negotiable framework that urges strict compliance and minimal deviation. This often leads 
to problems at the implementation phase given the plural nature of these partnerships and 
the significant regional diversities. As such, programme commitment and application may 
evaporate where there has been minimal consultation and input at the formulation stage. 
There remains of course, a fundamental irony in the initial scepticism that greeted these 
international frameworks and their perceived value in advancing the “war on terror”. 
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Implicit within this rejection was a vote of no confidence in the concept of global 
governance, yet for many commentators, the CTF campaign represents the most successful 
and coordinated area in the US government’s prosecution of the “war on terror”.  
 
European attitudes to the UN as a vital legitimising agent undoubtedly influenced the US in 
its quest for greater international cooperation in counter terrorism.60 The events of 9/11 
energised the organisation and addressed an arguably hitherto perceived ambivalence 
towards counter terrorism generally. UNSCR 1373 which focused on criminalising the 
financing of terrorism and required signatories to implement national terrorist finance 
legislation, was a major step in bolstering a common approach to CTF and the globalisation 
of policy on counter terrorism generally. Arguably then, the key relationship in the 
development of multilateral cooperation in counter terrorism was not the “special 
relationship” between the US and the UK, but rather cooperation between the US and the 
European Union. This would shape much of UK public policy on counter terrorism.  
Notwithstanding the fact that there were and remain acute philosophical and ideological 
differences in their respective positions, the lead provided by these two actors was crucial 
in enlisting support for the panoply of measures hallmarked as norms for counter terrorism 
practice. These included seeking to influence policy on those provisions at the heart of the 
US Patriot Act 2001 and on such matters as enhanced border security, judicial cooperation, 
passenger profiling and financial intelligence.   Despite an emerging consensus across a 
range of policy areas, transatlantic tensions were most apparent in respect of Iraq, with 
many European states failing to endorse the view that targeting Saddam was an essential 
aspect of the “war on terror”. Europe has instead placed greater significance on 
understanding the root causes which give rise to terrorism, rather than regime change, 
recognising that security interventions have their limitations.61  
 
Whilst this 'softer' more liberal European approach to counter terrorism has led to tension 
with the US, for the most part, this relationship has been mutually beneficial, given the 
empirical experience of many European countries in combating terrorism 62 Indeed, the 
TREVI structures 63 subsequently morphed into the Third pillar of the EU, which in turn 
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led to the establishment of Europol 64 which now plays a key role in the formal exchange of 
information to the US on counter terrorism matters.65 In response to the emerging threats 
from jihadist groups, the EU revised its CT infrastructure and streamlined cooperation with 
the US, dividing its programme into five thematic areas: (1) Police and Judicial 
Cooperation, (2) Bilateral relations with third countries, (3) Air Transport Security, (4) 
Economic and Financial Measures, and (5) Emergency Preparedness.66 The transnational 
nature of the terrorist threat ensured that success hinged on a similarly configured enduring 
transnational response. The alliance between the US and Europe was therefore essential in 
developing a common counter terrorism framework. 
 
Given the existence of endogenous Muslim populations throughout the EU, the US has 
benefited from unique perspectives on the wider consequences of its public policy. Issues 
around the sanctity of European jurisprudence now resonate with the US to a greater extent 
than was previously the case. The internationalisation of the US law enforcement posture 
and its practise of 'extraordinary renditions’ involving the extra-judicial transfer of detained 
subjects, have placed considerable strain on this relationship. From a European perspective, 
these highlight the US emphasis on short-term intelligence dividends at the expense of a 
more ethical security paradigm and underscored the ideological distance in their respective 
positions.  In spite of these differences, a singular vision around the need for multilateral 
cooperation to counter terrorism nonetheless prevailed.  
 
The most obvious dividends from this relationship included the streamlining of 
bureaucratic procedures by EU member states around EU Justice and Home Affairs 
cooperation, agreement on a European Arrest Warrant, a common definition of terrorism 
including a common list of terror groups and individuals and finally the upgrading of 
Europol and greater bilateral cooperation generally, closer cooperation has resulted in 
enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing67 and as a result, by September 2004, 208 
countries and jurisdictions had expressed their support for the financial “war on terror” 
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whilst 167 had issued orders freezing terrorist assets.  Furthermore over 90 nations had 
been cooperating in law enforcement and intelligence sharing and domestic reforms have 
been introduced in most states to combat the threat from international terrorism.68  
 
Despite the importance of the relationship between the US and Europe, concerns still 
remain regarding the lack of cohesion and inherent variability in multilateral programmes 
and the wider concerns around threats to national sovereignty. Considerable success 
however, had been achieved through a series of bilateral exchanges, not least between the 
US and the UK which has remained resilient despite these additional US efforts to forge 
closer European cooperation. Indeed for some, these bilateral exchanges often added more 
value than multilateral initiatives and the major European powers increasingly seem more 
interested in bilateral action than in common EU positions. As a result of several domestic 
terror plots in Britain in recent years, the security of the UK has been the focus of 
considerable interest to the US and these have intensified bilateral cooperation on ‘Threat 
Finance’ initiatives in particular.69 These threats are central to the Research Question and 
this chapter has sought to examine the extent to which international architecture and 
multilateral engagement has enhanced the capacity of CTF interventions to impact the 
threat from increasingly autonomous and financially discreet attack cells. Whereas alliance 
relationships initially constrained US freedom of action and were prone to lowest common 
denominator outcomes70 the ensuing system of financial governance provided the 
architecture for this CTF programmes to flourish. 
 
Whilst the threat from jihadist terrorism further galvanised and refocused government 
bureaucracies, any assessment of the value of the CTF framework in terms of its 
implementation and impact is largely dependent on whether CTF is seen as a central issue 
when states' define their respective national interests. Indeed, Clunan71 suggests that from a 
theoretical perspective, counter terrorist financing is “a classic collective action problem,” 
given that the dividends from curbing the ability of non state terrorist groups to fund violent 
challenges to state authority is seen as mutually beneficial. Indeed, on an individual level, it 
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is vital that such challenges do not undermine domestic economies or disrupt the 
international financial system. Yet difficulties arise when individual states address the costs 
of upholding and implementing these arrangements. Moreover, domestically, many states 
lack the institutional capacity to implement those norms that lie at the heart of the CTF 
framework. These norms include well functioning, transparent and non-corrupt economies 
with appropriate AML legal frameworks, regulating both the formal and informal financial 
and trade services.72 This template requires a champion to define the mandates for such a 
regime. Clunan argues however, that the US has been unwilling to underwrite such a 
regime. Furthermore she suggests that the international effort on counter terrorist financing 
has been largely superficial with states displaying greater efforts around adoption and 
ratification of UN conventions, rather than tangible enforcement and outcomes from these 
measures.73  As a result, the US policy stance has tended to favour bilateral and regional 
organisations to monitor compliance, rather than develop a global multilateral regime. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of securing widespread global compliance, there is little 
doubt that UK public policy on CTF has been shaped to a significant extent by these 
international frameworks. This is reflected in the desire for a common universal approach, 
particularly around the centrality of the risked based approach to financial crime generally, 
the emphasis on greater regulation of the financial sector and the utility of financial data 
and the sharing of financial intelligence to further inform wider counter terrorism efforts. 
 
The US stance in prosecuting the “war on terror” when allied with its military campaign in 
Iraq, alienated many nations from embracing a US vision to curb terrorist financing 
globally. What has emerged however is a consensus on the need to ensure that the global 
financial system is less vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist and criminal organisations. 
Indeed, in contrast to the US blue-print, the European approach to CTF is less prescriptive 
and attaches less significance to government interventions in the form of designations and 
asset freezing, placing greater emphasis instead on a global multilateral approach to 
AML/CTF benchmarking, which focuses on an intelligence based template advocating 
greater European and G-8 information sharing. This 'battle of ideas' is central to 
understanding how CTF programmes might develop in the future.  Underpinning these 
differences is a wider policy debate on strategy, and whether 'macro' interventions such as 
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designation and asset freezing using legal frameworks have an operational relevance in 
combating 'new terrorism'. This emphasis on macro interventions has obvious benefits for 
government, given that quantitative data can be easily manipulated as a tangible indicator 
of operational success. Whilst the primary focus in the UK in recent years has shifted to the 
targeting of domestic attack cells and the use of microfinancing methodologies, CTF 
‘macro’ interventions nonetheless remain a core aspect of work undertaken to combat the 
international threat. HM Treasury is responsible for the implementation and administration 
of international financial sanctions in effect in the UK and for domestic designations under 
the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act 2010.74 By way of providing context on the scale of these 
interventions, HM Treasury are required to report quarterly to Parliament on the operation 
of the UK’s asset freezing regime mandated by UNSCR 1373.75 
 
In recent years however, the utility of financial data and the 'follow the money' doctrine has 
gathered momentum. Disciples of this approach advocate enhanced regulation of the formal 
and informal financial sector and greater emphasis on due diligence and 'know your 
customer' regimes. They champion data collection and data mining, financial surveillance 
and greater intelligence analysis, sharing and cooperation. Indeed, there is a growing 
realisation that financial data and third party information can be covertly exploited by both 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies to assist wider operational objectives. Such data 
can assist in the development of financial profiles and typologies that are central to the fight 
against international terrorism. The focus on financial data has thus emerged as the 
preferred option for the intelligence agencies and the exchange of information for use as 
'intelligence only' product has obvious benefits when engaging in multilateral programmes. 
 
It should be noted however, that both macro and micro strategies are not mutually 
exclusive. CTF strategy should ideally comprise elements of both. Whilst from a global 
CTF perspective, albeit shaped by US Executive Orders 13224 and UNSCR 1373, the 
period 2001-2004 was characterised by designation and asset freezing, thereafter the 
deliberations and the recommendations of the 9/11Commission76 emphasised the value and 
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utility of financial information to investigators.  The UK government accordingly revised 
its CTF strategy to reflect these recommendations.77 As the operational significance of 
financial data has increased in recent years, the emphasis on 'macro' interventions thus 
perhaps requires re-evaluation. 
 
Whilst the US has been the principal driver in disseminating a framework of norms and 
values around counter terrorist financing, no agreed global CTF agenda has emerged. In 
spite of this however, greater international cooperation now exists in addressing the issue of 
terrorist financing. The US together with its European allies have brought an international 
dimension to the FATF structures which now provides the means to extend the CTF agenda 
globally.  Despite an almost universal acknowledgement that combating the financing of 
terrorism is a laudable ideal, whether the key aspects of western CTF practise will be 
universally embraced, depends on the centrality of the concept within a states key national 
security priorities. The appetite for any counter terrorism measures is often heightened by a 
states vulnerability and its recent exposure to terrorism. The UK has been particularly 
active on the CTF front in recent years and whilst this has its origins in decades of 
confronting Irish terrorism, it is the more recent threat from domestic home-grown terror 
cells that has consolidated this approach. It is anticipated that CTF will again feature 
prominently in Northern Ireland, should the threat from Residual Terrorists Groups 
intensify.78 Ultimately however, a states operational capacity and the emphasis it attaches to 
the utility of finance interventions, will determine whether they implement those measures 
proffered from the compendium of suggested CTF best practice. 
 
CTF and Globalisation 
 
In the past decade, key aspects of international terrorism, ranging from group composition 
and structure, to how such entities are funded, have been revised to take account of 
globalisation. Indeed, the global jihad itself reflects one of the core trends of globalisation: 
as the nation-state has yielded its centrality to supranational, global entities and concepts – 
so terrorism has morphed to embrace these changes.79 Moreover, the gradual erosion of the 
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ideological basis of the nation-state is arguably reflected in the demise of the nation specific 
terrorist organisation. Thus for many, ‘new terrorism’ is essentially borderless. As a result 
of these developments, globalisation is now central to any assessment of the efficacy of 
CTF interventions. The world has become more interconnected and integrated and 
globalisation has made it easier for terrorist organisations to communicate, plan and 
organise funding. It has enhanced the diversification of the terrorist funding portfolio and 
accelerated the volume of funds moving through the international financial system.80 In 
2000, it was estimated that foreign workers remitted some $113 billion in funds, yet by 
2006 this figure had doubled to approximately $255 billion.81 As a consequence of 
technological enhancements in global commerce generally, new methods have evolved for 
the transfer and storage of funds. Informal Value Transfer Systems in particular have 
benefited from mobile communications. The use of digital currencies such as e-gold, and 
Liberty Reserve have obvious benefits for terrorist and criminal organisations given the 
absence of robust “know your customer” (KYC) and “due diligence” (DD) requirements.82 
Furthermore, globalisation intrinsically undermines attempts to impose robust regimes to 
govern the auditing and control of funds, as these processes and systems are typical of 
heavily centralised organisations.  
 
To understand the UK government’s response to the challenges and threats from 
globalisation and 'new terrorism', it is necessary to examine the wider policy discourse from 
which it emerged. Bulley83 considers the doctrine of international community embraced by 
Blair in 1999, with its emphasis on states having both rights and responsibilities, to explain 
in part the UK's approach to combating ‘new terrorism’. From this we can assess the UK's 
commitment to the concept of international community and its ensuing contribution to 
global financial governance and effective CTF. This doctrine poses a challenge to the 
traditional philosophy of interstate relations that has prevailed since the treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. Indeed, what happens internally within other states is now of 
significant interest to others. In light of recent political developments, states are more likely 
to embrace notions of globalisation and collective governance. Brassett84 develops this 
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further by providing a critical analysis of the relationship between cosmopolitanism and 
terrorism. The concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’,85 with its emphasis on defending 
international laws and constructing international institutions, provides a framework to 
consider the emerging global architecture that has evolved to counter the financing of 
terror.  Political cosmopolitanism is after all, concerned primarily with envisaging 
institutions that might better organise world society. The development of international 
architecture to promote CTF thus acknowledges and reinforces the value of this doctrine.  
 
Alternatively, Giraldo and Trinkunas in considering more recent international 
developments, suggest that globalisation has contributed to the diversification of the 
terrorist finance portfolio by enhancing opportunities for terrorist groups to plan organise 
and communicate on a global scale.86 The trans-national nature of terrorist finance is 
examined in the context of international cooperation and support, from which they suggest 
that government CTF programmes inevitably face problems of coordination, oversight and 
information asymmetries that render them vulnerable to disruption. By contrast, 
globalisation has allowed terrorist organisations to take advantage of a highly regulated 
financial system and created greater ease of communication and mobility, these 
developments inevitably pose challenges for governments in confronting these constantly 
changing phenomena. Indeed, globalisation compounds the challenge by eroding the 
command and control structures of terrorist organisations and the relative ease of targeting 
centralised monolithic structures. The extent to which globalisation has fuelled the 
emergence of flatter, looser, diffuse terror networks is addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis 
which examines the social organisation of terrorism and its implications for CTF 
interventions. 
 
What is clear however, is that the development of unifying communications technology has 
enhanced the capability of various social groups to mobilise87 and this presumably extends 
to independent terror group networks. Cryptography and the internet provided the means 
for terrorist networks to evolve and communicate globally. Furthermore, terrorists use the 
Internet in much the same way as multi-national corporations: for marketing, research, 
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command and control, information gathering [intelligence], fundraising and other 
activities.88 The internet thus provides universal opportunities and supports ‘new 
terrorism’89 by providing the means for ideological development and the exchange of ideas. 
Indeed, without it, it is doubtful whether Al Qaeda could exist as a global entity and 
disseminate its doctrine on the scale witnessed to date. Furthermore, unlike terrorist 
organisations of the past, Al Qaeda has in part maintained its existence as a cyber entity. 
Ironically perhaps, the initial strikes from the “war on terror” on jihadist training camps in 
Afghanistan may have encouraged the organisation to target cyberspace as the primary 
platform to spread its message. However, the extent to which the West may have 
inadvertently accelerated this process is an area for separate research. 
 
Cyberspace has become an optimal area for ‘nomadic entities’, that can exist and organise 
from any location without the need for a permanent territorial base or sophisticated 
infrastructure.90 In this context, asymmetric struggles predominated. This theme was 
developed further in Networks and Netwars 200191 and highlighted the changing nature of 
terrorism and the extent to which specific features of globalisation and terrorism are 
intertwined. Al Qaeda has largely replicated the manner in which multi national 
corporations have adapted to take account of emerging economic, social and technological 
developments. The increasing emphasis on corporate notions of decentralisation has 
encouraged greater autonomy amongst attack cells and this has proven to be particularly 
problematic for CTF practitioners as microfinancing methodologies and operational 
autonomy increasingly predominate. In essence, globalisation is value neutral; the same 
technologies social processes and institutions that support the spread of liberal democracy 
can equally be applied to grow and nourish other ideologies, including violent global jihad.  
 
As indicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, terrorist groups now collaborate more easily 
with criminal groups and networks. The changing nature of criminal and terrorist networks 
may in future require a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to combating terrorist 
                                                
88 Shahar, Y., ‘Al Qaida: A Reflection of Globalization?’ International Institute for Counter Terrorism, September 2008, 
http://www.ict.org.il, p2 
89 See Chapter 3 for a discussion on the characteristics of ‘new terrorism’. 
90 Schweitzer Y., & Shay, S., ‘The Globalisation of Terror: The Challenge of AQ and the Response of the International 
Community.’ Transaction Publishers, London, 2003 
91 Arguilla J., & Rondfeldt D., ‘Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy’, Santa Monica, CA, 
RAND 2001 
 37 
financing than is being pursued at present. This includes a more robust regulatory system to 
track the flow of commerce and trade based enterprises. Indeed, Farah92 underscores the 
emerging macro trends offered by globalisation by focusing on the growth of failed states 
and the corollary merging of terrorist pipelines with organised crime. Emphasising that 
policy makers often failed to disaggregate different types of failed states, he cites the 
efficiency of Charles Taylor’s Liberia and the terrorist finance activities pursued by Al 
Qaeda and Hezbollah under his imprimatur. 
 
Some commentators have questioned the enduring effectiveness of global partnerships and 
the setting of global CTF standards to combat the funding of terror by highlighting cracks 
in the international CTF apparatus.93 Others are critical of the inherent unwillingness to 
address structural problems specifically linked to off-shore banking and shell companies 
that inevitably impede all AML and CTF initiatives.94 Further recognising the challenges to 
implementing effective global CTF programmes, Matt Levitt95 advocates more 
sophisticated discourses around asset freezing specifically.  Levitt is particularly critical of 
traditional approaches to CTF which tend to focus on fundraising alone rather than other 
nodes of activity such as accessing, transferring and laundering funds. Significantly, he 
likewise endorses the value of financial data, arguably the most obvious CTF dividend 
bestowed through globalisation, as a key intelligence asset and questions whether there is 
sufficient global consensus around financial data as an effective pre-emptive tool per se.  
 
De Goede96 develops this theme further and examines the role of pre-emption in the “war 
on terror” and suggests that Europe has effectively legitimised asset freezing as a 
precautionary security practice and transposed the language of precaution into European 
jurisprudence. The war on terrorist finance is thus “widely inscribed with a precautionary 
function and measures including financial data mining and asset freezing are [now] seen 
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as cutting edge ways of tracing and disabling terrorist organisations and networks at an 
early stage.”97 O’Harrow98 gives further weight to the emphasis attributed to financial data, 
highlighting the value investigators place on financial activity to the extent that it is now 
considered “a fuel for their intelligence engine.”99 Zarate underscores this further by 
asserting that “money trails don’t lie” and champions the capacity of financial data to reveal 
“blue prints to the architecture of terrorist organisations.”100 As such, precautionary logic 
has developed as part of the mainstream security apparatus and migrated into public policy. 
Consequently, financial intelligence and financial surveillance, the most obvious fruits of 
globalisation from a CTF perspective have emerged as mainstream components of 
contemporary security practice. Not surprisingly, a separate debate is emerging on whether 
the focus on pre-emption, with its emphasis on asset freezing, extra legal interventions and 
financial data mining and data retention should be considered as an erosion of liberty and 
due process. In response to these developments and as a result of matters highlighted in the 
empirical research undertaken to support this thesis, the challenge of reconciling liberty and 
security in the context of CTF interventions will be addressed specifically in Chapter Five. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main blocks of the UK’s national security are enduring. The UK benefits hugely from a 
tried and successful approach to collective security using a wide set of alliances and 
partnerships, principally with the US, but also as a member of the EU, NATO and the UN 
Security Council.101 For the United Kingdom, the 'special relationship' has been crucial in 
defining the shape and direction of counter terrorism policy generally. Although questioned 
on occasions, the concept of the US-UK ‘special relationship’ does have substance, 
particularly in terms of defence and intelligence cooperation. However, as noted in a 2005 
Congressional Research Report,102 the UK’s foreign policy influences are deemed closer to 
those of its EU partners than to the US and this has arguably migrated to include how the 
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UK executes its approach to CTF.  Whilst the outcome of the current counter terrorism 
policy stance adopted by the Obama Presidency requires further research, the tone set 
latterly by the previous administration was arguably more calibrated and nuanced than 
some of the literature suggests.103 Though ideologically predisposed to a more unilateralist 
stance, the ensuing US policy choices have been guided largely by perceptions on the 
nature of the threat and the range of policy options available. What has emerged is ‘tough-
love multilateralism’104, driven by sober rationality and political pragmatism rather than 
political preference. It is precisely multilateral cooperation with the UK and its transatlantic 
partners on the CTF agenda that is cited as the most obvious example of collaborative 
success in the “war on terror”. 
 
Whilst multilateralism is often problematic given the difficulties in aligning legal and 
jurisdictional systems and procedures, in the case of the US and the UK, transatlantic 
security cooperation in the form of bilateral and operational cooperation with the European 
Union, illustrates pragmatic internationalism at work. This achievement is all the more 
surprising given that Europe is a complex multi-level actor.105 The notion of a robust and 
enduring regime of global financial governance around CTF must therefore be seen within 
the context of the transatlantic relationship and the ensuing complexities and tensions 
which often arise. Whilst the future for CTF as a universal doctrine of shared goals and 
objectives will doubtless be determined by the wider US global relationship, Kolodziej and 
Kanet suggest that the US is no longer able to influence international politics as it had done 
previously. As a result, they argue for the emergence of a multipolar world in which the US 
at best occupies a position of primus inter pares and advocate a policy stance that 
acknowledges the limits imposed by domestic weakness and international constraints, a 
recognition of diminishing superpower status and a shift in emphasis away from force, pre-
emption and unilateralism, towards sustained multilateral cooperation.106  Whilst the US 
had sought to promote a programme of financial governance in typical unilateral fashion, it 
quickly acknowledged that success required unprecedented multilateral cooperation and 
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engagement.  Although the Obama administration has not endorsed the “war on terror” as 
the organising principle of US foreign policy, it has approached counter terrorism and CTF 
in much the same way as its predecessor.  As such, the policies of the new administration 
are characterised more by continuity rather than change107 and as a result, CTF as a doctrine 
has reflected this course. 
 
Current global CTF efforts have undoubtedly been successful at targeting both the costs 
and risks of terrorist group engagement in developing funding platforms. Such measures 
are essential in undermining and degrading a groups' ability to develop and execute 
operations. However, the game of operational chess that has emerged between the security 
community and the terrorist groups, will evolve and mutate again as each side seeks 
competitive advantage.  The regulatory response must be cognisant of these developments. 
Indeed since 2004, the nature of terrorist financing has shifted with increasingly less 
reliance on the transnational movement of funds.108 The most recent attacks in the UK 
addressed specifically in Chapter Five of this thesis, attest to this development. As such 
questions arise regarding the metrics for success in CTF terms.  Whilst symmetry exists in 
large part between the UK and US in broad CTF policy terms, individual state solutions 
often predominate within the EU despite the transnational nature of the problem.109 Indeed, 
Al Qaeda was quick to exploit the opportunities afforded by globalisation and took 
advantage of the jurisdictional and procedural constraints often encountered by law 
enforcement as a result. 
 
Ultimately, any assessment of the impact of global measures to counter terrorist financing 
is defined by several factors, not least the nature and scale of the threat, both domestic and 
international and whether the policy choices outweigh the costs. There is little doubt that 
the measures introduced to enhance regulation in the formal banking sector have been 
successful and prompted terrorist groups to review their funding practices accordingly. Yet 
there is also recognition that financial controls alone are insufficient to thwart the financing 
of terror. Again increasing emphasis is now placed on the multilateral coordination of 
intelligence and enhanced global cooperation to counter criminal activities. Perhaps the key 
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operational dividend has been a widespread recognition of the utility of financial data. 
Indeed there is now a greater focus on financial intelligence gathering and analysis and its 
application in confronting both counter terrorism and organised crime. Financial 
intelligence adds value in several areas. It provides corroboration material for more 
sensitive forms of intelligence and is a minimally intrusive form of investigation. The data 
is relatively unambiguous and thus easily understood and processed. Its key strength 
however, is in exposing target vulnerability. “Joining the dots” has become accepted 
parlance amongst those financial investigators charged with analysing the data and 
developing profiles to support intelligence collection and disruption operations. 
Understanding and interpreting financial data and its intelligence value has contributed to 
understanding the structure of organisations, the patterns of life adopted by operatives and 
the tradecraft and modus operandi duly employed. 
 
Financial intelligence has thus emerged as one of key assets in the global CTF campaign.  
Intelligence cooperation generally has strengthened with more products now being 
exchanged both bilaterally and multilaterally than in previous years.110 Aldrich111 suggests 
that such cooperation should be seen in the context of a rather specialist form of “low 
politics” which is driven by pragmatism – a “fissiparous activity” that can add value 
despite strong ideological and strategy differences. Whilst intelligence channels between 
the UK and the US have long existed and proven mutually beneficial and reinforcing, this 
has not always been so in the US/EU relationship. However, in purely pragmatic terms, 
Europe and the US now acknowledge the value of bilateral cooperation in dealing with 
transnational threats. As a result, intelligence cooperation has emerged as the first line of 
defence against a plethora of illicit actors and security challenges. Despite disagreements 
over ideological and legal issues, those proposals around terrorist financing, asset freezing 
and pre-emption are indicative of wider consensus and alignment generally in US and 
European policy. These developments have in turn shaped the UK CTF policy response. 
 
Intra-state intelligence exchange between partner agencies is a key feature of UK/US 
security cooperation and many countries have embraced this model and established Fusion 
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Centres that seek to enhance intelligence prioritisation across their various security and 
intelligence agencies. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)112 was established in the 
UK around this principle and is now mirrored within other European jurisdictions. What is 
notable is that CTF is now a priority area for these Centres which typically comprise 
private industry partners from the financial and telecommunications sector. These 
partnerships have in turn enhanced information and data sharing and have been strongly 
welcomed within the security community.113 Naylor 114 however is critical of this 
development and suggests that the banking sector now constitutes part of the “global 
espionage apparatus”. This reflects growing concerns that some private corporations and 
financial institutions have de facto, assumed “proxy sovereign status” on behalf of the 
state.115  
 
Thus whilst “new terrorism” has gained momentum from globalisation, similarly 
globalisation has further enhanced cooperation and intelligence sharing. Yet in spite of this, 
inter-state relationships are often far from harmonious and consensual. Tensions were 
evident recently as a result of the emphasis placed by the US on targeting Osama bin Laden 
and degrading the leadership structure of Al Qaeda when set against the damage inflicted 
on long term intelligence gathering and the wider “hearts and minds” battle around 
Islam.116 Despite this friction, the consensus is that CTF programmes have impacted on the 
ability of terrorist organisations to operate unmolested.  The extent to which the 
transformation and degradation of Al Qaeda in recent years is largely a response to wider 
diplomatic and military efforts or is instead partly attributable to global CTF cooperation, 
architecture and tactical interventions is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, the fact 
remains, that since 2006, Al Qaeda has encountered significant difficulties in raising funds 
and sustaining itself.117  
 
Whilst further anecdotal reporting indicated that core Al Qaeda was in rude health during 
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the period spanning the most recent high profile UK attacks, 118 the organisation 
nonetheless experienced difficulties in funding its affiliates overseas. This may account in 
part for the shift in recent years towards greater financial independence and autonomy by 
affiliated cells. There is little doubt however that the persistent targeting of couriers, 
facilitators and fundraisers has indeed degraded those methodologies favoured to generate 
and move funds. Yet despite these interventions, Al Qaeda and its affiliates remain the most 
potent threat to the UK. It is anticipated that these attacks will continue through groups who 
are inspired but not trained or directed by Al Qaeda and by those who have travelled 
overseas for training or insurgency and home-grown individuals who have been inspired to 
commit attacks without formal indoctrination.119 Indeed, the UK National Security Strategy 
2010 highlights the danger specifically from “lone terrorists” and anticipates further attacks 
by disaffected Muslims.  120 
 
Despite the reframing of international architecture to address the threat from ‘new 
terrorism’, the main issue emerging from a financial analysis of the most recent terror plots 
in the UK, is that the scale of funding required for these attacks was nominal, with an 
average expend of approx. £6,000. 121 Furthermore in each of these incidents, finance was 
secured either privately or derived from personal debt defaulting rather than centrally 
remitted from the organisation or derived from the proceeds of crime.122 This change in the 
economy of terror effectively limits the use of those ‘macro’ interventions initiated through 
multilateral cooperation and the global CTF apparatus which evolved from these inter-state 
relationships. As such, the existing UK CTF policy template requires to be reviewed in 
light of the changing nature of the threat and the new methodologies emerging for the 
funding of terror.   
 
                                                
118 This refers to the period 2005-2009 
119 ‘UK National Security Strategy’ Op. Cit. p13,  
120  Ibid, para 3.23 
121 Internal Metropolitan Police Service publication, 28 October 2009. 
122 Ibid. 
 44 
 
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
Financial Responses to Terrorism 
 
Current responses to terrorist financing have their origins in the chaos which ensued in the 
days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks. The acknowledged absence of clarity or lucidity 
on terrorist financing generally during this period raises obvious questions regarding the 
subsequent global framework which would shape UK public policy on CTF in the years 
ahead. Indeed, insofar as terrorist financing was concerned, a “parallel universe” emerged 
built around dubious axioms, assumptions and founding myths. 123 These assumptions 
largely focused on addressing terrorism in the context of crime, and thus criminalising the 
financing of terror. The same template which had been applied previously to combating 
organised crime and drug trafficking cartels would in effect now be used to attack the 
financial architecture and funding processes of terrorist organisations. CTF thus evolved as 
an adjunct to AML and would be shaped by the general investigative principles used to 
address financial crime generally. This harmonisation of CTF with AML is currently the 
cornerstone of the UK's response to terrorist financing in both policy and operational terms. 
Therefore any assessment of the value of counter terrorist finance programmes to inhibit 
the challenge of 'new terrorism’, demands an evaluation of the principles on which it is 
based. This chapter therefore considers the extent to which AML architecture can be 
applied to CTF and whether this consolidated and synthesised approach is appropriate to 
impact the funding methodologies employed by recent UK terror cells. 
 
Whereas reservations emerged regarding the value and likely impact of military 
interventions to combat jihadist threats in Afghanistan and Iraq, no such concerns were 
expressed regarding the use of financial counter measures. Perhaps by comparison, these 
were less contentious, arguably less understood and thus more politically palatable. Indeed, 
attacking financial networks had a certain coherent logic and limited risk factor which 
resonated with a public eager to support government action given the scale of recent terror 
attacks. The general discourse around financial interventions such as account monitoring, 
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sanctions and of asset controls seemed so complex and technocratic, that few challenged 
whether the use of financial countermeasures was both justified and appropriate to defeat 
terrorism.124 The specific targeting of terrorists finances and financial infrastructure had 
wide appeal and played to the public's sense that international finance was one great 
machine in which every moving piece could be found125 and in turn audited for use by state 
authorities in pursuit of wider public safety.  
 
With the exception of the UK and its domestic experience in confronting Irish terrorism, 
terrorist financing as an operational asset had hitherto received little consideration. 
However, the attacks on the Twin Towers suddenly elevated terrorist financing to the apex 
of financial crime. The underlying narrative in this development was the expectation of 
impact from financial measures similar to those applied in the fight against organised 
crime. During this period, however, there was a general lack of discourse around the 
universality and transferability of AML measures to combat terrorist financing. For largely 
bureaucratic and political reasons, money laundering and terrorist financing became 
interchangeable. The financial logic being, that by taking the profit out of crime, criminal 
activity would be reduced. Correspondingly, attacking the sources of terrorist financing 
using an AML template would likewise deliver the required operational impact.  
 
Ironically, many of these assumptions gathered momentum under a Bush administration, 
seemingly eager to posture and under pressure for quick political wins. Whereas previously 
the administration had a strong bias against financial controls per se, the quest for a robust 
and immediate response may have taken precedence over ideological conviction. A more 
probing interventionist dispensation thus emerged.  The US federal government sanctioned 
greater surveillance, scrutiny and regulation of the financial system, to trace, pursue and 
require greater information and disclosure. The CTF template which emerged was 
embraced wholeheartedly by a UK government keen to support its closest ally. At a 
visceral level, the links between terrorism and finance were easily articulated and 
understood. Indeed counter terrorist financing programmes was perhaps the one area in 
which there was most potential and likelihood for international cooperation and consensus. 
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In essence the US sought to establish a de facto regime of global financial governance and 
the UK government was quick to endorse this initiative, later placing CTF at the centre of 
its presidency of the European Union.126  
 
The reasons for this may well be rooted in intuition, rather than logic or any real 
understanding of the facts. Crucially the efficacy of counter terrorist financing interventions 
was already understood and acknowledged in the UK given its reliance on these 
programmes domestically in the 1980's and 1990's in addressing the threat from the 
Provisional IRA.127  Furthermore, CTF and financial rhetoric played well as assumptions 
on the common characteristics of crime and terrorism predominated. From a UK 
perspective, this was reflected in the publication of the seminal document on CTF “The 
Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism”128 which provided the most comprehensive 
UK compendium for CTF and set the strategic direction for practitioners and officials in 
combating the financing of terrorism. Thus any assessment of UK CTF interventions to 
impact and critically inhibit 'new terrorism' must begin with an understanding of the 
underlying strategy.  
 
UK CTF Strategic Framework 
 
“The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism” set the context for the Government's 
strategy for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing by describing the threat to 
UK national security from criminal organisations and terrorist networks. It further 
established the framework of anti-money laundering and counter terrorist finance measures 
and the milestones to be achieved in reducing harm from both phenomena. The document 
acknowledges changes in the criminal economy and the economy of terror and the long-
term challenges for the future. Finally, it maps out the Government's strategic priorities to 
address these challenges and the significant areas of focus for public and private 
stakeholders to maximise the impact against crime and terrorism in the years ahead. 129 
What is immediately apparent from the tenor of the document, is that following a period of 
review after the 9/11 attacks, it again sets the framework for addressing CTF and AML 
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'collectively' and reinforces the notion of a symbiosis between crime and terror, whilst 
endorsing the need for multilateral engagement to deliver operational impact. This 
framework was championed and actioned by various stakeholders and explicitly cemented 
the narrative of addressing terrorist financing through the prism of criminal finance. Whilst 
acknowledging that terrorism and organised crime are distinct phenomena with differing 
drivers, it perhaps somewhat surprisingly, advocates a coordinated response around a 
limited set of common characteristics to enable both criteria to be tackled 
simultaneously.130 As such, criminal finance and terrorist financing interventions are 
considered synonymous and interchangeable. Indeed, “The Financial Challenge to Crime 
and Terrorism” is peppered with references to the common characteristics of “financial 
crime and terrorism”.  Whilst some of these are at best loosely drawn, this Chapter reflects 
on the current literature and the key arguments for pursuing this approach and its influence 
in shaping current public policy on CTF.  In doing so, it considers the use of operational 
methodology to combat CTF through established AML procedures and interventions and 
questions whether the fusion of AML and CTF around the common utilisation and disguise 
of money flows, is sufficient to justify this approach overall. 
 
The UK Government and its international partners now routinely employ financial tools to 
target both crime and terrorism.131  Moreover, the international framework necessary to 
achieve this has likewise developed significantly in recent years. Domestically, the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) applies international standards and delivers one of the 
most powerful legal tools against money laundering of any jurisdiction. This borrows 
heavily from the financial provisions of Part III of the Terrorism Act 2000,132 thus 
establishing a common legislative approach for AML and CTF in the United Kingdom. On 
several levels, the threads of commonality can be identified and this perhaps accounts for 
the consolidated approach in setting the 3 Core Objectives for tackling AML and CTF.133 
Each of these are measured against their delivery by actions underpinned by the organising 
principles set out in the Anti Money Laundering Strategy, 2004,134 specifically around 
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effectiveness, proportionality and engagement.  It is precisely the financial measures, 
bolstered by these principles that have fostered an increasingly integrated approach to 
tackling crime and terrorism collectively.135 It is however, the disparities of sizing the 
criminal economy and the current economy of terror which are perhaps the starkest and 
caution against a fully integrated and simultaneous approach. Whilst estimates regarding 
the size of the criminal economy need to be treated cautiously, the assessed laundering of 
£Billions per annum through the regulated sector highlights the contrast.136 Recent terrorist 
financing by comparison has been characterised by greater frugality, independence, 
efficiency and most significantly in recent years by ‘non criminal’ sources of finance. It is 
precisely the use of sterile, licit sources of finance regarding the funding of recent domestic 
terrorist incidents in the UK that question the relevance and value of a consolidated 
philosophical AML/CTF approach.   
 
This approach has shaped subsequent Counter Terrorist Finance Strategy and Delivery 
Plans137 developed by the Home Office to support wider 'CONTEST'138 objectives, 
specifically with the aim of detecting, investigating and disrupting all aspects of the 
terrorism supply chain, both domestically and overseas.139 The influence of AML is evident 
throughout these Plans as is the emphasis given to maximising the use of broader criminal 
finance investigation techniques.  From a CTF perspective, there is also recognition of the 
need to address and target those vulnerabilities which have migrated from the domain of 
financial crime. These include Money Service Businesses (MSB's), cash couriers and new 
payments methods 140 and an emphasis on law enforcement and regulatory bodies to play 
key roles in disrupting terrorist financing activity in the UK and overseas, particularly were 
acquisitive crime is evident. As a result, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and 
the former Financial Services Authority (FSA) were central to CTF efforts through the 
supervision of the MSB sector under general financial crime statues such as the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007 and the Payment Services Regulations 2009. It is also 
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acknowledged that terrorists and donors in the UK tend to raise finance through those 
means with which they are most acquainted and it is with regard to criminal sources such as 
minor financial fraud and state welfare abuse that most attention is now focused. As such 
the emphasis has also shifted to include the UK's general financial regulatory systems and 
law enforcement processes to combat terrorist financing.  
 
This stance is also reflected in an internal document, the Threat Finance Toolkit141a further 
compendium published by HM Treasury in 2010 which again draws heavily on AML 
architecture to combat “Threat Finance”, an umbrella term which refers to the financial 
elements of all threats to national security including terrorist finance, proliferation finance 
and insurgency finance. The Threat Finance Toolkit documents a range of measures that 
might be used for the investigation and disruption of illicit financial activity. Again it relies 
heavily on those assets which have their origin in combating financial crime generally and 
those regulatory frameworks which underpin this approach. The basket of measures for 
countering “Threat Finance” thus reads like an AML a la carte menu with options around 
Customer Due Diligence, Suspicious Activity Report's, Customer Information and Account 
Monitoring Orders, Asset Freezing, Civil Recovery and other Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
provisions. The UK approach to CTF is thus defined heavily by its reliance on AML 
templates and regulatory frameworks. This reinforces the Government's objective to make 
financial tools a mainstream part of the UK's approach to tackling all forms of illicit 
finance.142 The increasing emphasis on exploiting financial information and disrupting 
threat finance now requires routine access to sophisticated and detailed financial data 
generated under the KYC and CDD risk and compliance protocols required by mandate 
under the AML regime.143 This further consolidates the role of AML as a progenitor of UK 
CTF strategy. 
 
AML and CTF: Financial Responses to Crime and Terror 
 
In recent years however, the reverence previously accorded to CTF has evaporated 
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somewhat, accompanied by a challenge to the orthodoxy and assumptions on which it is 
based. Warde144 is particularly critical of the use of AML apparatus to combat terrorism 
and asserts that the almost disproportionate focus on finance has concealed inadequacies of 
action elsewhere.  Indeed, the financial war on terror initiated by the Bush Administration 
was considered a sham in some quarters, motivated by greed, driven by politics, and 
manipulated by an administration eager to show results.145  Warde lists a series of dominant 
assumptions, which have shaped US public policy on CTF, and chief amongst these is the 
notion of money as the causal factor in terrorist operations. In addition, he challenges the 
view that terrorist acts are both expensive and that terrorist finances are plentiful. This 
resonates with those who advocate marked changes in thinking about the economy of terror 
in recent years.146 The key element of Warde’s counter narrative however, is that the crime 
for profit logic runs counter to the funding of politically and ideologically driven terrorism. 
Crucially he suggests that the two logics are entirely different and indeed antithetical and 
that the use of a money laundering template to counter terrorist financing is at the origin of 
many dysfunctions of the financial war.147 From this perspective, recourse to an AML 
blueprint makes sense only where the intention is to conceal the origin of the funds.  
 
Implicit within his observations is the notion that terrorist financing is an organic 
phenomenon and thus shaped by its external environment. Recent changes in the funding 
methodologies of several UK attack cells, addressed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis, 
further question whether this ‘crime for profit’ logic is relevant in addressing the challenges 
of low cost terrorism and the use of non criminal sources of finance. It is precisely the 
manner in which terrorist groups have managed to adapt to stringent financial controls and 
look for greater economies in their funding model that adds to the dynamic of modern 
terrorism.148 For many, the empirical evidence now suggests that the post 9/11 financing 
paradigm is so fundamentally different that new counter measures are required. This issue 
lies at the heart of the Research Question in this thesis and thus seeks to contribute to the 
debate on the appropriateness or otherwise of the reflexive shoehorning of terrorist 
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financing within an AML operational toolkit. The key question flowing from this 
development therefore is the extent to which policy makers and CTF practitioners have 
responded to changes in the funding methodologies of autonomous home-grown groups in 
particular and whether the ethos of AML should continue as the dominant narrative shaping 
both public policy and operational strategy.  Whilst the application of AML apparatus is at 
the heart of current UK CTF Strategy, this approach is not without its sceptics. Ironically, 
FATF which has become a key player and architect in policing global financial structures 
had in 2001, expressed its unease in using a ‘cut and paste’ AML blue print for CTF.149 
Key questions thus emerge in response to this approach, not least, whether this 
harmonisation and interplay of language around AML and CTF is a triumph of convenience 
and bureaucratic alignment or whether this in turn has prevented a more searching and 
reasoned assessment of the key distinctions and characteristics of each.  Thus, any 
evaluation of CTF to impact 'new terrorism' should be grounded in the current discourse 
which considers changes in the economy of terror and the emergence of new funding 
models. Furthermore, any assessment of AML as a valid operational framework for CTF 
must consider whether acquisitive crime is central to contemporary terrorist financing 
methodology. As such it is necessary to explore the relationship between terrorism and 
organised crime and what we conceptually mean by terrorism itself. 
 
Organised Crime and Terrorism: Contrast or Convergence? 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, organised crime and terrorism have been considered as part 
of an emerging spectrum of non-military threats that challenge the conventional 
understanding of internal and external security paradigms. This relationship is not new 
however, as illustrated by the emergence of narco-terrorism in the 1980's in Latin America, 
where drug cartels and terrorist groups developed de facto strategic alliances.150 What is 
notable however, is the way in which government efforts to thwart these two distinct 
phenomena have become mutually reinforcing. Moreover, governments within the West 
have come to see organised crime and terrorism as justifying an inter-related series of 
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countermeasures151, which explains in part the interconnectivity of AML and CTF. This 
represents something of a paradigm shift, given that historically, the police service in the 
UK typically ‘ring-fenced’ terrorists and terrorism and addressed these threats almost 
exclusively through counter terrorism structures. The previous protocols governing the 
remit of Special Branch and the constraints on the wider dissemination of national security 
intelligence may explain in part this siloed approach. However, given that terrorists have 
long sought to engage in various types of criminality to further their objectives and crime is 
an enabler to capability, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in the UK is 
committed to exploiting overlaps between existing counter terrorism and organised crime 
policing efforts.152 This may be explained in part on the basis of anticipated enhanced 
intelligence collection dividends from engagement in both serious and volume crime to 
provide greater visibility on the terrorist threat at local level. Extremist ideology often 
provides justification for criminality and ‘absolves’ individuals to pursue attack planning, 
procurement or financing activity. Indeed, understanding that the denial of criminal 
opportunities for terrorists can ultimately disrupt their activities, the intelligence services 
and police increasingly recognise the value of collaborative working and the use of 
‘criminal’ (non terrorist) legislative instruments for the purposes of counter terrorism.153 
 
This alignment is the product of several factors, not least the fact that in recent years 
terrorist groups have become highly self sufficient and self financing through criminal 
activity.  The erosion of territorial borders, the spread of democratisation and access to an 
ever expanding global market and the prevailing political and economic conditions have 
collectively provided the stimulus for this relationship to develop and prosper. More 
widely, there is little doubt that the emergence of a complex, sophisticated and globalised 
black economy provides endless opportunities for terrorists to interface with organised 
crime syndicates. Several opportunities flow from the synthesis of terrorism and organised 
crime. The most obvious dividend is the fact that the proceeds of crime provide a vehicle 
for terrorists to diversify financial sources and spread the risk across multiple funding 
streams. Moreover, this illicit political economy reduces the risk of forensic scrutiny of 
their activities by law enforcement and thus stymies the likelihood of financial surveillance 
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and data retention which is now characteristic of the precautionary logic which shapes 
much of current public policy around CTF. 154  
 
The extent to which globalisation has complicated the security environment will be 
considered later in this thesis, however, there is little doubt that enhanced production 
capacity, emerging markets, technology and financial developments have provided a fertile 
seedbed for this relationship to flourish. There is little doubt, that the commercial and 
financial dividends from these developments have been exploited by organised crime.155 
Indeed, globalisation has led to the expansion of parallel economies and such conditions are 
difficult for criminal and terrorist organisations to ignore. Makarenko156 charts various 
crime-terror relationships which have developed between criminally and politically 
motivated groups and these are of considerable interest and relevance in understanding the 
contemporary financing of terrorism. Criminal and terrorist groups regularly engage in 
strategic alliances for mutual benefit, largely around knowledge sharing in respect of 
money laundering and wider operational support for the purpose of safeguarding 
infrastructure and access to transit routes etc. The convergence thesis, which envisages both 
organisations converging into a single entity whilst displaying common characteristics, is 
of particular interest to those whose focus has been on the funding methodologies 
employed by Irish terrorist groups.  The convergence thesis suggests that terrorist groups, 
who are intent on generating profit, use their terrorist identity as a justification for unrelated 
criminal activity. In Northern Ireland for example, the relationship between paramilitary 
and organised crime groups developed organically and was consolidated further as a result 
of the terrorist campaign. Whereas previously, recourse to crime was simply a pragmatic 
vehicle to secure adequate funding platforms for terrorism, those national and transnational 
networks and infrastructure, which previously facilitated organisational mandates such as 
weapons procurement and group welfare provision etc., were being used increasingly for 
private criminal ventures during the later stages of the campaign.157   
 
These developing relationships are unsurprising given their obvious similarities. Whilst 
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conceptually both have been viewed as distinct and separate entities, Sanderson suggests 
that organised crime and terrorism occupy a common environment or space outside the 
sphere of law and cites a list of common characteristics which reinforces their mutual 
interconnectivity. These include the use of extreme violence, threats of reprisals, 
kidnappings, assassinations and extortion. In addition, both phenomena operate covertly in 
defiance of the state and the rule of law, with group loyalty and allegiance the dominant 
characteristics.158 In addition, there are structural similarities that would appear to make 
collaboration advantageous for both.  Terrorism and organised crime are transnational in 
orientation and reach; both routinely exploit diaspora communities and crucially both have 
in the past relied heavily on external sources of funding. In the immediate post 9/11 
security environment it was initially difficult to map the distinctions, which characterised 
terrorism from organised crime, and this perhaps accounts for the harmonisation of CTF 
with AML. Indeed, Makarenko's 'Crime-Terror Continuum' (CTC) is cited as an illustration 
of the redundancy of the 'distinctions' argument,159 albeit acknowledging that politics and 
ideology remain important factors for terrorist groups.  
 
It would be a mistake however to conclude that the primary beneficiary from this 
relationship has been terrorist groups. Whilst the desire for finance has prompted closer 
alliances and the operational plagiarism of funding mechanisms through crime, the most 
sophisticated organised crime groups have borrowed heavily from terrorist methodology, 
employing military discipline and tradecraft to shore up their own operational practices. 
Conversely, 'new terrorism' is increasingly reliant on network and cell based structures and 
this at least acknowledges the greater security, control and operational autonomy afforded 
by the prevailing structural configurations of organised crime groups.  Central to this model 
is the notion that terrorism and organised crime exist on the same plane and as such are 
theoretically capable of converging at a central point. In their traditional guise, both 
organised crime and terrorism are situated at separate ends of the spectrum, each 
manifesting distinct positions. However, at the fulcrum of the model lies the 'convergence', 
the point at which a single organisational entity exhibits both criminal and terrorist 
characteristics.  As such, notions of security should increasingly be considered more as an 
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amalgam of emerging threats that interact with one another and at times converge. It is in 
this context specifically, that the “crime-terror continuum” exists.  
 
Whilst the model is more complex than this simple characterisation, it nonetheless provides 
sufficient justification to consider the notion of a synthesis or nexus emerging between 
organised crime and terrorism and by extension the use of a coordinated AML/CTF 
approach.  Thus, if the lines of distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups are 
becoming increasingly blurred and difficulties predominate in determining ideological from 
criminal motivations, the use of an AML template seemed wholly appropriate for 
combating terrorist financing. Crucially, the key to this approach is perhaps the centrality of 
the 'crime for profit logic' and the extent to which the sources of terrorist financing are 
derived from acquisitive crime. The emergence in recent years however of indigenous, 
home-grown and seemingly independent terror cells in the UK using 'sterile' non criminal 
funding platforms, is a significant development and lays challenge to the continued benefits 
of a shared AML/CTF approach.  
 
In spite of the obvious similarities, Williams nonetheless cautions against broad 
generalisations regarding cooperation, without first taking cognizance of those barriers and 
impediments to more effective collaboration. Indeed, he suggests that lumping together 
disparate phenomena under a simple heading such as a ‘crime-terror nexus’ is unhelpful 
conceptually and problematic for policy makers.160 He challenges the linkages between 
organised crime and terrorist groups which are considered largely circumstantial and rarely 
tested by solid empirical evidence. He further contends, that any cooperation which may 
evolve, is likely to be based on expediency and mutual convenience, with alliances rooted 
mainly in commercial considerations.161 Thus, any assessment of the growing synthesis 
developing between crime and terrorism must of necessity, understand and recognise the 
distinct characteristics of each. In essence, organised crime is best understood as an entity 
committed to profit. Terrorist organisations by contrast, are overwhelmingly committed to 
political change, effected through the use of violence. As such any engagement with 
criminality is in the main predicated on facilitating much wider political, religious or 
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ideological objectives. 
 
The growing global interconnectivity of organised crime, its ability to transmit funds, share 
information, exploit and manipulate modern technology and provide endless quantities of 
black market commodities has changed the way some terrorist groups conduct their 
business. The significant issue is the extent to which otherwise small and insignificant 
groups can join with organised crime cartels to exercise disproportionate leverage.162 The 
implication and logic flowing from this assessment is that alliances between criminal 
organisations and terrorist groups have yielded major synergies for both entities but 
particularly for the latter, given that they inhabit the same environment and possess similar 
requirements for weapons, documentation and funding etc. Nowhere, has the appropriation 
argument been more compelling, than in the case of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Whilst 
historically, PIRA has sought funding from three core platforms; political donations from 
the Irish diaspora, legitimate commercial ventures and the exploitation of various criminal 
enterprises, it was overwhelmingly the latter upon which the organisation had been most 
reliant. The involvement of Republican paramilitary groups in criminal activities for the 
purpose of generating finance is well documented.163 The sophistication of PIRA’s 
financial infrastructure highlighted the reliance on exploiting these core platforms 
supplemented further by self-financing revenue streams acquired in part from engaging in 
state welfare fraud.164  
 
Indeed crime has been the major source of funding for all paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland, and organised crime was significantly greater in scale, impact and complexity than 
it might otherwise have been, because of such groups.165 These crime groups ranged from 
close-knit structures, often based on family or ideological affiliation, to loose networks 
engaging with other criminals in pursuit of profit. In recent years, Northern Ireland has also 
emerged as an interesting case study of the political context of crime, as the transformation 
from civil conflict has been accompanied by unintended consequences. Political, policy and 
economic factors have all contributed to the changing nature of serious and organised crime 
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with several paramilitary groups, Loyalist and Republican alike, taking advantage of the 
new physical and social spaces which have emerged.166 The prevailing view in recent years 
is that there has been a shift from paramilitary terrorism to paramilitary crime.167  
 
Indeed, operational environment is assessed as a key factor in shaping terror group 
involvement in organised crime. The presence of regulators, law enforcement, allied to the 
capacity and scale of opportunities for exploitation and the potential competition from 
existing organised crime syndicates are all key factors. Thus engagement with criminality is 
not risk free. Kostakos & Kostakos168 suggest that a fragile balance between the external 
and internal criminogenic environment determines the survival and lifecycle of such 
groups. Globalisation, information communications technology, developments in finance 
and transportation are all cited as external forces which affect the criminogenic balance of 
organised crime and terrorist groups. Such technologies are being employed internally by 
terrorist and organised crime groups to achieve equilibrium with their external 
environment. Adaption to such change is vital for the continued existence of such groups. 
 
Further studies have indicated that terrorists who engage in criminal activity risk diluting 
their ideological focus.169 Furthermore, the command and control mechanisms of organised 
crime often run contrary to the ideals of terrorist groups which rely mainly on community 
and stakeholder endorsement. Thus engagement with organised crime requires careful 
consideration and management if the dividends in terms of pecuniary and logistical support 
are to outweigh the dangers. Terrorist groups often mutate into criminal enterprises, 
reflecting changes in the political landscape, where disillusionment with political progress 
often results in the triumph of profit over ideology. This was and to an extent remains the 
case in Northern Ireland, where terrorism spawned legions of volunteers who were 
routinely engaged in criminality over several decades. These individuals not surprisingly 
have acquired a skills set, based on disciplined military-style tradecraft, which is now being 
routinely exploited for personal gain – a disturbing legacy of the Irish terrorist campaign. 
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Initial assessments by the Organised Crime Task Force concluded that in excess of 70% of 
transnational organised crime groups operating in Northern Ireland evolved from the 
various paramilitary groups active during the conflict. Whilst recent assessments from the 
Independent Monitoring Commission170 have declared that PIRA as an organisational 
entity is committed to an exclusively political path, in its transformational guise, it was 
assessed as an “increasingly obvious criminal conspiracy, engaged in significant money 
raising and money laundering operations in the absence of an armed struggle.”171 Whilst 
cooperation between organised crime and terrorist groups had clearly increased, the key 
issue yet to be determined, is the extent to which the ‘appropriation’ of organised crime 
methodology is likely to continue given the shift lately towards independent terror cells and 
the use of non criminal sources of finance or low level micro financing methodologies.  
 
 A Triumph of Convenience: Can AML be applied to CTF? 
 
In addressing the Research Question, it is therefore essential to consider the financial 
responses to terrorism and the extent to which the emphasis on AML principles are 
justified. CTF as a discipline is predicated on an understanding of the methods employed 
by terrorist groups in raising, storing, moving and using funds for terrorism.  The 
relationship between organised crime and terrorism clearly provided an opportunity for 
policy makers and law enforcement to borrow heavily from the existing tool kit, given the 
assumed similarities and parallels of both phenomena. Whilst this had undoubted 
advantages where the funding platforms involved an element of financial crime, the use of 
countermeasures constructed for one domain were not guaranteed to deliver impact to 
another. To assume so, often ignores the subtleties and nuances of each. Yet there is little 
doubt that the global AML regime has had a profound impact on both legislation and 
institutions and that CTF practitioners have also benefited hugely from these developments. 
This is manifest above all by the criminalisation of money laundering activities generally, 
the emphasis accorded to the SAR’s regime, the regulation of money service businesses and 
the widespread establishment of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU's).  Crucially it is 
perhaps the alignment of core risk and compliance functions such as KYC policy and CDD 
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protocols which have provided key indicators for identifying potential terrorist financing.172  
 
However, the value added from the AML regime in ‘drying up’ terrorist financing is more 
difficult to assess. Indeed in the context of acquisitive crime alone, there is some debate on 
the efficacy of AML measures to impact the acquisition and movement of funds 
generally.173 This Chapter has therefore sought to consider the historical context in which 
the interconnectivity emerged and whether this amounts to a “triumph of convenience”, 
where the ease of applying a ready-made ‘off the shelf’ process model took precedence at a 
time of vulnerability and confusion. It has sought to provide a challenge function to the 
narrative around 'similarity' and whether this simply dominated policy discussions at the 
expense of more reasoned discourse on the apparent distinctions of each phenomena and 
the elevation of specific rather than a general suite of counter measures.     
 
Whilst it is logical that curbing terrorist financing must correspondingly restrict the scale 
and impact of terrorist action, the immediate financial requirements of recent terror cells are 
now so modest, that law enforcement may be relatively powerless to intervene. Moreover, 
regulation alone without the appropriate financial intelligence development and overt action 
around the micro-financing of terrorism is unlikely to undermine the capacity of such 
groups. The democratisation of violence, the emergence and emphasis on networks and the 
exploitation of technology, have all contributed to a reduction in the cost of financing terror 
generally. Increasingly, the volume of monies required to fund terrorist operations is 
smaller and such amounts can easily evade the formal banking system. Whereas the bulk of 
funding streams have historically been focused on maintaining organisational 
infrastructure, this has become less significant in recent years as a host of domestic attacks 
now confirm. 174    
  
It would be somewhat disingenuous however to ignore the value of AML measures to 
combat terrorist financing by focusing on the relatively small sums required to stage recent 
terrorist attacks. It is now widely accepted, that terrorists can be operational for relatively 
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modest amounts. Whilst the 9/11 hijacking is assessed to have cost in the region of 
$500,000 for travel, training and expenses175, the cost/impact ratio of the incidents in 
Madrid, London and Glasgow illustrate significant shifts in the economy of terror.  It would 
be a mistake to simply focus on the operational costs alone in constructing effective counter 
strategies to terrorist financing. The costs of financing terrorism in its widest sense range 
from maintaining organisational infrastructure, post incident forensic management, 
recruitment, training, group welfare and transportation. Thus, where funds have been 
acquired through the exploitation of various criminal enterprises, an AML template should 
deliver operational impact. That said it is extremely difficult to achieve any meaningful 
quantitative metric for AML interventions. Most notably, the measurement efforts at the 
FATF176 have not yielded anything remotely precise enough to be used with any confidence 
for evaluating control attempts. 177  The same applies to the nine Terrorist Finance 
Recommendations grafted onto the original forty core Money Laundering 
Recommendations.178  In addition, whilst the impact of the European Union Money 
Laundering Directives have yet to be fully evaluated, there appears to have been little 
progress around CTF, save for the substantial regulatory penalties levied in the UK. In 
truth, these have served as little more than symbolic displays of unacceptable practices 
although strengthened further with the threat of reputational risk for financial 
intermediaries.179 Whilst there has been more of a seamless transition in the US in 
collectively addressing the challenges posed by organised crime and terrorism, the same 
cannot be said for Europe, where security challenges have often cut across organisational 
competences.180 Such issues needless to say frustrate wider action around counter terrorist 
financing within these jurisdictions. 
 
The adoption of those prevailing money laundering principles and their application in 
combating terrorist financing will in the future doubtless require further research. Wider 
issues demand further examination, not least the extent to which AML typologies and 
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software are conducive to identifying indicators of targeting terrorist financing. Whilst it is 
perhaps easy to focus on the apparent similarities between terrorism and organised crime, 
more time should be devoted to understanding the wider ideological, structural, and cultural 
characteristics of each. The application of lessons from the control of transnational 
organised crime to the control of financing terror is a particularly difficult task, and 
compounded more given the asymmetric nature of recent threats from home-grown Islamist 
terrorism and the funding models employed.   
 
There are obvious parallels in this context flowing from the work of Sageman and his 
“leaderless jihad theory”181 Whilst conventional thinking around CTF has focused on the 
need for terrorist groups to have sufficient financial capacity to maintain and sustain 
organisational infrastructure, the emergence of flatter, ‘bottom-up’ spontaneous networks 
which are largely self funding, lays challenge to these assumptions. Social networks and 
group dynamics are central to Sageman's research and his contention that Islamist terrorism 
has been fuelled by spontaneous self-organisation of informal collections of people. 
Existing law enforcement models of organised crime which are based on discreet criminal 
groups with clearly defined hierarchical structures will require revision to take account of 
looser flexible networks and the emerging emphasis on decentralised structures. Given the 
emergence of self-sufficient networks, Al Qaeda Core no longer needs finances to maintain 
its organisational infrastructure on the scale previously required.  As such, these 
developments now demand a shift on the part of intelligence agencies and law enforcement 
to challenge those wider assumptions on the funding requirements of terrorist organisations 
generally. The focus on the social organisation of terrorism in Chapter Three of this thesis 
will further enrich our understanding of the likely funding requirements of these cells in 
future years. Law enforcement must therefore enhance its capability to respond to these 
changes and match the flexible exploitation of globalisation in particular. In response to this 
more frugal and leaner funding model, ‘crime for profit' logic, the ideological reference 
point for CTF, may gain a second wind, as the micro-financing of terrorism from volume 
crime assumes greater importance in the years ahead.  Therefore, as the focus shifts to ‘new 
terrorism’ and globalisation and the self-sufficiency status of terror group networks, the 
‘crime for profit’ ethos of AML may by default, again prove valuable in this new 
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dispensation. 
 
Yet perhaps the real value of using a money laundering template to attack terrorist 
financing has been in developing a mindset around the study and investigation of financial 
crime generally. It is the integration of financial investigation into counter terrorism 
strategy which is perhaps the real success. Historically, financial investigation was a post 
incident phenomenon; however more recently the value of financial data as an intelligence 
asset is more fully understood as highlighted by the August 2006 bombing plot in the 
UK.182 By focusing on audit controls, regulation and greater transparency and a 
commitment to develop international banking compacts and asset freezing, an unintended 
dividend has emerged. Money is now understood as a form of intelligence.183 The emphasis 
accorded to mining financial data for intelligence purposes is now central to UK counter 
terrorism strategy.184 The real question perhaps, is the extent to which success in combating 
terror is increasingly wedded to financial intelligence development rather than AML 
frameworks. The value and utility of financial data generally will be discussed further in 
Chapter Four. 
 
Therefore, any assessment of the financial responses to terrorism cannot ignore the clear 
integration of financial investigation into UK national counter terrorism strategy and the 
emphasis on financial intelligence assets which are now a central feature of counter 
terrorism interventions generally. Thus whether by accident or design,  AML architecture 
has made a significant contribution to counter terrorist financing. It is ultimately for others 
to decide the extent to which this is simply serendipitous; a triumph of convenience and 
bureaucratic alignment, rather than a carefully articulated programme of measures. In the 
final analysis, successful law enforcement interventions are defined by context. The 
harmonisation of CTF with AML made infinite sense in the aftermath of 9/11 given the 
UK's previous experience and understanding in attacking the finances of Irish terrorist 
groups. The emphasis which these groups placed on exploiting criminal commodities 
required an approach tailored overwhelmingly to combating acquisitive crime. Recent 
changes in the ‘financial organisation’ of terrorism and the changing funding models of 
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home-grown UK attack cells and their emphasis on non criminal funding streams, may 
ultimately determine whether new approaches to CTF are required in the future.  
 64 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Social Organisation of Terrorism: Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) and 'New 
Terrorism.' 
 
The challenge for those constructing counter terrorism strategies is to recognise the utility 
of terrorism as a tactic and to understand the nature of emerging security threats and 
challenges. In respect of the former, one of the most convincing arguments for terrorism as 
a means to advance ones interests is that it is less resource dependent and logistics intensive 
than conventional warfare. Crucially in the context of this thesis, terrorism has been subject 
to some financial remodelling in recent years and is now relatively inexpensive to 
resource.185  As a general rule, most terrorist organisations exploit two key asymmetries. 
Whereas counter terrorism professionals must consider and protect all areas of 
vulnerability, terror groups by contrast can limit their targeting and exploitation to a single 
area of weakness. Second and crucially in CTF terms, the costs of planning and executing a 
terrorist attack are merely a fraction of those incurred in defending these conspiracies. As a 
result, the nature of contemporary terrorism reverses the conventional military view that the 
offense should be three times that of the defence.186 Thus in the context of resourcing and 
terrorist financing, such a ratio is significant and presents considerable challenges for 
successful CTF interventions. 
 
In recent years, the academic sector has focused on the emerging threat from 'new 
terrorism’, which is routinely characterised by different motives, actors, sponsors and 
lethality than previous forms of political violence.187  Though multidimensional in nature, it 
is primarily the emergence of diffused, networked and franchised terror cells and their 
perceived use of new funding methodologies which is of most relevance to CTF 
practitioners. This Chapter will thus focus on the notion that a 'newer' and increasingly 
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autonomous form of domestic terrorism has evolved in the UK in recent years. It will also 
consider whether this has spawned changes in the economy of terror and encouraged new 
sources of finance to resource home-grown' jihadist cells.188  The notion that a 'newer' 
threat phenomenon has developed, accompanied by a paradigm shift in the resourcing of 
such entities, is clearly of major interest to those tasked with combating the financing of 
terrorism.  
 
Whilst acknowledging the wider debate on the novelty of 'new terrorism', in the context of 
this thesis, it is specifically the implications for CTF policy and the efficacy of operational 
strategy from these developments, which lie at the heart of this research. This Chapter 
frames the key issue underpinning this thesis, namely the extent to which 'new terrorism' is 
sufficiently distinctive that new approaches to counter terrorist financing are required. As 
such, it is necessary to reflect further on the concept of 'new terrorism' as this has fostered a 
paradigm shift in the way that academics, policy makers and counter terrorism 
professionals now interpret recent security threats.189 Indeed, the concept of 'new terrorism' 
captures the notion that there has been a revolutionary transformation in the nature of 
terrorism.190 At the outset, it is acknowledged that 'new terrorism' is a concept that has been 
used by many commentators yet questioned by few.191 Recent research undertaken by 
Lynch and Ryder192 examines the use of the term in a sample of terrorism literature to 
identify whether it represents a stable concept within the field of terrorism research. In 
short, they highlight its varied and inconsistent use and conclude that the notion of 'new 
terrorism' is problematic, given that it does not reflect a coherent category for analysis.193 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, organisational structure and organisational change, widely 
acknowledged, as the key characteristics of 'new terrorism' will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
As indicated previously, the organisation of ‘new terrorism’ is addressed in this chapter in 
terms of the wider political, social, economic and cultural change from which it emerged. 
Changes in communications technology and financial architecture in particular have 
                                                
188 Acharya, A., ‘Small Amounts for Big Bangs: Rethinking Responses to Low Cost Terrorism,’p286, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 12.3 2009 
189 Field, A., ‘The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?’, p195, Political Studies Review; 2009, Vol.7. 
190 Ibid 
191 Duyvesteyn, I., ‘How New Is New Terrorism?’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 27, No.5, 2004, p439 
192 Lynch, O. and Ryder, C., Op. Cit  
193 Lynch & Ryder Op. Cit p. 272 
 66 
impacted the social organisation of terrorism and undermined the dominance of hierarchies 
in favour of base level operatives who rely increasingly less on the leadership for 
operational sanction. What has emerged therefore are autonomous groups that are self-
mobilised, self-sufficient and crucially, increasingly self financing.194 This shift in 
contemporary terrorism as a response to wider changes in the global environment has 
enabled terrorist leaderships to undertake functions which differ radically from their 
predecessors. Proximity and regular engagement are no longer deemed critical. Whilst 
impacting on perceptions of community and collegiality, these developments now enable 
leaderships to devolve aspects of operational control and to focus instead on providing 
strategic guidance. Indeed, recent terror attacks in Europe and the UK has confirmed the 
propensity towards organisational autonomy and the corollary of self-sufficiency, frugality 
and legitimacy across a range of funding mechanisms. It is in this context that 'new 
terrorism' will be considered.  
 
Deja vu: How New is ‘New’? 
 
The idea that the world confronts a 'new' terrorism unlike the terrorism of the past has thus 
taken root in the minds of policy makers, journalists and academics to the extent that our 
knowledge of traditional notions of terrorism is for some now considered irrelevant, 
obsolete and anachronistic.195 At ministerial level, the UK clearly embraced the notion that 
terrorism had changed. Indeed, in October 2006, Gordon Brown as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer referred to new terrorist threats of which there was “no real precedent”.196   This 
accounts for his previous address, which more fully considered new targeted financial 
measures to impact terrorist financing.197 The UK Home Secretary in a speech to the 
Institute of Public Policy Research later echoed this in October 2008 in which she noted 
new forms of terrorism emerging with new motivations and greater complexity than 
previously encountered.198  As a result, what emerged were a dismissal of old terrorism 
paradigms and an endorsement of new studies which stressed the unprecedented 
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characteristics and nature of these new security threats. Thus for some commentators199 
significant changes have occurred in the aims, methods and structure of terrorist groups to 
support the notion of a shift from 'old' to 'new' terrorism.  
 
Whilst in academic terms the concept of 'new terrorism' predated the 9/11 attacks, it is these 
events which have accelerated its use. At the heart of the 'new terrorism' debate is the 
notion that there has been significant change in the nature of terrorism itself. Indeed it was 
suggested that those terrorist organisations that dominated the political landscape during the 
1980's and 90's had morphed into more conciliatory entities and were replaced with more 
extreme and indiscriminate forms of terrorism. Difficulties have surfaced however, in 
attempting to provide a coherent explanation for these developments. Indeed the 
transformation from 'old' to 'new' terrorism has been neither uniform nor universal.200 The 
notion that a 'new' and distinctive form of terrorism had emerged, acquired a currency and 
momentum, due in part to political factors and the requirement to both resource and 
legitimise policy preferences. Whether 'new terrorism' is as distinctive or as consistent with 
previous forms of terrorism will remain a matter of vexed debate. Its principal significance 
however, is in the ensuing policy and operational responses which follow from these 
discussions. New challenges inevitably require new solutions as policy makers and 
practitioners are encouraged to consider new systems and methods to impact these 
developments. It is precisely around determining whether these threats are sufficiently 
distinctive and of such scale and significance, that conventional [AML] responses to 
terrorist financing require redress.  
 
Various scholars in recent years have articulated a new paradigm for terrorism that includes 
different actors, motivations and outcomes from the old terrorism of the 20th century. 
Hoffman advocates a “sea-change in our thinking” to counter these developments.201 Whilst 
acknowledging elements of continuity, the proponents of 'new terrorism' see a clear shift in 
the motives, strategies, characteristics and tactics of terrorism, and see these distinctions as 
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a product of an evolving international environment.202. Indeed, Hoffman highlighted the 
emergence of new trends, tactics and potentialities as far back as 1993 and later cited new 
motivations and rationales to challenge conventional notions of terrorism and its 
overwhelmingly monolithic, hierarchical organisational form.203  Whilst early 
characterisations of 'new terrorism' emphasised networked, diffuse and amorphous 
forms,204 more recent mutations have seen an emphasis on greater structural and 
operational autonomy. Indeed, given that terrorism inevitably responds to changes in the 
external environment, it is not surprising that 'new terrorism' has seemingly shifted once 
again. Whilst the most dramatic structural reform saw a move from hierarchical national 
entities to looser affiliated global networks, these more recent manifestations based on 
greater independence, arguably lay challenge to contemporary counter terrorism responses.  
 
For Bobbit205 terrorism has morphed to embrace the opportunities flowing from the 
decentralised privatised “market state” of the 21st-century. He offers a lament on the 
decline of national sovereignty in a globalised age. His central premise is that 'new' 
terrorism resembles a distorted mirror-image of the decentralised and increasingly 
privatised post-Westphalia market-state.  He acknowledges the shift from 'old' to 'new' 
terrorism by focusing on a revised paradigm for war in the 21st Century and advocates a 
shift in our understanding of war for the years ahead. He maintains that throughout history, 
terrorist groups broadly resemble the political state they confront. He cites the United States 
as the chief architect of globally networked terrorism, a by-product of its strategic 
dominance, as 'new' terrorism has adopted many features which have evolved from wider 
economic, social and technological developments.  
 
 'New' terrorism is thus simultaneously dependant upon and hostile towards the globalised 
economy and the benefits it affords. Indeed for Ferguson206 just as the plagues of the 14th 
Century were unintended consequences of trade and urbanisation; so 'new' terrorism is a 
negative externality of our globalised world. Thus outsourcing, decentralisation, migration 
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and technology are enlisted as both distinctive characteristics and key assets in this 
campaign. For Bobbit, new measures are thus required to confront these new threats. The 
nature of war [and indeed terrorism] has changed significantly since 9/11 and as such we 
must redefine our strategic approach to war and our ability to thwart future terrorist 
atrocities.  Market-states must respond appropriately to this new configuration rather than 
fight traditional wars. As such, pre-emptive security action and jury-sanctioned coercion 
are strongly advocated.  Old foreign policy doctrines, which advocate unilateralism, 
deterrence and containment, are no longer relevant. (See Chapter Two) As such, the shift 
from 'old' to 'new' terrorism may require some revised thinking around how best to address 
the financing of terrorism in future years.   
 
Several commentators however have questioned the 'novelty' of 'new terrorism', suggesting 
that the distinctions are largely artificial and exaggerated.207 It is primarily in determining 
the efficacy of these challenges that provides the basis to consider the value of current CTF 
interventions. Duyvesteyn208 is not convinced of a shift from “old” to “new” terrorism and 
suggests that there is perhaps more continuity than change. Moreover, she attributes the 
shift in character as a product of external factors which has impacted terrorism, rather than 
any conscious desire to mutate. She cites several key continuities between old and new 
terrorism which challenge the distinction that is implied, primarily those which exist around 
territorial focus, transnational links and networked structures. Furthermore she suggests that 
political, ideological and religious themes strongly overlap which again further weakens the 
notions of transformation.  
 
Crenshaw is also critical of much of the literature on 'new terrorism' and its failure to 
clearly specify the concept and chart those key distinctions from old terrorism. Indeed, she 
suggests that contemporary terrorism shares many of the characteristics of its historical 
forebears.209 Whilst organisational structure is by far the most cited characteristic used to 
compare and contrast the two terrorism models, Crenshaw again seeks historical precedent 
and cites the 19th Century anarchists as the forerunners of today’s autonomous jihadist 
                                                
207 See Tucker 2001, Duyvesteyn 2004, in Field A., ‘The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?’, Political Studies 
Review; 2009, Vol.7, p195   
208 Duyvesteyn, I.,   ‘How New is the New Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 27, No.5, September-
October 2004, p439-454 
209 Crenshaw, M., Op. Cit.  p25 
 70 
terror cells. Whereas 'new' terrorism may have more self-generating tendencies than some 
earlier forms of terrorism, for Crenshaw it is not without direction.210  
 
Her concerns are anchored primarily in the notion that in the post 9/11 environment, policy 
makers and government officials have come to view jihadist terrorism in particular as 
radically new and distinct from its predecessors. It is suggested that these distinctions can 
be evidenced from three key characteristics; goals, methods and organisational 
composition.211 Whilst conceding that terrorism has changed, she suggests that the 
departure from the past is neither as pronounced nor qualitatively 'new', but rather grounded 
in historical context. The goals of ‘new terrorism’ are assessed as being both unlimited and 
non-negotiable, with fanaticism rather than political interest as the primary motivation. By 
contrast, the goals of 'old' terrorism are pragmatic, negotiable and limited, local rather than 
global in nature and much more specific and restrained in terms of targeting. Thus 
traditional terrorism was largely constrained by its dependence on constituencies and their 
political interests. Indeed, the quest for political legitimacy often acted as a bulwark against 
operational excess.  
 
For Crenshaw the appeal of “new terrorism” is rooted in the desire for major policy change, 
a justification perhaps, for the “global war on terror”, the pre-eminence of pre-emption and 
a variety of domestic security initiatives which by their nature inevitably restrict civil 
liberties. Thus if policy makers are increasingly reliant on a set of simple assumptions 
about terrorism, Crenshaw suggests they no longer need to worry about a contradictory or 
confusing reality.  In this context, policy is often framed on metaphors, narratives and 
analogies and a heavy reliance on prior cognitive assumptions. Crenshaw invokes previous 
studies by Rapoport212 to bolster this view and cites his analysis of the historical evolution 
of terrorism in terms of ‘waves’, a structured history of modern terror charting its evolution 
through anarchist, anti-colonial, new left and religious 'waves'. Indeed, Rapoport sees each 
'terrorism' wave ebbing as the new wave takes force and although not qualitatively different 
from the preceding waves, does suggest a natural process of evolutionary replacement.  He 
thus attributes many of the features of 'new terrorism' to the fourth wave and its emphasis 
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on religious motivation.  
 
Crenshaw likewise acknowledges differences amongst groups though attributes such 
changes largely to a changing environment, specific opportunity structures, globalisation 
and evolutionary progression. Crenshaw nonetheless voices concern against dispensing 
with our historical understanding of terrorism, as policy rooted in assumptions often has 
grave implications for the construction of effective counter strategies. Field 213 endorses 
this view and acknowledges the attractive simplicity of embracing the concept of 'new 
terrorism' but again questions whether the behaviour of terrorist groups has altered 
sufficiently to mark their current guise as significantly transformational.  
 
The new terrorism model assumes that religion is the main precipitating factor of those 
groups with millennial or apocalyptic ideologies. 'New' terrorists are assessed as having 
ambiguous goals on a systemic level and to value destruction for its own sake. By contrast, 
'old' terrorism is considered more pragmatic reasonable, comprehensible and specific. 
Crenshaw however is unconvinced of the accuracy of such categorisations. In particular she 
cites the broad transnational goals of 'old' Anarchists and more recently the German and 
Italian terrorist groups of the 1970's and 80's. Moreover, even strict jihadist groups are not 
without a clear strategy or concrete demands as the communiqué of 2005 between Zawahiri 
and Zarqawi confirms.214  
 
Zimmerman likewise advocates “a sceptical treatment of the 'new terrorism' paradigm.”215 
Whilst there has been considerable emphasis on new structural templates to support the 
notion of a 'new terrorism' by some commentators, Zimmerman suggests that terrorist 
groups in the 1970's had likewise established highly sophisticated organisational structures 
which were extremely resilient and flexible. Moreover, he suggests that the precursor to the 
current diffused templates was the operationally decentralised cell structure with its 
independent command units, predicated in large part on those operational processes typical 
of traditional hierarchical military configurations. Excluding the emotional language and 
narrative around 'new terrorism', Zimmerman likewise sees little to differentiate 
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contemporary terrorism from its predecessors. Indeed, he suggests that it is best understood 
in terms of impact, scalability and the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception and the 
potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD's). It is primarily these characteristics, 
which distinguish it from conventional terrorism. Therefore, what is perhaps most apparent, 
is that the definitional debate on the characteristics of traditional and 'new terrorism' has 
achieved consensus only insofar that there is no meaningful agreement on what exactly 
constitutes terrorism and thus by implication, ‘new terrorism’.   
 
Zimmerman further cautions against making assumptions about terrorist entities or 
“political violence movements” (a term he uses to describe the behaviours and 
characteristics of 'new terrorism') based on abstractions of terrorism, as these may 
“permeate government decision making, translate into policy directives, and result in huge 
fiscal commitments and superfluous exertions.”216 Whilst acknowledging that distinctions 
do exist between traditional and 'new terrorism', Zimmerman suggests that these are 
essentially quantitative rather than qualitative and framed around the capacity for lethality 
and impact. What therefore distinguishes these “political violence movements” from their 
predecessors is the scale of conventional and unconventional mass destruction and how this 
in turn translates into psychological leverage. It is this, and the fact that target selection is 
perhaps more ambitious, that represents the only innovative aspect of contemporary 
terrorism.  
 
This debate is further infused by Neumann217 who suggests that some observers have failed 
to understand the specific context and circumstances from which this new brand of 
terrorism has emerged and most significantly, equates the shift in contemporary terrorism 
as a response to wider changes in the global environment. For Neumann, 'new' terrorism 
cannot be understood without making sense of the dynamics that have been caused by late 
modernity and globalisation. These include changes in the structure and modus operandi of 
terrorist organisations from which new political agendas have emerged from these 
developments. Just as difficulties prevail in making distinctions and ascribing definitions of 
'old' and 'new' terrorism, the same is true in respect of achieving a consensus on what 
constitutes 'late modernity and globalisation' in this context. For Neumann, the former 
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should be considered as those social, political and economic processes which characterise 
modern society and include the growth of capitalism, representative democracy, 
urbanisation and industrialisation in its current form. As such, globalisation is seen as one 
of the defining characteristics of late modernity rather than an entity in itself. Whilst there 
are those who challenge the very notion of globalisation218   Neumann’s thesis is based on 
the proposition that globalisation exists. Held and McGrew 219proffer a matrix of processes 
which attest to the existence of globalisation which includes an increase in transnational 
flows of people, goods and services and the creation of new transcontinental networks of 
activity and interaction.  
 
Yet whilst globalisation has been touted as a panacea for many of the most vexed social and 
economic problems befalling contemporary societies, much of what globalisation has 
spawned by way of collective benefit has not surprisingly also been exploited by 
extremists. It is precisely the fruits of globalisation which generates most concern amongst 
counter terrorism practitioners and officials. Moreover, it is primarily the information 
revolution that lies at the heart of these developments. Neumann cites the enhanced ability 
to maintain, communicate and respond to global constituencies and the development of new 
mind-sets around national identity that have transcended borders and ethnicity and 
expanded transnational space.220 Communications technology and the mobility of migrant 
communities thus account for the shift in the nature of terrorism. Globalisation has 
undermined the dominance of hierarchies in favour of lower strata operatives who rely 
increasingly less on the leadership for operational sanction. As such, what have emerged 
are indeed autonomous groups, self- mobilised, self-sufficient and increasingly self-
financing.221  
 
As such the growing autonomy and independence of “new” terrorism is inextricably 
wedded to the growth and impact of the Internet. For Neumann, the Internet simultaneously 
represents and projects the sense of identity and community on which jihadist ideology 
rests. Aside from determining the media agenda and exploiting jihadist web forums, the 
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Internet has facilitated a greater element of democracy and accountability amongst 
networked groups. That said, provision currently exists to act with autonomy on target 
selection, whilst ensuring that there remains some ideological consistency.  Neumann 
cautions against the notion of fully embracing the shift towards fully independent 
autonomous cells and cites the Madrid bombings in 2004 which though originally 
indicating autonomous action, later confirmed regular engagement with Al Qaeda 
franchises in North Africa and Europe. Moreover he further cites the case of Younis Tsouli 
as a counterpoint to Sageman's notion of a 'leaderless jihad”.222 Thus rather than seeing 
“new” terrorism as an increasingly autonomous phenomenon in which foot-soldiers 
predominate, it is perhaps more the case, that conventional notions of command and control 
predicated on hierarchies no longer apply and have thus resulted in changes within all 
strata.  
 
Thus for Neumann, 'new' terrorism is primarily rooted in the evolutionary nature of 
terrorism itself rather than some unprecedented phenomena. As such, due recognition is 
given to the many continuities in terrorism, in particular, how what is 'new' is more the 
context in which terrorism has evolved and the phenomena which have influenced this 
development. As such, the consequences of 'new' terrorism are best understood, not as a 
question of “either /or, but rather in terms of degree – 'newer' versus 'older'”.223 In an effort 
to track the transformation and evolution from 'old' to 'new' terrorism, Neumann like 
Crenshaw has sought to capture the changes by considering three variables; aims, method 
and most importantly in terms of counter terrorist financing interventions, organisational 
structure.224 By considering terrorism in these terms, he suggests it is possible to chart the 
changes which have occurred over time. This chapter seeks to give context and illustrate 
how terrorist entities have mutated in recent years from hierarchical to seemingly 
autonomous entities and chart the ideological basis of their aims and goals and how their 
methods have shifted to embrace martyrdom operations and mass casualty attacks. These 
developments will be assessed further in Chapter Five through an empirical examination of 
4 recent UK terror plots.  
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For Neumann, the most significant distinctions between 'old' and 'new' terrorism can be 
identified when reviewing terrorists' aims and ideologies. The political agenda of terrorist 
groups often reflects a society's ideological status quo. As such, Marxism and nationalism, 
the predominant ideologies in earlier decades, correspondingly inspired terror groups 
during that era. The subsequent emergence of radical religiously motivated political 
movements which evolved as a feature of mainstream discourse has not surprisingly, 
spawned a variety of religiously inspired terrorist groups.  Stepanova 225 likewise endorses 
the view that radical nationalism, which historically has been secular in orientation, has 
now increasingly embraced religious dogma.  The rise of Hamas, combining its aim of 
national liberation with overarching religious sentiments attests to this development.226 The 
conventional view of the 'new' terrorism model thus draws on the centrality of religion and 
suggests that contemporary religious terrorism is wedded to the pursuit of mass casualty 
operations with lethality as their hallmark. Whilst Crenshaw acknowledges that the 'new' 
terrorism model best fits with this criterion, she questions whether 'old' terrorist groups 
were really so discriminating and cites et al, the indiscriminate killings of civilians by the 
FLN, Pan Am 103 and the Air India bombing by Sikh militants to counter this assessment. 
As such, the correlation between 'new' terrorism and mass casualty impact may be 
explained in terms of technological developments around weapons and ordnance rather 
than specific ideological or tactical drivers. 
 
Whilst disagreements clearly exist on the scale and characteristics of 'new terrorism', the 
emergence of the term in academic literature nonetheless gathered momentum after the 
9/11 attacks and signalled a turning point in the treatment of terrorism as an academic 
subject.227 The extent to which this represents a shift in perception rather than substantive 
change is a moot point. It is primarily the notion that a qualitatively new brand of terrorism 
emerged requiring qualitatively new countermeasures that has most exercised practitioners 
and policymakers alike. Moreover, it is precisely because 'new terrorism' is distinguished 
from older traditional terrorism primarily by claims of changes in organisational structure 
that is of most interest to CTF practitioners. It is widely acknowledged that changes in 
organisational structure generally result in wider changes to internal processes, including 
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changes to infrastructure and support.228 In general terms the same is true of terrorist 
entities. These changes inevitably trigger changes in funding requirements and financing 
methodologies and it is the shift towards more frugal resourcing and non criminal sources 
of finance that are most significant in this 'new' dispensation. Lynch and Ryder cite 
Tushman et al and their classification of two types of change; convergent change which 
involves fine tuning to maintain consistency with existing organisational objectives and 
processes and secondly frame breaking change, a more significant reordering of 
organisational apparatus in response to unpredictable events within the operational 
environment. It is the latter which is most relevant when considering 'new terrorism' and the 
phased mutation towards networked, diffuse and ultimately more autonomous 
configurations. It is therefore in the context of these 'new' or emerging organisational forms 
that current CTF policy and operational responses should be considered. 
 
“Vertical or Flat: The Impact of Structure on Terrorist Financing” 
 
However one sees the doctrinal debate on the distinctions or otherwise of 'new terrorism', 
there is little doubt that significant change has occurred in the structural composition of 
terrorist groups in recent years.  Any attempt to understand the factors that have shaped UK 
CTF strategy must therefore consider the battle of ideas, or the “rancorous public feud” 229 
which developed between Sageman and Hoffman in particular around our understanding of 
contemporary terrorism and terror networks in particular. This debate exemplified the 
tensions that emerged in achieving consensus on the nature of terrorism and in articulating 
appropriate operational responses. Moreover such agreement is crucially important to 
policy makers and practitioners in shaping responses to terrorist financing and determining 
the emphasis accorded to both ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ finance interventions in addressing 
these challenges. It is imperative that the UK terrorist finance strategy, the product of 
collective discussion between the law enforcement agencies; key policy departments and 
the private sector, is framed on an agreed understanding of the threat. Structural 
composition ultimately determines the choices, range and scope of CTF interventions. Thus 
any assessment of structural composition must examine the recent historical chronology of 
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this concept and draw on the work of those such as Sageman230 who cite the threat primacy 
of networked terror cells.  
 
For Sageman, the Al Qaeda leadership had in the post 9/11 period, been superseded by a 
new threat emerging from diffuse low-level groups. Sageman proffered his “3 Waves 
Theory” to contextualise modern jihadist terrorism and this consolidated his earlier work 
with its emphasis on the centrality of social networks and the web of relationships that 
sustained them. Again technology is central to Sageman's contention of a “leaderless 
jihad.” Like Neumann, Sageman notes the impact of technological enfranchisement which 
offered a variety of options and accelerated the home- grown threat by eroding national 
identity and a sense of alienation amongst second and third generation immigrants and 
made possible a leaderless jihad of anti western political violence. Most significantly 
however, these developments have been orchestrated at minimal expense. The online jihad 
community has served to energise the threat from homegrown groups and radicalise its 
constituency at a pace which could not be replicated in either print or conventional 
broadcast media. The role of the Internet in facilitating the emergence of autonomous 
groups cannot be overstated particularly which regard to the dissemination of tactical and 
operational tradecraft.231   It is primarily these domestic threats which remain of most 
concern to police and the intelligence services. This shift in modus operandi thus questions 
the relevance of many CTF interventions. Indeed, one of the key characteristics of ‘new 
terrorism’ is the diversification of the sources of funding upon which they rely and the 
declining importance [and indeed irrelevance] of state and popular support within their 
funding portfolios.232  
 
Furthermore, given that’ new terrorism’ is now increasingly focused on self-sufficiency 
across a range of funding mechanisms, this may explain in part the capacity for greater 
lethality, given the absence of stakeholder constraints. Aside from the counter terrorist 
finance implications of the ‘home-grown’ threat, new paradigms are now required to 
understand the process by which certain individuals embrace terrorism. Social dynamics 
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clearly offers a framework for exploring these motivations and Sageman’s research proffers 
several theories about the nature of these networks, including the rationale for how and why 
individuals enlist for jihad, which he cites as a ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon. Several of his 
findings including those around ‘clique’ dynamics are deemed relevant to the case of the 
London 7/7 bombings and to the phenomenon of ‘self-starters’233and this will be explored 
more fully in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
 
Whilst Hoffman acknowledges that these informal terrorist groups were a critical part of 
the global terrorist network, he expresses deep concerns about Sageman's “brusque 
dismissal of much of the academic literature on terrorism and terrorist networks in 
particular.”234 Moreover, Sageman's view that Al Qaeda had receded in importance or had 
in someway been neutralised operationally, was dismissed as this ignored its agility and 
flexibility in exercising both top-down and bottom-up planning and operational 
capabilities.”235 Hoffman suggests that Sageman failed to recognise that the shift towards a 
more diffuse template was the result of deliberate strategic decisions made previously by Al 
Qaeda.236 Thus in effect, Hoffman asserts, that the seeds of radicalisation and the 
subsequent emergence of home-grown jihadists were part of a clear 'blue print,' an issue 
which Sageman seemingly ignored. Hoffman supports his argument by highlighting Al 
Qaeda's subsequent renaissance in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the assumption of greater 
strategic and operational control over previously affiliated tenuous groups.  For Hoffman, 
these developments confirm the fluid, structurally fragmented and transnational nature of 
Al Qaeda and lay challenge to Sageman's thesis.  
 
The Sageman/Hoffman contretemps illustrates the difficulties in formulating effective 
counter strategies whilst such profound disagreements existed regarding the nature of the 
threat itself. However this is viewed, Sageman attempts a paradigm shift to emerging areas 
of research around this decentralised jihadi community. Indeed, greater understanding and 
insights into homegrown jihadi attacks must come from understanding small group 
dynamics and psychological motivations. Sageman's thesis thus consolidates the shift 
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towards terror networks as a distinct area of research. That said, it is important to recognise 
that terrorist organisations are not exclusively organised in a network structure and as such, 
a variety of approaches should be considered. As such, momentum is developing in some 
quarters advocating novel asymmetric approaches if efforts to combat network based 
terrorist and criminal organisations are to achieve success.  
 
The key challenge for those involved in CTF therefore, is to acknowledge the changing 
nature of the threat and to articulate and construct effective counter measures to deal with 
these developments. Whilst other aspects of Sageman's thesis most notably, perceptions on 
the 'war on Islam' provide useful analytical frameworks for understanding radicalisation, it 
is the nature of mobilisation through social networks, which offers most value to those 
whose focus is on countering terrorist financing. Indeed, effective counter strategies must 
take into consideration, any perceived shift in how terrorist organisations, groups or 
networks are structured, developed and refined, as there will inevitably be a strong 
correlation in how these entities are maintained, sustained and funded. The key outcome 
from this debate, is that policymakers must take account of this phenomenon in an effort to 
better understand the potential direction in which these developments will evolve in order 
to avoid the spiral of further attacks and counter measures, a re-examination of political, 
legislative and forensic measures and a further deterioration in relations between Muslim 
and non Muslim communities.  This threat however, may ultimately require more radical 
measures and new discourses and theological perspectives on Islamist Jihadist groups. 
 
Any assessment of evolutionary change from 'old' to 'new' terrorism requires an 
examination of the key characteristics of the former as a comparative benchmark. From a 
UK perspective this must inevitably involve some assessment of the modus operandi and 
organisational template adopted by the Provisional IRA (PIRA). 'Old' terrorism is often 
cited as being innately ethno-nationalist with a specific territory central to its operations. In 
the case of PIRA, this is overwhelmingly so. What is notable, however, is that the 30-year 
terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland was characterised by several structural mutations 
and transformations, ranging from conventional hierarchical military structures to cell 
based entities. Moreover, the revision to cell structures did not include a diminution in the 
levels of central direction and control, particularly regarding operational sanctions and 
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weapons procurement.237 In effect, the primacy of an acknowledged hierarchy remained 
intact, with the General Army Council retaining its dominant status. However, whilst 
opting for asymmetric configurations and cell structures, it would thus be a mistake to 
consider this completely independent of central direction and control. Insofar as PIRA's 
aims are concerned, the organisations fundamental ideology had been consistent with its 
quest for a free and united Ireland. This was in turn wedded to strictly secular notions of a 
socialist republic, albeit inspired by Marxist philosophy, as a bulwark to British colonialism 
and imperial ambition.238 Similarly PIRA's tactics and methods whilst violent, rarely 
resulted in mass casualty attacks. Indeed, stakeholder constraints ensured that the 
overriding national liberation ethos softened the likelihood of a concerted indiscriminate 
campaign and thus ensured a certain political legitimacy. Thus whilst commentators point 
to structural configuration as the key determinant of 'new terrorism, there are many 
parallels to be drawn which support the notion of deja-vu in this context.  
 
Indeed, Al Qaeda like PIRA has during its lifespan also been subject to structural 
transformation. In the early years it too adopted a classic hierarchical model, with clearly 
defined command and control apparatus, with the leadership at the core and compliant cells 
primed for operational action.239 This in turn morphed into a looser more diffuse model, for 
some a philosophical franchise for violent jihad, pursuing action in accordance with the 
aims and ideology of the Al Qaeda leadership. Moreover, this reinforces the observations of 
Abu Musab al-Suri who explains the diffusion of Al Qaeda as entirely natural and 
deliberate and indeed consistent with the notion of Al Qaeda as a system rather than an 
organisation, with the only link between the core and its affiliates, a common aim, common 
doctrine and a self education program.240 The post 9/11 periods has thus been characterised 
by countless discussions on how Al Qaeda evolved in response to government counter 
strategies. The prevailing view therefore, is that the organisation has as a result of western 
military and intelligence successes become less hierarchical and adopted a more 
decentralised networked configuration.  This configuration is ironic, given that the 
conventional response of terrorist groups subjected to government attention has been to 
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reduce interconnectivity and strengthen their hierarchy, often by developing security 
bureaucracies. Whilst this was particularly so in respect of the Provisional IRA, Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates have ignored such responses as the preference for looser networked or 
increasingly autonomous structures prevail.  
 
Shapiro241 highlights an unexplained discrepancy between the historical adaptation to 
government pressure and the consensus on the evolution and nature of the current threat. 
This in turn has raised fundamental questions and points to the need for a better 
understanding of the organisational design and structure of covert organisations. From a 
counter terrorism perspective, understanding the factors, which influence these 
configurations, is central to constructing appropriate policies and strategies to mitigate the 
impact of such groups. Shapiro's research analyses the costs and benefits of different 
organisational design choices adopted by terrorist organisations. One key finding emerging 
from his work, is that while decentralised, highly interconnected organisational design 
makes it difficult for government to assess counter terrorist outcomes and impact, such 
design may also undermine the ability of such organisations and groups to realise their 
political goals. 
 
Crucially, decisions around organisational design, adaptation and composition are often 
influenced and determined by the sources of funding for such groups. Thus organisational 
structure is a key variable in understanding the financing of terrorism. Indeed, where 
diaspora communities are targeted for funding, looser structures may be appropriate. By 
contrast, where a key source of external funding is essential, a centralised control structure 
may be a more appropriate option rather than interaction with various independent factions. 
Likewise the same configuration applies where fundraising is obtained through criminality, 
as the need for command and control will predominate.   
 
Whilst Shapiro’s research on the consequences of terrorist group adaptation is worthy of 
consideration, the correlation between group structure and the funding of terror however, 
requires further development. Where public policy has prompted a change in structure and 
composition and thus undermined a group’s ability to operate freely and unhindered, such 
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outcomes may not entirely constitute effective counter measures. Indeed in this context, 
perhaps the real merit in Shapiro’s research, is in challenging some of the conventional 
assumptions which have emerged which seek to map how terror groups respond generally 
to government pressure and security constraints and applying these to our understanding of 
the current jihadist threat.  
 
Thus Shapiro and Stern242 have elevated structural composition as a key variable in the 
construction of counter terrorism strategies and tactics. Whilst discussions ensue regarding 
the nature and novelty of 'new terrorism', any such strategies to counter terrorist financing 
in the context of new structural configurations, should be framed on a clear understanding 
of the threat. In the context of this thesis, the key issue emerging is whether CTF 
interventions can critically inhibit 'new terrorism'. Indeed, making decisions without a clear 
understanding of the issues; general consensus on actors, motives, objectives and broader 
organisational capabilities, will severely undermine the wider policy process.  Only by 
developing a better understanding of how new terrorists entities evolve and are resourced, 
will opportunities emerge for shaping effective counter terrorist finance strategies. 
 
This thesis seeks to consider the role and impact of CTF interventions as a key aspect of 
wider counter terrorism efforts. Considerable resources and energy have been directed 
against terrorist financing in the past decade. Global financial compliance programmes and 
UN Resolutions have been initiated and financial legislation amended in over 100 
jurisdictions.243 In addition, these amendments have challenged many of the cherished 
principles which underpin European notions of jurisprudence and are viewed by many as an 
attack on fundamental libertarian values, not to mention limiting in terms of intelligence 
dividends.244 In addition Asset Freezes have in many instances destroyed Islamic charities 
that legitimately provided much needed assistance in areas of failed governance.245 
Similarly efforts to limit terrorists' use of Hawala banking and other alternative remittance 
systems have had disastrous social welfare implications in some of the poorest and most 
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vulnerable economies. As such it is now timely to consider whether these 'macro' 
interventions remain 'fit for purpose' in light of recent mutations and structural 
developments.  
 
Indeed, the picture of terrorist financing which has emerged in the wake of the most recent 
UK attacks is of a formal and informal global financial system which can be manipulated 
with relative ease. Indeed, Giraldo & Trinkunus suggest that “diverse and dispersed 
sources of funding and the methods of transferring [and raising] funds are exploited by 
equally decentralised and flexible terrorist networks that can easily shift from one 
mechanism to another to avoid detection.” 246Given the increasing reliance on 
independently financed domestic terror cells, the challenge for CTF practitioners could not 
be more pronounced. The current generation of jihadist terrorists has demonstrated a 
flexibility to respond to a variety of security interventions. However, whether there has 
been a reciprocal shift in the mindset of government is a moot point.  
 
Several assumptions have prevailed regarding counter terrorist financing practice generally. 
Biersteker and Eckert247 noted that all groups or organisations engaged in acts of terrorism 
were assumed to be broadly similar and thus attracted similar counter measures. As such, 
the regulatory systems and templates conceived to disrupt the financing of hierarchically 
structured groups were applied across the board with the expectation of equal operational 
impact. Moreover, measures deployed against ethno-national focused terrorist organisations 
were deemed to be as valid and appropriate as those deployed against transnational groups. 
Not surprisingly, the emergence of increasingly diffused and autonomous entities, have 
starkly challenged these assumptions. Furthermore, much of current public policy on 
counter terrorist financing was framed on the assumption that the formal banking sector 
was a key vehicle for the transfer of terrorist monies. However, there is growing evidence 
that the transfer of funds to such groups now increasingly by-pass this formal apparatus 
with greater reliance on cash couriers and informal value transfer systems as core funding 
platforms.248 As such, a new paradigm in counter terrorist policy is required which 
challenges those long held assumptions and more adequately acknowledges the centrality 
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of structure in the wider drive to frame effective counter terrorist finance strategies. This 
accords with the conclusions drawn by East West Institute (April 2007) 249 on the failure of 
global and regional counter terrorism structures to respond to the challenges posed by 
globally networked terrorist groups intent on waging a new form of social insurgency.  
 
In essence, a new dispensation on counter terrorism generally is required, to integrate 
success and apply lessons learnt across a range of levels. In addition to greater cooperation 
and cohesion between governing, judicial and security agencies, a new consensus is 
required on the characteristics and evolving nature of the threat. This includes further 
research to complement existing studies250 which seek to understand the pathways toward 
terrorism through self and group radicalisation in order that CT interventions can be 
targeted more effectively.  Whilst it is recognised that the terrorist threat is derived from a 
mixture of groups, networks and individuals, the key issue is the extent to which the UK’s 
response to terrorist financing is predicated on the wider debate around the nature of the 
terrorist threat, the structure of terrorist organisations and the primacy or otherwise of 
informal fluid networks and increasingly autonomous entities. It is precisely this shift 
towards such entities which suggest a further mutation towards a ‘newer’ form of terrorism.  
 
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, the notion that a 'newer' threat phenomenon has 
developed, accompanied by a paradigm shift in the resourcing of such entities, is of 
significant interest to those tasked with combating the financing of terrorism. The 
emergence of domestic “self-starter” cells in recent years represents a distinct and 
significant development. Further consideration will be given to this phenomenon and the 
accompanying shift in funding methodology and the extent to which new patterns in 
terrorist financing have evolved in response to decentralisation and new structural 
configurations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Qualitative Evidence and Analysis 
 
Western counter terrorism policy clearly affirms the relationship between terrorism and 
finance. Whilst the research question seeks to evaluate the contemporary relevance of 
Cicero's aphorism that ‘the sinews of war are infinite money’251, it is primarily concerned 
with reviewing the efficacy of the UK CTF model. This has been conducted using an 
‘insider’s perspective, both in terms of reviewing policy and operational impact. The first 
three chapters thus provide the framework for the thesis, by addressing the rationale behind 
current policy and operational choices and providing context for emerging developments. 
 
There are immense challenges in measuring the desired outcomes of counter terrorism 
policy generally. Effective counter terrorism strategy is multi-dimensional. On the one 
hand, it must acknowledge and understand the financial and social organisation of 
terrorism. However, operational impact will also be determined by a state’s ability to react 
to changes in the environment and in the context of CTF, those changes in funding sources 
and structures in an effort to mitigate emerging threats. Whilst it is natural to assume that 
reductions in terrorist activity reflect progress in counter terrorism efforts generally, this 
underestimates the changing nature of terrorism to respond to changes in the environment 
and the asymmetric non-linear nature of terrorist operations.252 The recent shift towards 
'home-grown' financially independent terror cells, 253 clearly attests to the significance of 
external control variables to trigger such mutations. If one accepts that terrorist activities 
and thus reciprocal counter terrorism measures evolve as a set of actions, incidents and 
other manifestations evidenced by changes in state, it is often difficult then to measure the 
impact of CT programmes generally and specifically CTF interventions in this case.   
 
As noted in the 'Introduction' to this thesis, the current emphasis on small scale, self-funded 
operations is particularly problematic for CTF practitioners, as the terrorist finance 
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Chapter 5 of this Thesis, ‘The Threat from Financially Discreet Home-Grown Cells in the UK.’  
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indicators are more difficult to discern, given that self financing and personal debt 
defaulting now play a key role in funding this 'new' terrorism.254 The lack of visibility and 
opportunities for interdiction at the conspiracy phase of terrorist operations and the 
increasing reliance on sterile funds further highlights the challenges posed. Thus, rather 
than focus on funds seized or networks dismantled, new discourses are required from which 
new metrics will evolve to determine success.  
 
The research question has therefore been framed to consider inter alia,  the trend towards 
‘new’ low cost terrorism255 with its emphasis on self sufficiency and the emergence of 
‘criminally sterile' funding methodologies and to provide a challenge function to the 
orthodoxy that shapes current UK counter terrorism finance policy and practice.  It 
considers the continued relevance of finance in the terrorism equation and the operational 
challenges posed to counter terrorism practitioners in combating ‘new’ threats. It therefore 
amounts to a ‘health-check' on the status of UK CTF efforts in recent years and considers 
these summatively by evaluating CTF interventions as a collaborative programme of 
activity comprising various strands. In the main, however, it focuses on the collaboration 
between UK policy officials, intelligence services, law enforcement, regulators and the 
private sector. In doing so, the research considers the centrality of finance as a key enabler 
to terrorism and thus CTF interventions as critical inhibitors. It assesses the nature and 
scope of the terrorist threat to the UK both domestically and internationally and those 
emerging challenges which are likely to shape future UK CTF strategy.  
 
Research Design 
 
Consideration was given at the outset to the suitability of various methods for conducting 
this research. The traditional formulation of the evaluation question considers the extent to 
which the programme in question is achieving its goals.256 Designing an evaluation 
framework involves trade-offs which are governed by a variety of factors.  The most 
challenging aspect of applying social research procedures to this study was the need to 
capture the merits of a multi dimensional programme that has evolved and continues to 
                                                
254 Ibid 
255 Napoleoni L., Op. Cit. 
256 Weiss, C. H., ‘Evaluation Research’, Prentice Hall 1972, p4 
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evolve over time. Indeed, CTF interventions now comprise a range of activities and involve 
multiple actors and stakeholders. The fact that CTF as a concept, is sufficiently mature and 
acknowledged as a key element of wider counter terrorism strategy, accounts for the 
summative nature of the evaluation. As such, the research focuses specifically on the policy 
process and structures that have shaped the operational response, whilst also considering 
the efficacy of these measures to deliver operational impact and degrade terrorist attacks.  
 
Given that this thesis is concerned primarily with establishing whether CTF remains a 
viable counter terrorism intervention and continues to deliver operational impact, I have 
opted for an interpretive approach and thus a qualitative research design to support this 
study.  My intention was to avoid developing hypotheses apriori, deferring instead to the 
data for illumination, yet cognisant of the emerging literature that indicates key changes in 
both terror group structural organisation and funding methodologies in recent years.  
 
The research has been undertaken because I believe that this is a watershed moment for 
CTF generally and therefore operationally relevant. I have progressed this through a series 
of structured and less formal discussions with counter terrorism professionals and policy 
officials and by analysing various official documents and papers. In total, seventeen 
professionals, a combination of counter terrorism finance practitioners and officials 
contributed to the research.  The core of the fieldwork, the five comprehensive semi 
structured interviews, included some stimulus material to allow for the probing of views 
and opinions. This combination of informal discussions and semi structured interviews took 
place between March 2011 and April 2013.  This approach has added depth, range, and 
specificity to the methodology. The value of this phenomenological approach afforded the 
opportunity to elicit more detailed responses and to explore subjective meanings that the 
respondents ascribed to concepts, phenomena and events.257 In conducting the semi 
structured interviews, I opted for a series of interactional exchanges of dialogue, conducted 
'face to face' on a 'one to one' basis and grounded in a loose thematic, topic centred 
approach.  
 
My choice of qualitative interviewing is largely rooted in my ontological position which 
                                                
257 Gray, D. E., ‘Doing Research in the Real World’ 2nd Edition, Sage Publications 2009, p373    
 88 
affirms that those interviewed were selected on the basis of their respective CTF policy and 
operational experiences. Each had specific functional experience as key CTF stakeholders 
in managing and advising on different elements of the CTF portfolio. These included UK 
policy officials and counter terrorism professionals drawn from law enforcement and 
intelligence disciplines, with extensive experience of both domestic and international 
terrorist financing investigations. Indeed it was assessed that those selected specifically for 
semi structured interview had a broad spectrum of experience in engaging with ministers, 
operational practitioners, regulators and the financial services sector. Their experiences and 
interactions were thus considered meaningful and particularly relevant to the broad themes 
which my research question sought to explore. All participants understood the parameters 
of the field research and consented to interview, acknowledging that extracts from the semi 
structured interview sessions would unless requested for redaction, be quoted anonymously 
in the thesis if relevant. Due consideration was given to ensuring that there was no intrusion 
into matters that may be subject to a protectively marked security classification and all 
protocols were duly observed and respected. 
 
Unlike quantitative data analysis where the statistical tools are well understood, it is 
acknowledged there are no hard and fast rules for organising and presenting qualitative data 
beyond some preliminary coding. In this case however, a number of established principles 
were observed and applied. These included personally transcribing the data from the 
interview sessions to develop familiarisation, coding and organising the data and finally 
identifying themes for theoretical sampling. Indeed, this process sought to generate theory 
by establishing connections between categories and concepts emerging from the data.258 
The use of thematic analysis259 was an attempt to understand and conceptualise the key 
issues emerging from professional practitioners with a view to understanding current 
actions and informing future UK policy.  A major advantage of this approach is that it 
avoids a preconceived idea of outcome and forces the researcher to keep an open mind.  It 
seeks to organise many ideas from analysis of the data with the emphasis firmly on building 
theory within the research rather than ‘thin’ deductions from some general theory apriori. 
The generative methodology and inductive nature of this approach allowed for the 
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development of a theoretical understanding of the subject.  In this case, it provided a 
systematic method of analysis whilst eliminating the need to conceive preliminary research 
hypotheses, thus affording greater freedom for wider CTF policy and operational 
considerations to emerge. 
 
Thematic analysis in this study provided other advantages aside from the guiding structure 
around data collection, analysis and coding. Indeed, as the research gathered momentum 
and direction, it afforded an opportunity for further engagement with existing literature for 
comparative purposes. Moreover, it was particularly suited to this study given its flexibility 
to cope with more complex data relating to a multiplicity of variables rather than traditional 
positivist methods. Finally, the centrality and emphasis on the semi structured interview 
sessions to build theory, also afforded the opportunity for respondents to maintain greater 
control of the data collection and reduced the moral and ethical risks of researcher bias. 
Maintaining researcher objectivity is often cited as a key challenge for qualitative 
methodologies. Neutrality and impartiality are not easy stances to achieve, particularly in 
this instance where there has been considerable professional engagement in the research 
area. That said, the politics of evaluation requires that individual researchers make their 
own peace with describing what they do and how they address objectivity, neutrality and 
impartiality.260 I was acutely aware of the potential for interviewer bias to emerge in 
interview sessions either subtly or otherwise, hence the rigid adherence to acknowledged 
protocols and ethical guidelines.  
 
Whilst thematic analysis is the methodological pillar of my research, I have as indicated, 
also supplemented these interview sessions with additional fieldwork using the case study 
approach, to reflect on four significant terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom during the 
period 2004 - 2007. This method was considered most appropriate to investigate 
contemporary phenomena within a real life context,261 particularly in terms of establishing 
emerging financing trends and particularly those changes around terrorist group support 
infrastructure and funding capability. This combined thematic analysis/case study approach 
provided greater flexibility within the research site and produced further data to understand 
the continued operational relevance of counter terrorist financing interventions.  
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Whilst the use of the semi structured interview format afforded a set of key starting points 
for discussion, the interviews remained sufficiently fluid to allow for the development of 
tangential ideas and unexpected themes. Instead of focusing on a series of abstract 
questions, I allowed for the construction of contextual or situational knowledge by 
concentrating on relevant issues raised during interview. The choice of qualitative 
interviews was therefore an attempt to generate richer, more nuanced, and complex and 
more rounded data across a range of issues within the counter terrorist-financing spectrum.       
 
Whilst quantitative techniques have traditionally been considered more appropriate to 
measure outcomes262 it was decided that given the requirement to consider the process and 
structures as well as policy outcomes and future challenges, that a qualitative paradigm was 
more appropriate. The combination of informal exchanges and semi structured interviews 
was thus chosen to provide a greater depth of explanation and an opportunity to explore the 
opinions and motivations of those interviewed.  Having further reviewed the existing 
literature, the author established a general structure by deciding in advance of the interview 
sessions, those areas to be covered and the core questions to be asked. This interview 
framework thus comprised those key policy and operational issues that had emerged during 
the literature review263 and provided an opportunity to maintain a degree of flexibility and 
direct the interview sessions, taking account of the participant’s specific professional 
experience.  
 
In summary, the core of the research was thus conducted through a series of in-depth 
interviews and those selected had to demonstrate considerable CTF operational and/or 
policy experience and have been familiar with and supported or contributed to formal UK 
CTF structures.264 This type of expert sampling enabled the selection of participants whose 
qualities and known demonstrable professional experiences permitted an understanding of 
the various phenomena in question.265 The decision to progress this through qualitative 
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research design was considered most appropriate in obtaining culturally and professionally 
specific information about the values, opinions, behaviours and experiences of those 
sampled. The decision to use this approach was based on the perceived benefits of peer 
group evaluation and the unique and on occasions, shared experiences of subject matter 
experts.  
 
Each participant was furnished with a question set in advance of the interview, comprising 
a range of familiar areas for discussion. This provided an opportunity for participants to 
consider and reflect on those matters prior to interview with a view to enhancing the 
richness of the data. At the outset, it was stressed to those sampled; that the preliminary 
question set was merely a framework to highlight the general areas for discussion and that 
each session should evolve organically and would be shaped in part by the unique 
experience of those interviewed. The use of open-ended questions gave participants the 
opportunity to comment on their professional experiences and to prioritise and accord 
emphasis to various phenomena.266 This approach therefore allowed for the in-depth and 
detailed study of the experiences of specific stakeholders, with the aim of eliciting rich 
detailed material for subsequent analysis.267 Whilst the data collection addressed loosely 
predetermined categories of analysis, it remained sufficiently flexible to capture the detail, 
intonation and emphasis that quantitative strategies often fail to secure. Moreover, this 
approach also provided an opportunity to experience the affective as well as the cognitive 
aspects of the responses.268  
 
The interviews were structured around 4 broad areas of CTF activity. The framework for 
the empirical research was influenced in part by the response of the UK government in 
2002 to the financing of Irish Related Terrorism in which it advocated a counter terrorism 
approach based on “intelligence, joint working, combined strategies and legitimacy.”269 
Though not categorised as such to the participants, the interview sessions were sufficiently 
fluid to allow for the unique experience of those sampled to be addressed specifically. The 
                                                
266 Patton M., Q. ’Depth Interviews: How to use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation’, Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 
p108-143 
267 Lofland J. & Lofland, L. H., ‘Analyzing Social Settings; A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis, 3rd Edition, 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1994 
268 National Science Foundation Handbook, ‘Common Qualitative Methods’, Chapter 3, 
www.nsf.gov/pubs/1997/nsf97153 accessed //10/2012 
269 HOC NIAC Fourth Report, Op. Cit. p28 
 92 
study design was thus iterative and dynamic and adjusted accordingly on the basis of what 
had been discussed and learnt. In terms of data format, each interview was recorded and 
subsequently transcribed and all parties consented to these arrangements. Where 
appropriate, field notes were recorded for further elaboration and record. These interview 
sessions have been supplemented with data collected from various operational reports, 
policy papers, reviews and evaluations. However the primary data from these interviews 
was then distilled and organised into major themes and case examples and are discussed in 
detail.  
 
The first area examined current 'Structures, Policy and Strategy' and sought to establish 
whether the structural framework, policy tools and powers for intelligence, investigation 
and disruption were ‘fit for purpose’.  The research considered the issue of 'threat' finance 
generally and whether the current arrangements were appropriate to counter the challenges 
posed by recent attack cells and specifically the emergence of autonomous and financially 
independent groups. The relevance of existing public policy and structures was considered 
in the context of addressing those areas of greatest risk. The research also sought to identify 
the dominant assumptions and narratives which shape current UK CTF policy and strategy. 
 
The efficacy of these structural and policy initiatives was considered in terms of 
'Operational Effectiveness' and whether the public policy framework and ensuing Terrorist 
Finance Strategy, discharged through CONTEST 270 could deliver impact both 
domestically and internationally. Several new phenomena were identified as important 
areas for discussion. These included the emerging threats from insurgent financing and an 
acknowledgment of the UK's role as a “net exporter of terrorist finance”. As such the 
interviewees were specifically challenged on those interventions targeting the sources, 
transmission mechanisms and destinations for funds raised in the UK to support terrorism 
overseas. The research also sought to address recent perceived changes in the economy and 
efficiency of terror and the difficulties of conspiracy phase interdictions, where there may 
be little or no indication of acquisitive crime to generate finance.   
 
The third area focused on evaluating those structural and legislative 'CTF Assets', spawned 
                                                
270 ‘CONTEST’ is the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy. See www.gov.uk/counter-terrorism 
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in large part as a result of security and diplomatic efforts in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 
The Suspicious Activity Reports, (SARs)271 regime and the compliance and regulatory 
protocols championed through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) were examined 
specifically. Particular significance was given to reviewing the contribution of 
public/private partnerships in combating the financing of terrorism, and the perceived 
assumption of 'proxy sovereign status'272 by private institutions in discharging their role. 
Most significantly however, the value of financial intelligence was highlighted as a specific 
area of interest, largely in the context of the anecdotal post - blast utility of the 'follow the 
money' doctrine which has shaped much of the West's CTF response since 2004.273  
 
The final element of the interview sessions addressed the “Future Challenges and 
Vulnerabilities” that are likely to dominate the agenda for CTF practitioners in the years 
ahead. In doing so, it sought to identify potential and as yet unexploited opportunities and 
interventions to disrupt nodes of activity across the terrorist-financing spectrum.  
Domestically, most concerns centred on combating the threat from radicalised UK 
nationals. In addition, difficulties were anticipated regarding financial instruments, payment 
mechanisms and those sectors which are deemed most vulnerable to exploitation. The 
research focused specifically on the arrangements governing remittance systems and 
specifically Money Service Businesses (MSB’s) in the UK and sought to determine the 
impact of the ‘light touch’ regime in regulating these entities.  The research also addressed 
the extra-jurisdictional challenges of CTF interventions overseas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
271 SAR’s refers to Suspicious Activity Reports generated by Financial Institutions and the Regulated sector. 
272 de Goede, M., Op. Cit., p161-179. 
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INTERVIEW RESULTS 
Part 1 
STRUCTURES, POLICY & STRATEGY 
 
The Effectiveness of Current Structures in Shaping CTF Strategy 
 
Insofar as UK CTF structures are concerned, the main theme distilled from the interview 
sessions was an acknowledgement that the existing apparatus, which is made up of 
Treasury, Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials, with further 
input from operational practitioners, was generally considered effective in shaping current 
terrorist finance strategy. Indeed, it was suggested that the tripartite apparatus enhanced 
accountability and underscored the view that successful CTF interventions could not be 
delivered unilaterally.  
 
 “We are very fortunate here in the UK that we have Ministerial interest that cuts across three 
Ministries that actually sign off and approve CTF strategy for the UK.  As you are aware you don’t tend to 
find this in my view in other parts of Western Europe or indeed elsewhere.  This has come about of course 
because the Treasury have the financial portfolio, the Home Office have the CT portfolio and the Foreign 
Office have the International portfolio and because TF and CTF is a cross-cutting tool and actually involves 
all three Ministries, so this arrangement I suppose reinforces Departmental accountability.   As part of what I 
can only describe as an anomaly, HMT actually hold the CTF portfolio as part of their wider financial crime 
portfolio.  So in terms of regulation and investigation it involves both the Home Office and the Treasury.”274 
 
Whilst the current balance in terms of policy/practitioner influence on CTF strategy was in 
the main considered appropriate, some concerns were voiced that these arrangements may 
be too policy focused, with less attention paid to practitioner concerns and experience.275   
However, whilst a partnership model drawn from various government departments was 
strongly favoured, a broader ‘whole of government’ approach to CTF, similar to the US 
template, was also advocated. The inclusion of the military as further CTF partners was 
thus suggested, given their experience and perspectives on threat and specifically insurgent 
finance interventions.276  
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It was also acknowledged that the tripartite arrangements 277 served to enhance the status of 
CTF and more specifically ‘counter threat finance’ as a key concept in counter terrorism 
strategy generally.  The participation of the Treasury, Home Office and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, was based on their respective responsibilities for finance, counter 
terrorism and international diplomacy and confirmed the operational complexity and global 
nature of terrorist financing.  Whilst policy officials had no operational mandates as such, 
their strategic oversight role was seen to add value by providing a challenge function to 
ensure that all parties, including law enforcement and intelligence services, were engaging 
and contributing as intended and in accordance with the Terrorist Finance Delivery Plan.278  
 
 “Various actors are engaged in framing counter terrorism strategy around terrorist financing, for 
example the OSCT, HMT and our SRO who we report to, together with the Counter Terrorism Directorate of 
the FCO on international issues, effectively form the Secretariat for TFAG,[Terrorist Finance Action Group].  
Therefore, sitting on that group, are all the key law enforcement agencies, all the key political departments 
and key supervisors.  We don’t try to interfere as such, as we are not CT specialists.  We are policy officials, 
we have no investigative or operational remit.  What we try to do is to provide oversight, provide ideas and 
set strategy for those areas which are emerging threats or potential threats such as new payments methods, 
cash couriers and money transmitters. “279 
 
Evidence from interview thus confirmed CTF as an area with significant endorsement from 
joint departmental leads that collectively formulated counter terrorist financing policy as 
part of the wider CONTEST Counter Terrorism Strategy.  It was suggested that the strength 
of these arrangements was based on robust multidisciplinary partnerships which required 
all parties to engage around common objectives. The ensuing Terrorist Finance Delivery 
Plan subsequently addressed threat finance through a matrix of thematic scenarios from 
which objectives and milestones were set. These indicators were subject to a review and 
evaluation process to determine progress at policy and operational level.280  
 
 “In terms of how this works in setting CTF strategy it’s a consultative process, with joint leads from 
the Home Office, the Treasury and the FCO who have a less strong interest.  The first two largely drive CTF 
as part of the wider CONTEST strategy, they set the strategic goals and the generic objectives and this is 
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pushed down to much smaller focus groups which include law enforcement and intelligence services which 
meet at least once a year to refine strategy.  In addition they usually meet every six months to review these 
objectives. It’s therefore a review and refresh process.” 281 
 
However, the issue of whether the appropriate balance has been struck on 
policy/practitioner input did not result in universal endorsement. Some concerns were 
voiced that the current strategy was perhaps too policy driven and focused on indicators 
that are capable of being measured rather than those that would genuinely deliver impact.282  
That said, there was strong endorsement from law enforcement that CTF structures should 
be policy led and that developments within the policy and political arena had significantly 
advanced progress on the matter more than practitioner interactions and engagement.283     
 
 “I'm comfortable with the current balance and believe that CTF policy should be policy-led, we are 
fortunate in some ways, practitioners uncover so many different ways of circumventing legislation, rules and 
money transfer regulations and new instruments that are coming on to the market that are being used and 
abused.  Clearly practitioners have the visibility on these that policy makers do not.  Whilst everything has to 
be policy driven, the policy makers have to listen and consult.  When you have that synergy between 
practitioner expertise and policy expertise both in terms of domestic, EU and international policy and 
legislation, you do have a strong deck of cards that can operate not just in the UK but internationally and 
particularly with our European partners.   This is important; success in CTF is not something which can be 
delivered on a unilateral basis.  It must be delivered through multilateral institutions and inter-governmental 
conferences and whilst we see that more at a policy level, we do not I believe see the same developments at 
practitioner level.   Hopefully that will come if we push the policies hard enough and the portals start to open 
up.” 284    
 
The current Terrorist Finance Action Group (TFAG)285 arrangements have attracted some 
criticism that CTF in the UK is at present addressed largely through a “forum of converts”. 
Concerns were voiced regarding the potential adoption of a ‘one –dimensional’ or corporate 
mindset.286 As a result, there have been some calls for a revision of the current 
arrangements and procedures, in an effort to generate some fresh ideas and new 
perspectives.   
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 “I suppose I'm broadly happy with the current structures… the trouble is the way this is delivered, is 
through a ‘forum of converts’ and by this I mean the TFAG Ministerial and Officials meeting and various 
other ad hoc meetings which take place around the edges, comprising all the usual suspects. We need to look 
again at the composition of these groups; we could do with some new input and ideas.  On the one hand we 
have buy-in across the board which is a good thing, but for me it misses one of the critical aspects of finance 
in terms of how it is viewed from an MOD perspective.” 287  
 
In response to concerns that the current structures may unwittingly foster a myopic 
perspective on CTF, or at least simply perpetuate established and conventional thinking on 
CTF, the inclusion of military perspectives on the subject was proffered as a suggestion for 
inclusion in future strategy. Indeed, the issue of threat finance has emerged in recent years 
as an area of significant operational interest for the military that routinely targets ‘key 
enablers’ to capability. As such, the terrorist financing conundrum is considered in the 
context of “threat = capability x intent”.288 It is generally acknowledged that reductions in 
finance significantly degrade operational capability. Thus from a military perspective, 
finance is considered as a key transactional activity within a wider programme of measures 
central to supporting the aims of terrorist groups and should therefore be targeted 
accordingly. 289 Whilst this is an issue best considered in tactical and strategic terms, it 
further highlights the significance of structural configuration as an arbiter of strategy.  
 
Whilst there was broad agreement that the existing structures were effective in facilitating 
the formulation of CTF strategy, concerns were raised that the current arrangements did not 
adequately provide policy officials with the levels of operational detail which might better 
inform and shape subsequent strategy. 
 
  “We have a sense at the centre that we are not getting a comprehensive or detailed understanding of 
the threat within the UK.  We don’t know exactly where it is happening, or who the key individuals are, those 
sorts of things we are not really sighted on which is fine, except that Ministers and senior officials continually 
ask questions when they get reports from [civil servants] or the Security Service about investigations.  So we 
have a thirst for more information and we are trying to develop better ways in which we can get a fuller 
understanding of the intelligence picture”.290  
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It was acknowledged that the Research Intelligence Communications Unit (RICU) could 
perhaps play a greater role in this respect and whilst their messaging campaigns tended to 
be focused more on the ‘Prevent’ strand of CONTEST, there was a desire for greater 
engagement with RICU on matters involving terrorist financing. Whilst cognisant of the 
balance and parameters governing the operational sphere, the lack of specific operational 
detail was nonetheless considered an impediment to more effective engagement and 
ultimately enhanced policy outcomes.  This was deemed to be particularly pronounced 
when attempting to engage with regional counter terrorism partners.  
 
 “One of the problems we have at the moment is to tap into the CT machinery across the country and 
access the types of data which can help shape counter terrorism policy generally.   I am sure the information 
is there, but it’s not being communicated effectively to the centre and therefore it is difficult for RICU to 
engage on those targeted campaigns.  It’s important for us because we are setting policy from the centre, but 
actually how can we measure the impact if we don’t know where the problems are and we can’t determine if 
there is any improvement.  We are really trying to work with law enforcement, not interfering with current 
law enforcement operations, but rather to enhance our competent communication with law enforcement to 
add value overall.” 291  
 
The Policy Challenge of Impacting Home-Grown Financing Methodologies  
 
There was universal endorsement from those sampled that the UK's multi disciplinary and 
multi layered policy approach to CTF had spawned a strategy which recognised the need 
for both domestic and international interventions. However, whilst the Counter Terrorist 
Finance Strategy and Delivery Plan292 on the whole targeted the right areas and sought to 
generate maximum operational effectiveness, law enforcement practitioners acknowledged 
the international focus of these programmes and the limitations of interdiction and 
disruption interventions in addressing the emerging threats from domestic self-financing 
attack cells. This shift also coincided with an increasing emphasis in recent years on the 
“follow the money” doctrine which has dominated much of current CTF thinking in recent 
years. It was however suggested, that the current Strategy suffered from significant 
intelligence gaps on the home-grown threat. Moreover, from a terrorist finance perspective, 
this threat also needed to be understood in the context of the 'Prevent' strand of 
                                                
291 Ibid 
292 See note 276 
 99 
CONTEST.293 A greater focus on targeting facilitation networks, which often morph into 
attack cells, was also advocated as a CTF option for primary phase interventions. It was 
hoped that this would be more explicit in future strategy. Furthermore, it was suggested that 
more emphasis should be given to targeting assets with ‘value’ and that financial 
investigation tools and methodology might be used to target merchandise and equipment 
typically required by attack cells. Indeed, specific reference was made to typology work 
undertaken by the National Terrorist Finance Investigation Unit of the Metropolitan Police 
Service in 2006 confirming the sharing of modus operandi and financing methodology in 
particular across several seemingly independent attack cells.294   
 
The issue of micro financing, low level funding methodologies, which include minor 
financial frauds, personal credit defaults and state welfare fraud, was cited as an area of 
increasing operational significance. Though acknowledging that greater emphasis has been 
given to these areas in recent years and that the Strategy and Delivery Plan in part reflected 
this, micro financing was nonetheless likely to emerge as an area of increasing operational 
attention.295 That being the case, it was suggested that practitioners could benefit from the 
previous experiences of those engaged in combating Irish terrorist group financing which 
relied heavily on micro- financing initiatives.296  
 
 “We have been dealing with terrorist financing before the Islamic threat. We cut our teeth with the 
Irish groups and we had to respond to a variety of challenges over the years. We understand that resourcing 
comes from a variety of sources, both small scale funding and through crime and international donations. So 
we need to keep this in mind, we have been here before. We have a lot of corporate knowledge not just on TF 
but on CT generally.” 297 
 
Evidence from interview also indicated that those responsible for framing CTF strategy had 
on the whole, taken cognisance of recent changes in the nature of the threat both 
domestically and globally and responded accordingly.  
 
 “The current strategy has been revised and refreshed and replaced the 'Financial Challenge' 
                                                
293 Interviewee’s 1, 2 & 4   
294 Interview with CTF practitioner No.1 
295 Interviewee’s 1, 2 & 4   
296 Interview with CTF practitioner No.2  
297 Interview with CTF practitioner No.4 
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document [HM Treasury publication, February 2007] to be more aligned with CONTEST. It draws on 
the JTAC Threat Assessment, its wider, more broadly focused, and looks at international terrorist 
financing as well as the domestic threat. It's also about ensuring that we protect and preserve the 
integrity of the UK financial system which is hugely important to our national interest.  It also 
recognises the need for bi-lateral assistance to high risk countries and includes new priorities such as 
credit card fraud, benefit fraud, cash couriers, K&R [Kidnap for Ransom], and counter insurgency links 
to TF.” 298  
 
Similarly, from a public policy perspective, the current strategy was deemed to be effective 
in terms of preventing funds for terrorism generally, and specifically in addressing the 
home-grown threat. It was acknowledged that disrupting funds for attack planning by such 
groups was of major political concern to ministers. As such, officials had been charged 
with ensuring that the right policy framework was developed to support police and the 
security services to deliver operational successes across a range of activities. 299 
 
 “The current strategy and the Delivery Plan are intended to support CONTEST, so it links 
directly into that. It’s still about the fundamentals of addressing the raising and movement of funds 
domestically and the threat to the UK from overseas.  We are very much aware of our role in supporting 
current efforts and assisting in developing a greater understanding of TF generally. It’s about helping to 
support the core functions of all those engaged in TF work, other departments, the financial and charity 
sectors and to fill the gaps and raise awareness generally. We aim to improve the collection; use and 
sharing of information and our capability around cash couriers, MSB’s and new payments methods. We 
also understand the challenges of dealing with the new face of terrorism, the fact that there may be no or 
little discernible financial footprint. It’s about agreeing priorities, delivering impact and holding people 
to account. We know that there is a lot of information out there on TF, but we need to develop a better 
way of sharing this, so the [Terrorist Finance Delivery] Plan should help. It’s important also that policy 
is shaped by the intelligence picture, which we believe we are not always fully sighted on. So the 
strategy should flow from the collective efforts of all those involved in TF work, government, private 
sector and should be informed by the right information and intelligence.” 300 
 
A further issue that emerged during the interview sessions was an acknowledgement of the 
increasing operational challenges and possible future limitations of interdiction and 
disruption interventions in addressing the emerging threats from self-financing attack cells. 
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Whilst this coincided with a greater emphasis on the perceived utility of financial data to 
illuminate CT investigations generally, the value of a multi-disciplinary, multi faceted 
approach to CTF was also strongly endorsed. Indeed, there was an almost universal 
recognition of the parameters of CTF as an operational asset which confirmed its status as 
an aid to degrading capability rather than eradicating threat. 301 Empirical evidence 
indicated that the Istanbul attack on UK interests in 2003 had been sufficiently delayed and 
frustrated as a result of CTF interventions targeting the funding networks and supporting 
apparatus.  
 
  “If you study the commissioning of these attacks, this was Core AQ [Al Qaeda].  If you look at 
the actual operatives, the cell leaders, the financiers and the facilitators… what was supposed to be a 
very short timeframe and in fact, what posed a problem for all of this, was the absence of money which 
essentially caused a breakdown in the process between the attack cell and the financial facilitator who 
was located elsewhere.  It is clear that these attacks were delayed by several months because of the 
absence of finance.” 302  
 
Indeed, it later emerged during the trial, that the Istanbul bombings required supplementary 
funding of approximately $150,000 from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Gulf to undertake these 
attacks.  Loai-al-Saqa, a Syrian national was subsequently jailed for securing the necessary 
finance and masterminding these attacks.303 The Istanbul attacks again confirm the 
centrality of money in the terrorism equation.  It further illustrates the impact which the 
degradation of capability and the disruption of money flows through enhanced regulation 
and other interventions pose to terrorist organisations when law enforcement actively 
targets transfer streams. The acid test for CTF therefore, is to impact and disrupt revenue 
streams, thereby securing a direct and disproportionately net effect against terrorist 
networks.304 Istanbul however, also highlighted the limitations of CTF, which in the end 
merely frustrated and delayed rather than prevented these attacks.   
 
On the issue of financially independent attack cells, it was generally accepted, that the 
economy of terror has changed significantly. As such, it was suggested that those 
conventional assumptions which have coloured much of the operational response in recent 
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years now require revision. Indeed, whilst the focus historically has been on developing 
strategy to target large scale funding requirements, changes in terrorist methodology have 
spawned similar revisions from CTF practitioners in their understanding of how such 
groups now finance their activities. However, whilst acknowledging this shift, there was 
some concern that current strategy did not give sufficient emphasis to explicitly articulating 
and targeting these developments.  
 
 “This isn't [any longer] about running terrorist groups like private corporations, with huge budgets 
required for political purposes and propaganda. The current strategy doesn't really or at least adequately 
deal with the threats and the challenges from these groups.. We should look at some of the ways in which the 
RUC attacked PIRA financing. Aside from large-scale extortions, my understanding is that a lot of the 
funding for weapons and attack planning came from volume crime, small scale stuff. We should be more 
aware of the potential for small scale funding, routine crime as a means of funding attack cells and direct our 
resources on low level financial frauds and even benefit fraud. We shouldn’t lose sight of the requirement to 
police TF in a strategic sense.” 305   
 
In terms of targeting micro financing methodologies, the perceived lack of emphasis on 
micro-financing initiatives was explained in part on a lack of intelligence on the home-
grown threat, not only with regard to funding methodologies but also regarding initial 
indicators for group member radicalisation, and associated networks. 
 
 “There are huge intelligence gaps. Our priority should always be about developing our intelligence 
picture to understand the main threats and where we are vulnerable, more knowledge on the activities of 
these cells, their behaviours, interests, patterns of life. The TFAG Programme was about information and 
knowledge, developing a greater understanding of TF generally, particularly around sources of income, 
finance, movement and vulnerabilities. It was also about understanding networks, how these functioned, 
operated and financed themselves. So I suppose in that sense, the strategy should be capable of addressing 
the threat from these groups [home-grown]. In the end of course it’s about setting the right intelligence 
requirements, understanding where we lack visibility where there are gaps and then on the basis of this 
reporting, shaping the operational response We need more visibility here. The strategy should flow from the 
intelligence picture, and then we can use a range of TF measures, policing methods etc. to deal with these 
groups. The small scale stuff is worrying though, this is going to be the main challenge.” 306  
 
On the issue of micro-financing specifically, difficulties were also acknowledged regarding 
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the current structural arrangements which tended to reinforce departmental objectives rather 
than a ‘whole of government’ approach to CTF. Further engagement was therefore required 
to deliver a corporate approach to terrorist financing projects to ensure greater consistency 
and alignment of prosecution thresholds in accordance with CTF strategy.  
 
 “There are practical and pragmatic reasons for this, not least the fact that the DWP [Department of 
Work and Pensions] are naturally and quite rightly more focused on large scale [welfare] frauds, whereas we 
are potentially looking at small scale individual abuse of relatively modest sums, which in the end may be the 
difference in providing the necessary finance for attack planning. This is a classic case of CT government 
objectives not necessarily being synchronised with other departmental objectives and in this instance 
specifically around tax and benefits etc. We therefore need more engagement to explain our requirements and 
sell the message. It is perfectly understandable that what may be perceived as simple, benign welfare fraud 
may infact be TF.”307  
 
It was recognised that minor financial crime, personal debt defaults and state welfare fraud 
were areas which were likely to emerge as key priorities in the future and that greater 
engagement with the Department of Work and Pensions 308 and the National Audit Office 
was essential if progress was to be made. Indeed, the later has the capacity to match a 
variety of data sets from accounts certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General and 
could potentially play a greater role in future CTF interventions. That said, there was a 
cautionary note against too swift an adoption of this perspective, given the perceived lack 
of empirical research on the subject. Indeed, concerns were expressed that there remains 
limited visibility on the extent to which ostensibly autonomous cells generate finance. It 
was suggested that there was a danger in exaggerating the extent to which these cells 
operate independently. 
 
 “I would say that the emphasis on independent cells is overplayed at the moment. Even going back to 
the late 1990s, AQ [Al Qaeda] have always encouraged independent action.  For example, the attacks in 
Tunisia in 2002 against a synagogue in Djerba, was an [Al Qaeda] inspired attack, self funded by an 
individual.  It’s perhaps a mistake then to believe that because of western military and intelligence successes 
and the displacement of AQ, we are now witnessing a new phenomenon.  Therefore … the notion of a 
homegrown threat doesn’t really buck any trends.  AQ has always been sufficiently flexible to adapt to 
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operational constraints imposed by CT practitioners.” 309   
 
The emergence of ‘franchised’ terror cells was considered more of a testament to the hostile 
environment created by law enforcement, given the increasing number of disrupted plots in 
recent years and the increase in the volume of persons arrested and charged with such 
offences.310 The increasing reliance on home-grown cells was also explained in terms of the 
enhanced logistical and operational challenges facing the Al Qaeda leadership in 
commissioning a 9/11 style attack in the UK.  Moreover, it was concluded, that the security 
regime in the UK was deemed to be sufficiently robust to frustrate and deter an attack on 
this scale, hence the focus on second and third generation disaffected UK nationals to 
mount low cost high impact attacks as an alternative.311 Aside from adding to the hyperbole 
which reinforced the current narrative on low funding thresholds, and the wholesale 
revision of CTF strategy to take account of these developments, it was suggested that too 
strong a focus on micro-financing methodologies had the potential to deflect operational 
focus from the real threat, those facilitation networks that support attack cells.312  Indeed 
both practitioner and policy officials confirmed these mutations and developments and law 
enforcement practitioners were specifically keen to stress that UK networks often looked 
externally, not just for inspiration or direction but for core logistical or financial support. 313  
 
 “If you start looking at wider networks that fuel these attack cells, most of the attack cells in the UK 
have sprung from facilitation networks or morphed into attack cells. Facilitation requires money, it requires 
revenue generation, it’s about procuring items which are not necessarily available abroad such as GPS 
laptops that can then be sent to hostile environments.  These will give the organisation a value, a value 
through goods as opposed to money. Now if you don’t interdict that, don’t do something about that, then that 
organisation has free rein. So interdicting the value in terms of the goods does have a disproportionately high 
net effect.”314   
 
In summary, it was recognised that CTF strategy should be multi-dimensional and therefore 
comprise a suite of measures which included both macro and micro interventions given the 
range of finance threats now emerging. CTF strategy should continue to include macro 
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measures such as enhanced regulation, the sharing of best practice and procedures, financial 
sanctions and asset freezing. Regarding the financing of home-grown cells, it was accepted 
that unless such groups have access to significant ‘clean’ donor finance or as in the 
Glasgow bombing attacks in 2007, where the conspirators had the capacity to self finance, 
then ‘franchised’ cells in the UK will almost inevitably require to generate funds through 
minor frauds, debt defaulting or state welfare abuse. Such funding streams however provide 
a rich environment for subsequent law enforcement action with strong empirical evidence 
indicating the sharing of information and tradecraft across attack cells. Indeed, as outlined 
in Chapter Four, the subjects of Operations Crevice and Theseus consulted on fundraising 
methodologies315, which should in part challenge the notion of strict attack cell autonomy 
and independence, stressing instead, connectivity and networking as key characteristics.  
 
A further theme from the interview sessions linked the threat from home-grown cells to the 
wider issue of radicalisation and the potential role of CTF to play an enhanced role in this 
context. Whilst it was accepted that terrorist finance programmes were not specifically 
developed for counter-radicalisation, the potential application of CTF was recognised and 
indeed anticipated given the perceived natural axis between both phenomena.316 Though 
acknowledging that disrupting funds for radicalisation was an area which had received 
greater government attention in the past, it was no longer considered an operational priority 
under the terrorist financing portfolio. 317   
 
 “Within the UK we do not put radicalisation under TF for legislative purposes, so for the purpose of 
interdicting, we do not see this under the “PURSUE” strand but rather under the “PREVENT” strand of 
CONTEST.  The main TF dimension of addressing radicalisation is through the targeting of Jihadist websites 
by using financial tools, financial avenues, the collection of monies through mosques etc. It wouldn’t be for 
CTF practitioners to address this, it’s more of an issue at local level.” 318 
 
On the whole however, it was acknowledged that seeking to address counter radicalisation 
through counter terrorist finance initiatives was likely to remain within the ‘Prevent’ strand 
of CONTEST for the foreseeable future and would be addressed through community 
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focused programmes such as the “Rich Picture” Initiative.319 Whilst CTF may have a 
complimentary role to play here in the future, it was overwhelmingly focused at present on 
targeting infrastructure rather than ‘soft’ power interventions.  
 
Narratives and Assumptions: Finance as the ‘Oxygen of Terror’  
 
On the issue of dominant narratives which shape CTF policy, the matter of finance as the 
'oxygen of terror' and thus a key enabler of terrorism, was the subject of specific attention 
during the interview sessions. Whilst this was acknowledged as a core assumption 
governing current counter terrorism practice, concerns were raised regarding the current 
'one-dimensional' exploitation of CTF which generally targets funding interventions to 
degrade terror group capability. 320 A more creative and lateral application of the concept 
was advocated to target the strategic opportunities which finance provides to exploit wider 
organisational vulnerabilities. 
 
 “Money is central to counter terrorism efforts. Most of the groups argue about money, it causes 
division within groups and is a permanent source of tension.  I don’t believe we have a coherent 
information operations campaign that subtly and covertly seeks to exacerbate those tensions.  This 
should comprise part of the focus and emphasis in terms of how we use financial intelligence in support 
of other counter terrorism operations.  The reason we don’t exploit this, is because we are now 
focussing more on the tactical rather than the strategic.  Money will always be a key enabler, access to 
finance will always determine the scale of event which our adversaries wish to deliver, it will determine 
the timescales and the level of sophistication. Access to finance generally provides greater options; this 
is exactly the same for the terrorist. Finance gives you the ability to develop more sophisticated systems 
to counter the actions of the military, police or intelligence services.” 321 
 
Thus whilst evidence from interviews reinforced the significance of CTF programmes 
generally, questions emerged regarding the centrality of finance and the continued value of 
CTF long term to deliver results, given the trend towards legitimate funding and more 
frugal resourcing by attack cells in recent years.  
 
 “The key assumption is that TF is important and that somebody should be doing something 
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about it. I think there are still question marks about how important finance actually is and how much 
impact we can have in terms of tackling it, particularly with the recent emergence of self funding cells.  
It’s still very important for example within the OSCT, there is definitely a recognition that there needs to 
be some unit with a specific responsibility for terrorist financing but as I’ve said there are question 
marks over how much impact we can have. There is definitely still an understanding that money does 
matter and that financial intelligence does matter for wider counter terrorism.  It is difficult to really 
determine the impact we can have by trying to stop money flows when we see the small sums now 
required for terrorist attacks.”322   
 
Whilst these concerns are valid in the context of challenging whether current CTF 
interventions can impact on the funding requirements of autonomous financially 
independent cells, they perhaps ignore the value-added which counter 'threat' finance 
programmes continue to deliver at a strategic level.   
 
 “For years we have almost become fixated on nominal or micro-financing and therefore when 
that plays out, the operational difficulties of targeting such small sums.  As you know, practitioners are a 
pretty realistic lot and have resigned themselves to accepting that cutting off money flows is now 
virtually impossible.  Look at the nature of recent attacks; it is not surprising that the focus began to 
shift to financial intelligence collection as a tool to assist wider counter terrorist investigations.  This 
may turn full circle again as we look strategically at TF and focus again on targeting monies for wider 
infrastructure.  So I would expect more emphasis in the coming years on Gulf donors, Zakat and on the 
Saudis.  It will be interesting to see how the Arab Spring works out and whether we see AQ seeking to 
capitalise on developments there as things evolve, move forward.” 323    
 
The issue of donor funding from Gulf States emphasises the need to remain cognisant of 
the wider strategic threat and cautions against a radical revision of CTF in favour of new 
initiatives which focus too narrowly on micro financing interventions. 
 
 “Large sums of money are clearly required to support Al Qaeda infrastructure, Al Qaeda senior 
leadership in AQ Core in Afghanistan and Pakistan, yet nobody really knows how much money is 
involved or how the money movement works here because it is interspersed with migrant remittances, 
criminal money and legitimate money.  I’m not sure we have a clear picture on AQ, the debriefing of the 
US material from Abbotabad will be very interesting and may shed new light on the scale of AQ Core 
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and the sums of money required to maintain the organisation in recent years.” 324  
 
Thus CTF may be at a crossroads, from which new options and choices emerge. Just as 
operational events shape and guide responses, CTF practitioners and policy officials must 
decide on the future nature and direction of counter terrorist finance programmes. A new 
model may evolve, influenced by new narratives and assumptions and the distillation of 
intelligence product uncovered from the raids in Abbotabad in May 2011 which better 
illuminate the strategic funding requirements of Al Qaeda Core.  
 
 “A lot of our current TF policy is US driven so I expect our strategy to reflect whatever is 
aggregated from the US debriefs from the OBL [Osama bin Laden] assassination.” 325     
 
Whilst much of current UK CTF strategy is based on an understanding of what is distilled 
through intelligence reporting, there are still huge gaps in intelligence coverage and 
visibility. The intelligence picture is limited to current priorities which are focused 
overwhelmingly on Afghanistan. This explains the emphasis in recent years on attempting 
to acquire a better understanding of money flows to the region and accounts for the recent 
'Terrorist Finance Surge Project’, which targeted money transfers to Pakistan.326 The quest 
for co-terminus UK/US CTF programmes is hardly surprising given the global context of 
terrorist financing. Indeed, this collaboration has also been instrumental in attempting to 
influence Pan-European attitudes to CTF 327 and accounts for the assimilation of those 
narratives which champion CTF as a key inhibitor. 
 
 “One of the main things that informs CTF policy in the UK is the underlying intelligence picture 
and how we see AQ [Al Qaeda] and this of course draws on our understanding of how our international 
partners and by that I mean the US deals with AQ both militarily and from a TF perspective.328 
 
Current US policy confirms the significance of finance as a major asset in counter terrorism 
programmes. Indeed, the US is particularly committed to the “operationalisation” and 
“institutionalisation” of counter threat finance within the US Department of Defence 
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(DOD), which is now represented on a range of forums and committees to discuss terrorist 
and insurgent finance. The DOD is committed to the application of the 4 ‘D’s doctrine – the 
denial, disruption, destruction and defeat of finance systems and networks which 
undermine US interests.329 Moreover, the US advocates a 'whole of government' approach 
to CTF which includes the military, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and diplomatic 
initiatives. This differs from the UK model were the Ministry of Defence are by contrast 
seldom engaged.330 
 
 “Let’s be clear, terrorist finance is not a priority for the military in the UK, but if the Security 
Service or rather if the intelligence services and law enforcement apply some of how the military think about 
addressing threat and capability and distilling the system for vulnerabilities and opportunities, this might 
better inform how UK PLC take this issue forward. There is a lot of work going on at the minute within the 
DOD [US Dept. of Defence] and some of this is likely to shift across in the future. It might be too early or too 
ambitious at the minute for the [UK] military to be at the table, but given the work on Taliban finance and 
insurgency finance, this should be considered. I think they would bring something fresh and let’s face it, as I 
said the current arrangements have been dominated by the usual suspects and there is clearly a danger in 
that. Look, the military see things differently and their experience in Afghanistan shouldn't be underestimated. 
The DOD work could also be discussed here and this has obvious benefits for us all. Seeing things in a 
different way. UK Strategy on TF should be or will be I expect, targeted more around defeating networks. We 
should see the emergence of 'All Source Fusion Centres', TF, will concentrate more on creating a rich picture 
of knowledge in Afghanistan, understand the networks more, internal and external to Afghanistan as a means 
of degrading enemy capability, there should be more of a focus on Taliban Finance, not just AQ, this should 
be embedded more in UK TF strategy.” 331 
 
It is widely acknowledged that CTF in the US remains a major operational asset and that 
attacking financing is still considered relevant and appropriate to counter the terrorist 
threat.332 Yet this should be set against an emerging theme within the literature 333 and the 
research334, which questions the continued impact of current finance initiatives to combat 
terror. This is arguably more pronounced, given the changes in the terrorism landscape; 
particularly when set against the vested interests which inevitably underpin public policy 
                                                
329 US Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5205.14 19th August 2011   
330 Interviewee 2 citing US DOD publication ‘Counter Threat Finance Vision: Combating 21st Century National Security 
Threats’  
331 Interview with CTF practitioner No.2  
332 Interviewees 1,2, 4   
333 Acharya, A., ‘Small Amounts for Big Bangs: Rethinking Responses to Low Cost Terrorism’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 12.3, 2009  
334 Interviewee’s 2 & 4 
 110 
programmes on this scale. That said, there was strong endorsement from those sampled for 
the ‘contribution’ if not the ‘centrality’ of finance interventions within wider CT 
strategy.335  
 
 “Money is still important, it’s just that the environment is changing and we need to react to this as 
well. The most obvious influence here is the work that is being done by the [US] military and the DOD [US 
Department of Defence] on counter threat finance. This will be picked up eventually and find its way into 
future strategy…. Ultimately there needs to be a multi-faceted approach.  UN sanctions, synchronised with 
local asset freezing and other forms of disruptions, this is what is required to generate an affect. The use of 
targeting through a single tool [finance] is not the most appropriate way to move forward.”336 
 
Some concerns were raised that the growing emphasis on reducing risk and particularly 
reputational risk has deflected attention from the core purpose of CTF, namely 
understanding how an adversary raises, stores, moves and uses terrorist funds. Whilst 
acknowledging that target hardening measures need to be in place, it was suggested that 
there has perhaps been a disproportionate focus on ensuring that the UK financial and 
benefit system is fully resilient from terrorist abuse.337 The key driver governing CTF 
policy should therefore continue to address how an adversary operates, from which 
'enablers' can then be identified and targeted.  Thus on the matter of whether counter 
terrorist finance programmes are 'critical inhibitors,' the interview sessions conveyed a 
broad pragmatism regarding the limitations of these interventions. 338  
 
 “I would say that without an adequate supply of money, terrorist organisations run the risk of 
suffocating or at least impairing their fitness to operate. It certainly won’t stop attacks; it will at best 
delay them and degrade their ability to operate. The bottom line I suppose is that money is still an 
important factor in any terrorist campaign because it gives you influence and ultimately some element of 
control”. 339 
 
Whilst the use of financial data as a first phase intelligence asset is widely acknowledged, 
more work is needed in fusing this data with other intelligence platforms. It was however 
acknowledged, that in response to the new dispensation emerging around the autonomous 
funding template for home-grown attack cells, the emphasis and utility of finance as a 
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critical inhibitor was now being questioned. It was further established that if finance 
interventions were to deliver operational impact, they must be used in conjunction with 
other instruments and assets and shaped by appropriate and credible intelligence. 340 
 
  “Rather than have your fin-inters, geo-inters, and sig-inters, working in isolation, greater 
cohesion is required to map and fuse these various intelligence platforms.   Someone needs to co-
ordinate this at a training level, so that each of these disciplines, rather than operating in silos, develops 
an understanding of the strengths and value added from other areas and platforms.” 341  
 
In summary, whilst there was a broad consensus on the direction of policy and strategy to 
deliver operational impact, it was recognised that CTF should be considered in context. As 
such, deploying CTF programmes against AQAP [Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula] would 
therefore have had limited operational impact whereas communication and media 
interventions were seen as a greater asset in the Yemen than finance interventions. 342 CTF 
was thus considered a 'critical inhibitor' only when used in concert with other methods of 
intervention and targeting.343 At a practical, operational and investigative level, the ability 
to track and map financial transactions remains hugely beneficial in identifying and 
eliminating networks, highlighting relationships between individuals and identifying other 
opportunities for exploitation.  
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Part 2 
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The Economy of Terror 
 
The principal theme emerging from the interview sessions was an almost universal 
acknowledgement, that the 'economy of terror' had changed and that the low levels of 
finance required for recent attacks posed significant problems for CTF interventions 
generally. The operational choices between 'follow the money' and interdiction were thus 
considered within the context of these changes. It was suggested that there were greater 
opportunities for post-blast 'follow the money' intelligence dividends in this new 
dispensation with options for conspiracy phase interdiction at best limited, given the rather 
'sterile' financial profile of recent UK attacks.  
 
As a result of structural changes in terror group composition, sanctioning mechanisms and 
changes in financing methodology, it was suggested that greater emphasis should be given 
to targeting facilitation networks in the future. As a means of enhancing operational 
effectiveness, specific reference was made to typology analysis from the most recent UK 
attacks, to capture changes in terrorist funding profiles from which new strategies and 
counter measures might evolve. Indeed the events of 7/7 were cited as a seminal moment 
which defined a reorientation in the approach now required from CTF practitioners.344    
 
 “I think we all realise that things have changed a lot in recent years, the economy of terror 
looks very different with relatively small sums now required for attack planning.” 345  
 
The emerging options of 'following the money' and interdiction were addressed 
specifically, with the limitations of the latter cited as an ineffective counter measure against 
emerging financially independent attack cells. Scholars and practitioners have long been 
concerned with combating the 'lone-wolf' threat which is considered more difficult to 
counter than the dangers posed by top-down entities.346 Given that this model has now been 
                                                
344 Interviewee’s 1&2 
345 Interview with CTF practitioner No.2,  
346 Chermak S. M., et al ‘Surveying American State Agencies About Lone Wolves’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Volume 33, Number 11, 2010    
 113 
embraced by domestic jihadists, this structural configuration and the wider debate around 
“leaderless resistance” has resulted in further discourses around CTF methodologies in 
particular. Concerns were specifically raised on the viability of interdiction measures to 
impact ‘criminally sterile’ cells.  The 'follow the money' doctrine was thus endorsed as a 
key asset in post incident investigations, particularly where there were significant evidence 
and intelligence gaps around the planning phase. The interviews thus reinforced the 
somewhat limited options for interdiction from increasingly ' covert and anonymous' 
threats.  
 
 “There is recent empirical evidence that shows that more attention is now focused on “following 
the money” and what has emerged is this tautology between “following the money” and interdicting 
finance flows. This will often vary depending on which one is in the ascendency at any one time, and 
what we know about the nature of the threat and from other sources etc. So I think it’s wrong to 
categorise the whole approach to financial investigation as “follow the money”. In many ways this is 
misguided. In the end of course, the operational response must be tailored to the threat and what we are 
seeing increasingly is an invisible threat, certainly an anonymous threat and this extends to the 
[financial] footprint of course. So we need to understand the limitations of seeking to interdict the 
planning of these attacks and focus on the intelligence outcomes from following the money.”347  
 
It was acknowledged that financial intelligence obtained from ‘following the money’ could 
provide investigative leads in identifying cell characteristics and associated networks, 
foreign travel, financial transactions and additional sources of external finance.348   By 
contrast, the rather routine, seemingly innocuous and legitimate behaviour exhibited by 
attack cell members during the conspiracy phase of recent high profile attacks, provided 
limited opportunities for interdiction. It was thus suggested that further typology work was 
required to advance the likelihood of impacting on other conspiracies, by considering new 
indicators which might emerge during plot generation phase.  
 
 “You still need to review [recent attacks] through a financial lens, not solely through a financial 
lens, there are other lenses we need to use when modelling any cell and key to determining the activity of 
cell members is the need to test that model against wider UK mapping.  It’s important to determine 
whether this [trend towards financial independence] is an anomaly. Personally I would suggest that 
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more emphasis needs to be placed on facilitators.” 349   
 
Dealing specifically with the 7/7 bombings in 2005, two key indicators emerged attesting to 
the shift in financial management and modus operandi employed by recent UK attack cells. 
Those involved emptied their bank accounts in the last days of the planning phase and 
made arrangements to deal with all outstanding matters around their private finances.  This 
included the making of wills and the provision of Power of Attorney to family members for 
transferring real estate.350 Such typology work and modelling clearly has the potential to 
inform CTF practitioners of key elements of new operational practices and provide 
indicators for future interventions.351 The notion that the funding methodologies employed 
during the most recent UK attacks would act as a stimulus for the revision of CTF 
practices, with micro-financing interventions dominating the strategic agenda was however 
strongly dismissed.352  
 
 “The micro stuff is crucial however, none of these individual strands are going to be successful in 
isolation.  They should all be mutually fluid and support each other.   The degrees of emphasis you give 
to each area should be fluid and we should revise our Delivery Plan on the basis of JTAC’s threat 
assessment and how we respond to new threats. I understand that recent attacks have resulted in greater 
emphasis being given to targeting low level frauds etc., however, we need to ensure that we don’t 
concentrate on this at the expense of our international work.”353  
 
Whilst it is perhaps understandable that changes in the economy of terror might result in 
greater emphasis on micro financing methodologies, evidence from interview confirms that 
the macro strands continue to dominate strategy. It was however acknowledged that CTF 
must be multi-faceted and continue to focus on facilitation networks through international 
interventions whilst recognising the need to police the threat from home-grown groups.354  
 
 “If you look at these cases [Domestic Plots] in isolation, the money may not appear as relevant, 
however if you start looking at wider networks that fuel these attack cells, then most of the attack cells in 
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the UK have sprung from facilitation networks or morphed into attack cells.” 355   
 
Combating International Threats 
 
Evidence from interview confirmed the continued reliance on the JTAC Threat Assessment 
to inform Ministers through the Terrorist Finance Action Group structures [TFAG] of 
emerging international and domestic threats and priorities. The current 'Threat Finance 
Toolkit'356 which is shaped significantly by operational data and briefings and circulated to 
various threat finance stakeholders, was considered fit for purpose in addressing both 
international threats and domestic conspiracies by independently financed cells.357 ‘The 
‘Threat Finance Toolkit' provisions target the financial aspects of threats to national 
security and include proliferation and insurgency finance to complement the overwhelming 
focus on terrorist financing.  It was acknowledged that successful ‘macro’ CTF 
interventions, delivered through a host of international initiatives, had resulted in 
significant impact in the funding of terror in recent years.  
 
 “These international programmes clearly have had some success, the measures put in place after the 
[9/11] attacks by the US and adopted by ourselves accelerated the focus on CTF. The new measures to 
tighten regulation and lift standards clearly have degraded AQ funding methodology, though this must be 
seen in conjunction with the initial Western military success in degrading capability.” 358  
 
Whilst new funding methodologies had evolved to finance domestic terror cells in the UK, 
these were accompanied by new developments on the international front. The 'transfer of 
'value', exporting goods for sale, trade based money laundering, on-line gambling and 
'kidnap for ransom', were cited as areas of increasing interest and vulnerability which 
should receive more attention and feature more prominently in future CTF strategy.359  
 
 “There is no single financial instrument or a single financial method that facilitators or financiers 
prefer. If you could block off one avenue then another will emerge, it’s simply the mechanics of how 
things are. All financial instruments are capable of being abused, some more easily than others. This 
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was highlighted years ago, although not TF related with North African fraudsters who had designs on a 
particular UK institution. Once this was addressed by law enforcement, they simply moved on to 
another, so we have to be realistic here. Its hard to be precise or prioritise future threats, but we will 
likely see more emphasis on the transfer of value and exporting goods for sale, certainly in terms of 
trade based money laundering as a possible future source of TF internationally. We need to be aware of 
what is happening in terms of financial crime generally because this will migrate across to TF, so we 
need to be vigilant here with the growth of on-line facilities to disguise and launder money generally as 
an emerging area of concern.”360  
 
The continued relevance of CTF as a discipline to deliver operational impact by degrading 
terror group infrastructure, whatever the configuration and context was reaffirmed during 
the interview sessions. The research specifically addressed those challenges from Al Qaeda 
funding requirements in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic Maghreb (AQM) 
and sought to establish whether UK Strategy was sufficiently flexible to counter these 
threats. Whilst these threats have arguably been superceded more recently by events in 
Syria in particular, they nonetheless illustrate how CTF programmes aim to degrade 
infrastructure and access to capital equipment such as vehicles and communications 
technology by targeting a variety of funding platforms. These have obvious limitations 
where the majority of finance is derived from 'kidnap and ransom' operations. Indeed, this 
was assessed as a particular area of concern given the limitations which CTF measures 
could affect on AQM’s increasing reliance on this methodology.361  
 
 “The majority of funds for AQM are derived from ‘kidnap and ransom’ operations and this is 
necessary to fund their operational requirements.  In short they require Euros.  My fear is that this will 
move beyond ‘kidnap and ransom’ to kidnap and political concession because this is how the ‘kidnap 
and ransom’ business works, either kidnap for political objectives, propaganda or the monetary 
reward.”362   
 
The issue of ‘‘kidnap and ransom' was deemed especially problematic given the current 
policy constraints of non-engagement with terrorists on this issue.  This was considered an 
area of particular concern given the emergence of closer alliances between AQM and 
criminal groups using this methodology. As such, it was suggested that a policy shift may 
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be required to address this vulnerability.363  
 
 “Kidnap and ransom is going to become a greater problem in the future.  There may be a policy 
shift here in terms of how we respond because whilst ransom payments to terrorist groups is a non 
starter, it is currently not prohibited to engage with and pay criminal groups such as the Somalian 
Pirates, so when terrorist groups start using criminal groups for funding we clearly have a problem.” 
364 
 
In the context of operational effectiveness, whilst it was recognised that CTF was a fluid 
and dynamic concept and would doubtless continue to add value to wider counter terrorism 
efforts,365 There was also an acknowledgement that CTF would in future give way to new 
technological and digital interventions. 
 
 “My gut feeling is that TF [work] will still have a role to play for big strategic operations aimed 
at degrading organisational capability but will increasingly give way to new developments around our 
technical capabilities. Look at recent successes from drones and predator strikes. Displacement makes it 
more difficult to plan and build infrastructure. In intelligence terms GEOINT and communications 
Intelligence will become increasingly significant in the future. I'm not saying finance hasn't a role to 
play but already we are seeing the increased use of [cash] couriers to by-pass the banking system. What 
impact CTF might have in dealing with AQAP is hard to tell but I would expect more reliance on other 
[intelligence] assets in the future.”366 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
363 Interview with CTF practitioner No.5 
364 Ibid 
365 Interview with CTF practitioner No.4 
366 Interview with CTF practitioner No.2 
 118 
Part 3 
CTF ASSETS 
 
 Financial Intelligence  
 
A further key theme emerging from the interview sessions was a recognition that CTF as a 
concept has continued to develop over time. More importantly however, this evolution, 
albeit assisted by developments in technology and digital media, has resulted in greater 
attention and emphasis being focused on the operational contribution of financial data 
generally. Whilst investigators have long recognised the value of financial information, the 
emergence of financial intelligence (FININT) as a distinct asset and specialist discipline, is 
one of the key developments in counter terrorism practice in recent years.367  
 
 “The way we now investigate terrorism has changed. There is now more emphasis on financial 
data, financial intelligence collection generally. FININT is seen as a primary intelligence asset along 
with SIGINT, HUMINT and GEOINT. The environment has changed. We are now in a digital age where 
the intelligence potential is hard to quantify. Who knows where we will go next with this. Do I believe 
that TF is still relevant for degrading AQ overseas or targeting the insurgents? Yes, because finance as I 
said will always be an enabler to capability.   Finance enables or provides for infrastructure for all 
those non-attack related requirements.  If you then look at how the military judges capability, it has 
defence lines of development or DLODs.  If you degrade any of these, you degrade capability.  I still 
think there is a lack of understanding around why we specifically target finance.  In simple terms, we are 
looking at finance because it is an enabler to capability.”368 
 
However, the acknowledged utility of financial data as a key feature of counter terrorism 
practice, has been accompanied by growing concerns regarding enhanced scrutiny and 
regulation, given the intrusive potential of this methodology and the obvious challenges to 
privacy and individual liberty. 369   
 
 “There is a strong recognition within law enforcement, that we are in a very privileged albeit 
legally sanctioned position in gaining access to personal financial information and that certain 
procedures and standards must pertain to how we handle this material.  We may get to a position in the 
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future, where access to financial intelligence may be governed or graded by the severity of the crime.  So 
if it became an issue, we need to make the argument that we require volume intelligence and volume 
surveillance where it poses a risk to life.”370  
 
Financial intelligence has clearly emerged as a key asset to corroborate other intelligence 
platforms. In the context of addressing threats to national security, it is now considered 
essential to complement digital, signals and human intelligence as well as emerging assets 
such as geospatial satellite intelligence (GEOINT) and Image intelligence (IMAGINT).371 
The real value of financial intelligence however, is when it is overlaid with other 
intelligence products for source verification purposes and to provide a more complete 
understanding of the subject.372  
 
 “We are certainly getting there in establishing financial intelligence as a significant 
collaborative area of intelligence that can corroborate existing intelligence or add new intelligence.   It 
should be seen in the same way as SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT and IMAGINT.  It is important to 
understand that financial intelligence only provides a unilateral perspective and its real operational 
value is when it is mapped over other intelligence platforms.  The key is to cross-fertilise with other 
intelligence platforms to give you an all source picture.”373  
 
On the wider issues of privacy and data protection generally, there was a clear 
understanding of the need by police and intelligence services to sensitively manage data 
supplied by industry partners.374  
 
 What is essential and vital is the need to develop and nurture these partnerships.  We need to be 
aware and demonstrate some understanding of their position and our commitment to respect the way we 
handle this type of information. This is a key partnership. There is a requirement to constantly engage 
because of the emphasis we continue to place on financial intelligence mainly through suspicious 
activity reporting (SARs).375   
 
Indeed the need to continually nurture and develop these relationships, to build trust and 
confidence and to apprise private actors of the parameters and mandates governing law 
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enforcement finance interventions was cited as an area for attention. However, concerns 
were raised during interview, regarding future access to financial data on the scale currently 
enjoyed, given the public’s increasing understanding of the power of financial information 
and the perceived challenges to 'privacy' and personal liberty as a result. It was suggested 
that this was perhaps an area, which might receive more scrutiny in the future from 
Regulators and Commissioners.  
 
 “Financial intelligence is a tremendous tool for law enforcement.  It’s about identifying patterns of 
life, location and source verification etc.  [It] has emerged almost as a separate discipline within CTF but one 
in which more operational attention is focused. The difficulty I foresee is the intrusive nature of this sort of 
collection. There's already a sense of paranoia on the scale of surveillance by the state, or a sense of the level 
of intrusion which law enforcement and the intelligence services can now bring from a range of assets. This is 
driven of course by technology. So I would expect some discourse in the future between the agencies and 
Commissioners regarding the regulation of these practices. The public at least notionally has some 
understanding of law enforcement capability, but it’s not that well informed. The policy emphasis on openness 
and transparency will no doubt bring about some additional scrutiny in due course, but that’s no bad thing. 
Law enforcement are simply exploiting the intelligence opportunities which these technologies provide. So I 
would expect that the way we collect financial intelligence may come under scrutiny in the future, not just 
financial intelligence, but other [digital] collection. There is a strong argument here regarding our CT 
mandates and our duty to protect the public. We just need to accept that this area may attract more scrutiny 
and supervision in the future.” 376 
 
The interviews confirmed the evolution of CTF in response to developments in data 
surveillance and the emphasis on the operational value of financial information.  
Confronting the terrorist threat now routinely involves the collection, classification and 
analysis of financial information and other personal data.  
 
 “If you consider how far things have come since FISAC 377was established, then its pretty clear that 
the most obvious developments have been around our use of financial material for intelligence purposes. It’s 
difficult to overstate the extent to which we rely on this material. It’s difficult to imagine any CT operation or 
investigation without supporting financial intelligence work to advise and inform. As the digital capability 
expands, so to does our financial footprint. We are moving towards a cashless society and this provides an 
intelligence windfall for investigators.  So the value of this product is going to become more important in the 
future, criminals and terrorist organisations can't avoid or easily circumvent these developments, the digital 
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and financial footprint is probably going to be more visible. You can rely on couriers to an extent to move 
small remittances, but financial intelligence or the value of financial intelligence is bigger than understanding 
TF. It’s the wider intelligence and surveillance potential which financial intelligence provides which is the 
real story.”378   
 
However, it is precisely this access to wider data analysis programmes which focus on 
financial risk assessments, automated screening and telecom link analysis which raise much 
wider questions around sovereignty and governmentality.379 For many states, the events of 
9/11 prompted a re-evaluation of the prevailing global security apparatus including a 
reappraisal of their existing surveillance architecture. In response to the attacks, several 
states hastily enacted legislation sanctioning enhanced levels of intrusion through access to 
consumer and bio-data. Significant surveillance opportunities thus emerged from 
developments in information technology and the capacity of networked systems. It was 
acknowledged during interview that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have 
benefited enormously from these opportunities by accessing those flows of personal data 
which regulate and monitor a variety of human interactions and activities.380  With the 
advent of globalisation, these modes of surveillance are now sufficiently flexible to track 
the movements, and general lifestyle preferences of individuals. 
 
Several core themes have emerged in recent years in the quest to counter the funding of 
terrorism which challenge the notion of liberal governance. These include the increasing 
reliance on, and use of personal information by the state as a tool for subsequent risk 
analysis. In addition, pre-emption and the precautionary principle have now evolved within 
broader counter terrorism policy. The emphasis on the collection of financial data 
consolidates the requirement that policy interventions should be 'intelligence led'. Given 
that the pursuit of personal data and the pace of development around its collection and 
sharing, now outstrips our understanding of the consequences, concerns were raised 
regarding the need to champion these assets whilst recognising the challenge of reconciling 
personal liberty with security interventions. 
 
It was suggested that the extension of financial intelligence collection by law enforcement 
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and intelligence agencies has resulted in unintended consequences for the individual and 
their relationship with the state. 381 The interview sessions sought to consider the value of 
FININT and financial surveillance generally to counter the threat from terrorism. 
Ultimately these sessions acknowledged the underlying challenges to liberty and privacy as 
a consequence of enhanced data surveillance. 
 
Public/Private Partnerships 
 
The reliance on private actors for CTF interventions was strongly endorsed and these 
partnerships were considered essential in the fight against terrorism. The structure of the 
UK financial services sector and the concentration of personal accounts held by the major 
retail banks conferred significant operational advantages for law enforcement.382  
 
 “We always believe that in comparative terms, certainly when benchmarking our relationships 
against other member states in the EU, that we have an excellent relationship and perhaps even an 
easier relationship given that there are four or five main retail banks which cover somewhere in the 
region of 75-80% of UK customers. So if you compare us to the US, were there are literally hundreds of 
institutions, we only need to concentrate on building and servicing four or five main relationships. Our 
framework for maintaining this relationship is of course legislative and in particular the DPA [Data 
Protection Act 1998] and other provisions under various financial statutes.” 383 
 
Whilst acknowledging the value of these relationships, evidence from interview suggests 
that pragmatism largely defines these relationships.  Indeed, whilst there was an 
acknowledgement of increasing reliance on and engagement with the financial sector 
generally, there was broad consensus that the commercial focus of these organisations and 
their statutory obligations for commercial governance and compliance mandates regarding 
'Due Diligence' and 'Know Your Customer' provisions, would take precedence over law 
enforcement considerations.384  
 
 “The bottom line is that banks are commercial organisations wedded to their shareholders. In recent 
times, those non-profit parts of the business, the compliance regimes etc. have been squeezed and this clearly 
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may over time impact on the relationship and service given to police and other agencies. There is a degree of 
obfuscation at times, but the relationship in the UK is overwhelmingly a pragmatic one. I don’t subscribe to 
the view that the institutions are ‘foot soldiers’. Financial information provides a huge 360 [degree] insight 
into individuals of interest, but despite considerable improvements over the years, there is still a problem 
getting full access to tax information in particular. If we had access to this data, to investments, shares, 
relationships to financial advisors and accountants, real estate etc. in one hit, then this would be hugely 
beneficial, however, as things stand, this is almost prohibited.”385  
   
Thus what had begun as an ad hoc and somewhat distant relationship between law 
enforcement agencies and the financial sector, has developed into a central pillar within 
wider CT apparatus. Several factors account for these developments, not least the emphasis, 
which had been attached to multi-agency and partnership, programmes as a key aspect of 
public policy generally. The emphasis by US authorities on this type of engagement and the 
desire for replication particularly within the UK and the European Union was considered a 
key factor.  
 
 “In wider terms, we are keen to develop a common approach in tackling TF, working collaboratively 
in support of our US and EU partners. There will clearly be some conflicting priorities but on the whole this 
has been about broader partnerships. The UK role and policy is in supporting the US TF tracking programme 
and communicating to the Europeans who are worried about the Data Protection aspect and data being 
transferred on Euro citizens to the US authorities.  We can’t stress enough the importance of this data from 
the programme in helping to build the intelligence picture and giving us new intelligence leads.  But we just 
can't give details, specific details of which operations have benefited from this data.” 386     
 
It was however, the developing understanding of the operational value of financial data 
held by the institutions, which largely explains the emphasis on consolidating these 
partnerships.  
 
 “Clearly one of the sectors we have had most success engaging with are the formal financial 
institutions.  We have an excellent relationship with the British Banking Association (BBA) and through 
them with the main financial institutions and they do have very good systems in place to disrupt ML and 
TF.  We continue to engage with them because they continually want more information from us as to 
what red flag indicators are.  We need to be better at feeding back the typologies, we can’t simply 
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demand enhanced levels of SARs reporting if we don’t reciprocate.” 387 
 
 “Public / private partnerships are clearly crucial to the collection of financial intelligence.  You 
don’t need this sort of engagement to do Signals Intelligence; you simply need a warrant from the Home 
Office and a set of headphones.  You don’t need public / private partnerships to do surveillance, you 
require a RIPA [Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act] authority, ten blokes, two bikes and two taxis, 
but you do require this for the financial institutions and Charities Commission etc. ... which is why we 
have strong relationships with these institutions.”388  
 
It is therefore in the context of enhancing intelligence flows, that these partnerships should 
be considered and understood. The current arrangements in the UK are based on a 
legislative framework which underpins and legitimises requests made by law enforcement, 
through the Data Protection Act 1998 and other statutory instruments.389 Aside from the 
formal mechanisms fostering closer engagement, there is considerable emphasis on 
promoting the notion of civic responsibility. Indeed the messaging around these 
partnerships affirms the view that the institutions have a key role to play within wider 
society and have a duty to support and engage with law enforcement around the supply of 
financial information for harm reduction and public safety. It is however recognised that 
this is a two-way process and requires considerable investment from all parties.390   
 
 “The key here is the 1929 Banking Secrecy Act, which allows an institution to breach 
confidentiality if it believes that there is a threat to life.  The UK position is that there is a legislative 
framework to underpin and legitimise the requests made by law enforcement.  In addition, the Banks are 
part of our society and they have civic responsibilities to support, to supply information in support of 
law enforcement.  This is a two-way process, it needs engagement and law enforcement has its 
responsibility to do its part to sell the message and explain in broad general terms why some of the 
requests are made.  This is about building confidence.”391  
 
Whilst the framework for maintaining these relationships is anchored by legislative 
instruments, with regulatory provisions and penalties, it is acknowledged that banks are 
ultimately private entities with commercial imperatives. As such, those parts of the 
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business which typically interface with law enforcement, those non-profit functions such as 
Risk, Compliance and Security, are often less well resourced and supported. Indeed 
concerns were voiced that organisational restructuring in the wake of the global banking 
crises of 2008 had the potential to adversely impact on the relationship and service given to 
police and other agencies.392 As such, greater engagement was encouraged to ensure that 
private sector partners understand their key role in providing data to law enforcement to 
reduce crime and enhance public safety. 393  Notwithstanding the acknowledged 
organisational tensions that surface on occasions, the institutions are nonetheless 
considered a key CTF asset.  
 
 “The nature of the relationship is no doubt influenced largely by the threat of regulation and 
penalties. The threat of exposure plays a large part in shaping the relationship. Often reputational risk 
is a factor and this must be balanced against their own policies and procedures and the pursuit of profit. 
It is simply the nature of how things work. The relationship in the UK is a good one, particularly 
between the NTFIU and the institutions, but it is as I have said, backed up with legal instruments.”394  
 
It was therefore considered essential and vital to develop and nurture these partnerships 
given the emphasis placed on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in particular. Despite 
these developments, there was little acknowledgement from those interviewed, that the 
banking sector had now transformed sufficiently to the point where it had as de Goede 395 
has suggested, assumed “proxy sovereign power on behalf of the State.”396  
 
 I don’t share the view that the institutions and the banking sector have transformed sufficiently to 
the point where they have assumed proxy sovereign power on behalf of the State as you indicate.  They 
still retain a lot of independence, that’s not to say that they don’t engage, but it is necessary as SARs are 
important, because Government relies on SARs as the first barrier in maintaining a hostile environment 
and it has worked reasonably successfully with the major banks.  Look at the intelligence value of the 
sort of information they hold and retain under the regulations [money laundering regulations], KYC 
[know your customer], basic information on names, addresses, spellings, additional mobiles, e-mail 
addresses etc. The official line is that they are valuable partners and the policy clearly reflects this. 
There is still an emphasis on the role of the private sector and this smoothes the path to an extent when 
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we increasingly place greater demands on the institutions. There are the usual grumblings still about 
resourcing, particularly in the present climate and again the issue of feedback or lack of it continues to 
feature, although things have improved a lot recently. There’s still the impression though that we don’t 
share or fully engage, that we take more out of the partnership, although this is less of an issue now 
compared to how things were years ago. The vetted group [Financial Sector Representatives] has been 
a success to some extent here, it helps of course that we have the right contacts with the right sort of 
experience at senior levels within the institutions to grease the wheels. The other issue for us clearly is 
the sort of work and profiling which is captured by the banks in terms of understanding their customer 
base, for marketing etc. so that new products can be tested, targeted. There has to be some intelligence 
value in this for us. There might be more we could do here to explore this more, particularly given the 
problems we are likely to face from those cells which are under the radar, we should be thinking about 
which products are likely to assist more with anonymity.397 
 
It was further suggested that closer engagement with law enforcement was necessary in 
terms of political and commercial pragmatism.  Whilst the institutions benefited from this 
interaction, they nonetheless retained considerable independence. It was suggested that 
these arrangements reinforced perceptions of civic responsibility, ethics and organisational 
integrity and were central to delivering counter terrorism outcomes.398 
 
 “There’s obviously an element of mutual benefit here in the relationship. The industry as a 
whole gets the benefit of partnership with the government, an understanding of the risks generally from 
criminal profits and terrorist financing, whereas we get access to valuable intelligence product” 399 
 
 “The financial sector is always looking for greater engagement and more information. It’s 
important for their reputation, it enhances their brand and yes it’s about civic responsibility. They are a 
key partner in assisting with CT interventions and recognised widely as such. The Home Office enjoys 
good relations with other Government departments, clearly there is further work we can do in terms of 
reinforcing the need for greater due diligence in the allocation of monies by other Government 
departments to the various NGOs.  There is an information message to be conveyed around the potential 
abuse of Government funding by donor groups with extremist views.”400    
 
A further perceived benefit to law enforcement from these partnerships was the potential 
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for preliminary engagement with industry professionals to discuss terrorist finance and 
wider criminal vulnerabilities from new financial products and instruments.401  
 
 We have also issued a [Threat Finance] ‘Toolkit’402 We need to understand which [financial] 
products are likely to be susceptible to abuse, which are most vulnerable and engage with the financial 
sector at an early stage. So government understands the threat and the importance of disruption and 
undermining capability through financial interventions and it aims to make these tools part of the UK's 
approach to targeting threat finance in the round.403 
 
 “We should be trying to design out crime in much the same way as [police] Commanders have 
had an interest in this sort of stuff for years. I accept that commercial drivers take precedence, but we 
need to be much smarter in future. The default for any new financial product should be some element of 
resilience testing against ML and TF. Greater cooperation at the product development stage should be 
encouraged. It’s not sufficient to leave this to the institutions, both law enforcement and the industry 
needs to be involved here. Let’s face it, they are caught between a rock and a hard place because the 
Board wants them to make money yet they still have a wider social and moral responsibility to assist the 
State and reduce crime.” 404 
 
Whilst this was a matter which required further discussion, the concept of law enforcement 
consultation at the product development stage was considered an area for enhanced 
engagement, given the obvious dividends of applying initial security features to mitigate 
risk and the benefits of greater cooperation between both sectors around financial crime 
interventions generally.    
 
  “We need to be quite imaginative here, more dialogue is needed with the industry around their 
future proposals on new products and where this fits in terms of threats and vulnerabilities, not just for 
terrorist financing. Obviously their commercial and business needs will take precedence, but we should 
be looking to get an early heads-up on what this means potentially for law enforcement and the TF 
community.” 405  
 
Thus the consensus emerging was of an effective, if somewhat pragmatic relationship 
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between CTF practitioners and the financial institutions. This was based on an 
understanding of differing, though not mutually exclusive operational and organisational 
values, albeit assisted by the existing structural apparatus which had helped to foster and 
nurture these partnerships.406 Ultimately however, the operational value of these 
partnerships will be determined by results and whether they impact significantly on the 
funding of terrorism. Whilst there has been an increased emphasis on multi-agency, multi 
sector engagement with public actors generally, it was acknowledged, that the acid test 
regarding success is not increased levels of engagement, interaction and shared 
responsibility, but rather, threat reduction and enhanced public safety.  
 
 “It’s very easy to demonstrate teamwork, to simply keep passing the ball to someone else; in the 
end it’s about results. Sometimes there is reluctance by some government agencies to engage fully with 
the private sector.  This needs to be more focussed, targeted and specific and address what exactly is 
required. At the moment we are perhaps content to demonstrate the partnerships rather than the 
outcomes.”407   
 
Suspicious Activity Reports  
 
Whilst the SARs (Suspicious Activity Report) regime, the most obvious asset from these 
public/private interactions, has often been seen as vital in establishing a hostile 
environment for financial crime, doubts regarding the utility of SARs for combating 
terrorist financing emerged as a recurring theme. It was suggested that the retail-banking 
sector was extremely vulnerable to abuse and had carried significant risk historically due to 
unsecured credit thresholds across a range of financial products. Evidence from interview 
cited the increased use of credit cards by criminals to purchase goods which were in turn 
sold on for cash. The use of multiple identities on credit card applications was also 
highlighted as a further area of concern.408  
 
 “We know that the retail banking sector offers the greatest risk due to the unsecured credit 
available however there is very little that can be done here with SARs. Even though things have 
improved, we still see criminals using credit cards to purchase goods, and selling them on for cash – 
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how to you deal with that? We see the use of multiple identities on credit card applications. How do you 
combat that?” 409 
 
The use of such methodologies serves to highlight the limitations of SARs in these 
scenarios. Indeed, as a result of the operational impotence of the SARs regime to impact on 
this type of criminality, such products and mechanisms were likely to be exploited further 
by criminals and terrorists. 
 
 “Given that some financial products will inevitably cause us problems and that certain types of 
bank and credit fraud are difficult to identify from a crime and terrorist financing point of view, this is 
where I would focus my efforts. This is where attack cells will concentrate I would guess and there is 
very little we can do. So from a SARs point of view they are pretty useless here. This is never likely to be 
picked up by the institutions.” 410 
 
In an attempt to enhance the effectiveness of the current SARs regime, greater outreach 
with financial institutions was encouraged on a range of matters. The need for regular 
debriefing to the financial sector at the conclusion of operations on trends and 
developments and emerging modus operandi employed by terrorist groups was 
acknowledged. Indeed it was suggested that greater mutual appreciation of the respective 
stances of law enforcement and private institutions had evolved over time and that a more 
formalised approach should be taken with regard to post incident debriefing particularly in 
terms of cooperation in typology development, in order that this can be disseminated to the 
institutions to thwart further attempts to generate funds through similar methodologies.411  
 
 “There was an element of arrogance I suppose, certainly at the beginning in the way in which 
we engaged the institutions generally, in the way things were done. We clearly had the authority and the 
security climate was such that these demands evolved.  Now its developed and matured, its more of a 
genuine partnership, though the industry believes we could still do more in terms of debriefing incidents 
etc. There will always be tension, its simply the nature of how organisations function. It’s part of the 
culture of law enforcement and how key information is disseminated. We are now much more 
comfortable with sharing intelligence and assessments and this is now much more formalised. The FSA 
have been excellent here, the industry now has a better understanding of our needs and the way we 
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operate. We now understand the value which the institutions bring here in mapping typologies and 
looking for patterns, trends.412  
 
Given the funding template used by recent domestic attack cells in the UK and the absence 
of financial crime to support these activities, there were huge difficulties in identifying 
terrorist financing from SARs submissions. As such, it was suggested that the institutions 
should be briefed more fully on these developments and the increasing limitations of SARs 
in this context and the emerging operational and intelligence challenges now facing law 
enforcement.413 
 
 “I think that there is or certainly was a degree of hyperbole around the whole SARs thing, a 
view that SAR's were gold dust. We however, must take some responsibility here and engage more, be 
clear about their limitations and our requirements.” 414  
 
That said, it was acknowledged that the financial institutions and the regulated sector are 
key CTF partners and that despite the difficulties, SARs continued to add value when fused 
with other assets.415 There were however several calls for improvements in the quality of 
SARs reporting generally.416 Indeed, it was suggested, that further 'product development' 
around SARs would enhance the ability of police and intelligence agencies to analyse and 
extract 'richer' and more detailed material. Enhanced liaison and engagement with the 
financial institutions could facilitate greater access to biographical and lifestyle data 
captured by the institutions under the KYC (Know Your Customer) protocols.  A greater 
understanding of the customer profiling data developed by commercial organisations 
largely for sales and marketing purposes was seen as an important and largely untapped 
intelligence asset which had not yet been fully exploited.417  
 
 “I still think that there are still some problems with the quality of SARs reporting, although 
things are improving. If you look at the sort of material which is routinely recorded now under the 
[money laundering] regulations and their KYC and CDD obligations, then this is clearly intelligence 
gold dust for starters, but it requires to be developed and refined further, and I'm not sure that this is 
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ever really fully recognised or understood. ” 418 
 
 “SARs reporting is unlikely to provide the “silver bullet”, they are unlikely to be the final piece in the 
jigsaw, but they have value and we need to engage more to lift the quality and improve data-mining generally.  
Somebody said of SARs, they may not save your life, but they are the “canary in the mine-shaft”.  They are 
often the first indication that’s something’s wrong. I suppose SARs can claim some credit for shining a light 
on the whole financial intelligence thing and that perhaps is what we should concentrate on when assessing 
their value, it has changed the way we investigate crime and terrorism.”419 
 
Whilst it emerged that the value of SARs for CTF outcomes may have been somewhat 
overplayed, there was nonetheless an acknowledgement that the SARs regime had served to 
heighten the interest and attention given to financial intelligence as an asset to CT and 
criminal investigations generally.420 Whilst it was stressed, that financial information 
required to be analysed and overlaid with other data for wider operational impact, SARs 
had a key role in shaping subsequent modelling and typology work and that this was an 
area in which greater attention and resources should be allocated to advance their value. 
This emphasis on modelling and typology profiling was therefore considered essential in 
order that banks respond appropriately to the data and set their internal control strategies in 
an effort to enhance the likelihood of identifying fraud and terrorist financing.421 
 
 “We have done some modelling around a Vulnerable Products Paper which identifies products 
which have been used in the past, the products which are vulnerable to exploitation to finance terrorism 
or other extremist activity.  We are also relying here on the need for regular and routine debriefing to 
the financial sector on the modus operandi employed by terrorist groups or extremists. This should be 
done automatically at the conclusion of operations and investigations so that this knowledge can be 
disseminated further throughout the financial sector to thwart other attempts to generate funds through 
similar schemes.  I know this has been done by NTFIU in the past but it also firms up their partnerships 
with the reporting sector.”422  
 
Finally, the FATF regime was cited by several participants as a valuable asset in promoting 
SARs universally and attempting to raise standards around the investigation of financial 
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crime and specifically in promoting the risk based approach. FATF was also endorsed for 
its role in attempting to foster wider international cooperation to combat both money 
laundering and terrorist financing.423 FATF was further credited with developing an 
industry standard across various jurisdictions and a network of subgroups, which in turn 
had raised legislative standards. 
 
 “FATF is a useful lever for us for our international work and trying to get certain countries to 
take TF work seriously.  The fear of reputational damage through naming and shaming is a great tool 
for this.  We still need to focus on capacity building and training which I know is being taken forward to 
great effect by the NTFIU, but we still need to invest here. The fact that FATF exists and has taken on 
TF work as part of its wider portfolio is important in selling the message, particularly to those countries 
where we have problems. I’m aware of the arguments here, its difficult to say, but Ministers will always 
take comfort from these institutions, even if there is probably more cynicism from practitioners.”424 
 
“[FATF] has created the basis to continue the conversation on CTF, whether that’s confronting old or 
new terrorist groups.  What you get is a degree of international buy-in, a standard from which 
governments, institutions or law enforcement can learn.  There will always be a huge benefit from the 
promulgation of its policies, however, the real value I suppose is on the diplomatic front, it puts CTF on 
the agenda, though it still falls some way short of really having significant impact for practitioners. 
There are still major legal and jurisdictional problems which sit outside the remit of FATF.”425  
 
Thus, FATF was valued more by government officials as a vehicle to promote finance 
interventions and accelerate scrutiny and set universal standards around risk and 
compliance. Its value from a practitioner’s perspective of those sampled was less 
enthusiastic.  
 
 “You do need international conventions, some sort of structure which recognises the need to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing and the [Terrorist Finance] recommendations do push 
the boundaries and assist in establishing greater understanding. There is criticism that the real value is 
cosmetic, it seems that the emphasis is more about the institution itself rather than what it can deliver for 
practitioners like us. The nine TFSR’s [Terrorist Finance Special Recommendations] are a macro-level, 
supra national way of getting FIUs, the regulated sector, the SARs regime and all those regulators that 
fall out of it more focused and cohesive. It’s about enhancing credibility for what the role of a national 
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FIU should target and also about establishing the minimum standards required for protecting financial 
intelligence. As a tool specifically for targeting terrorist financing, I would say the jury is still out, but 
some of the Working Groups on Terrorist Finance have produced some reasonable typology exercises.” 
426  
 
 “I’m not convinced that the TF special recommendations have delivered. This was a classic 
policy response. They were more about catching the TF tide, about finding a TF role for FATF. They 
[Terrorist Finance Special Recommendations] certainly matter to Government; they are taken extremely 
seriously when you are mutually evaluated by your peer group.  Nobody wants a bad evaluation.  FATF 
have created an almost industry standard across many States and created a network of sub-groups 
whether it’s the Asia Pacific group or elsewhere. Whilst they may have a basic legislative standard, 
many States still may lack the resources beneath that.” 427  
 
In summary, whilst there were doubts regarding the impact of the FATF Terrorist Finance 
Recommendations, FATF was considered a useful lever for the UK government to enhance 
its international work on CTF by encouraging a range of countries to embrace reform and 
tighten their internal risk and compliance procedures. The fear of reputational damage 
through naming and shaming for non compliance with FATF mandates was considered a 
valuable tool in securing wider international engagement and underscores the value of 
multi-lateral, multi-sector cooperation. Whilst the emphasis internationally was focused 
more on capacity building and training, FATF was nonetheless considered an important 
partner in selling the CTF message and welcomed as such by UK ministers.428    
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Part 4 
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND VULNERABILITIES 
 
The final part of the research considers the “Future Challenges and Vulnerabilities” which 
are likely to dominate the CTF agenda in the years ahead. This was deemed necessary to 
inform future public policy and operational strategy. It draws on the professional 
experiences of those sampled and further seeks to elicit recommendations on suggested 
improvements to the current apparatus in addressing these challenges. It was therefore 
informed by a visceral and intuitive understanding of how the terrorist finance landscape 
might evolve, from which counter measures and the future resilience of CTF infrastructure 
might be considered and revised. In recent years, greater attention has been given to 
understanding remittance systems and most notably, the vulnerability of Money Service 
Bureaus (MSB's) as a platform for terrorist financing and money laundering. Whilst 
strongly reflected in both the literature and policy,429 this theme was also reinforced during 
the interview sessions, with the dedicated and enhanced targeting of MSB's considered a 
key priority.430 Whilst the challenge of addressing the threat emanating from home-grown 
groups was cited as the principal domestic challenge in the short to medium term,431 
Pakistan and Gulf Donor states were acknowledged as the main international threats.432 As 
regards those measures cited to improve future UK CTF interventions, greater judicial 
cooperation and international engagement were advocated433 along with enhanced access to 
secondary financial data, for the purpose of modelling and profiling in order that CTF 
policy and strategy might be better informed.434  
 
Remittance Systems 
 
With regard to remittance systems and Money Service Businesses (MSB’s) in particular, 
several initiatives in the “Counter Terrorist Finance Strategy and Delivery Plan 2011/12” 
specifically include provisions to strengthen the governments approach to the MSB sector 
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and tangentially, to improve the UK's capability to disrupt terrorist cash couriers.435 Though 
acknowledged that MSB's have traditionally been an easy conduit for diaspora communities 
to remit funds, there was a consensus that CTF interventions are particularly vulnerable to 
these entities given their lack of formal controls and SARs reporting.436 As such it was 
suggested, that greater operational focus be given to targeting the routine use of these 
institutions for small remittances from the UK to hostile environments overseas. Whilst 
there was sufficient evidence and intelligence presently, to indicate complicity in terrorist 
financing and crime by some MSB’s, from a regulatory perspective these infringements 
were difficult to identify given the lack of transparency around cash transactions.437 
Moreover, the current supervision and regulation of MSB's was highlighted as an area of 
particular concern. 
 
 “The focus in future years should be on the vulnerabilities of small institutions such as MSB’s 
rather than large institutions and the routine use of these institutions for small remittances out of the UK 
to hostile environments. I understand the legitimacy of these businesses and why they are used and the 
fact that from a regulatory perspective it is difficult to spot TF or crime. There is however sufficient 
evidence presently to indicate complicity in TF and crime by some MSB’s. There is a cross over here 
and it is difficult to address this given the lack of transparency in targeting cash.”438  
 
“The use of HMRC as both an enforcer and regulator of a ‘light touch’ regime has not in my view been a 
success. We need to take a look again at the regulation; its not working, its difficult I know, but this is where 
we are most vulnerable, MSB’s and [Cash] Couriers. The problem here is separating out the legitimate 
transfers from the criminal, we have a major problem here with monies going out to the FATA, Pakistan 
generally, we just can’t be specific. Again there is perhaps an intelligence failure here on the detail. This is a 
big concern. Part of the problem is cultural. We have become too accepting of the difficulties, we need to 
make an example of those we suspect to be complicit, to send out a strong message. They are only really 
paying lip service to the regulations, we need to focus on SARs here as a starter, get the quality and the 
numbers up for a start.”439  
 
The limited prospects of securing successful operational outcomes against Informal Value 
Transfer Systems (IVTS), Hawala and Money Service Businesses, was universally 
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recognised by all participants.440  
 
 “Remittance systems will always be problematic for us, we just have to accept that, but we need to be 
smarter in identifying 'bad money'. Take Western Union with its large financial intelligence unit based in 
Denver, even they are at a loss in separating out dirty money or money for terrorist financing. If the funds are 
moving through the unregulated sector, you have virtually no chance of detecting it for intelligence purposes, 
never mind trying to disrupt it, particularly when the number one remittance corridor is to Pakistan.   When 
the sums of money now involved are so small and mixed in with thousands of perfectly legitimate remittances, 
this is virtually impossible.  It’s the same with cash couriers, obviously with regular and substantial number 
of travellers going to Pakistan and other TF destinations they take cash with them so the perennial question 
and real challenge is how do you identify bad money.”441 
 
A reassessment of the fundamentals around remittance systems generally was suggested, 
although it was acknowledged that work was currently on-going in terms of remittance 
profiling and a re-evaluation of the current supervisory regime as well as law enforcement 
engagement with the sector.442  
 
 “The MSB sector obviously is a major source of concern and we are already doing some work 
here to strengthen our approach to the sector. This is a Treasury lead and we are focused in terms of 
delivering impact here and have already taken this forward with HMRC in terms of identifying key 
deliverables to disrupt the use of MSB’s for the purposes of TF and obviously crime generally. We also 
need to improve our knowledge on TF generally. We need a better understanding of the nature and 
scope of TF across the UK. We are not really getting as full and comprehensive a picture as we would 
like, we believe we are well sighted on the picture here in London, but there are gaps in our 
understanding overall. We need further outreach work here regionally with our [CT] partners to really 
understand the scale of the problem.”443  
 
Further difficulties were highlighted regarding the monetary thresholds for remitting funds, 
most notably the fact that no formal documentation is currently required for payments of 
less than €1,000. Given that UK nationals often routinely remit funds to diaspora 
communities in Pakistan in particular, the ‘red light’ indicators for money laundering are 
inappropriate and thus ineffective for terrorist financing, unless the funds have been raised 
illegally. 
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 “There is very limited reporting in the UK from MSBs and funding TF is extremely difficult as much of 
the reporting is badged as money laundering.  There is a priorities issue here, whilst the Security Service are 
interested in terrorist finance, they don’t look at TF as a separate issue, it tends to be incorporated within a 
wider suite of activities linked to specific operations.  We on the policy side could perhaps benefit if there was 
more modelling done on TF as a separate and distinct subject area to shape and inform public policy.” 444 
 
In an effort to enhance outcomes, consideration has been given to reviewing current US and 
European supervision practices which target the expansion of the regulated sector to 
include previously unregulated entities. It was further suggested that the civil enforcement 
role undertaken by HMRC Assurance Officers under the Money Laundering Regulations 
2007 should be used to greater effect. In future there should be less focus on compliance in 
administrative terms, with greater use instead of the civil and criminal penalties to name 
and shame persistent offenders.445 Indeed HMRC currently has the ability to levy unlimited 
fines on businesses which fail to comply with customer due diligence requirements, flout 
audit and record keeping requirements and those entities that trade outside HMRC's 
supervision.446 Finally it was acknowledged that successful interventions against MSB's 
would as a consequence result in other methodologies assuming greater significance. 
 
 “The more success we have in creating a hostile environment for MSB's and Hawala, then the more 
couriers will be used. We will simply displace the problem, although this is nothing new, we understand this 
and simply have to plan accordingly. 447  
 
Cash Couriers 
 
It was acknowledged in several interviews that terrorist financiers and criminal 
organisations use various methods to remit illegal funds.448 These generally involve the use 
of the financial system, fraudulent trading arrangements and the physical movement of 
money. The UK is assessed to be a net exporter of terrorist finance449 with cash couriers, 
MSB’s and bearer negotiable instruments (BNI’s) the preferred methods of concealment 
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and transfer.  
 
 “We know that groups use a variety of methods to move funds out of the UK. We are doing a lot of 
work around the threat in terms of money transmitters.  What does a UK money transmitter look like, how do 
we best approach that market in terms of our supervision of it, how might law enforcement engage with that 
sector and what should we be doing differently?   These are the sorts of issues we are currently looking at. Of 
course one of the problems is and perhaps contrary to how we used to think, it’s not just hawaladars and 
back-street Money Service Bureaus (MSBs) that are being abused.  Actually because of the fact that if you are 
transmitting under €1,000, which quite often people are transmitting these amounts to relatives who might be 
based in the FATA, you don’t even have to produce documentation, and the red light indicators you might 
look for in terms of money laundering don’t necessarily exist in TF unless the money has been raised in an 
illegal way.450    
 
It was suggested that terrorist finance is commonly moved from the UK in small amounts 
by cash couriers451 in particular and in the absence of specific intelligence, it is often 
difficult to differentiate terrorist financing smuggled by money remitters from legitimate or 
other forms of criminal funding.  
 
 “Cash smuggling is a real concern and with the sums involved, it’s difficult to pin down whether this 
is legitimate or TF [terrorist financing]. We know that AQ prefer this, there is no need to engage with the 
financial sector, no audit, the money is simply carried to the source of need. The Operation Tartan452 work is 
on-going and there has been some success in targeting routes to disrupt facilitation and funding. The big 
problem here is that the legislation doesn’t cover e-money and [stored] value cards. We need to look at this, 
we urgently need the legislation in place to block this loophole.” 453  
 
The issue of cash couriers has long been considered problematic for terrorist finance 
practitioners, with FATF having adopted Special Recommendation IX (SR IX) on Cash 
Couriers in October 2004.454   SR IX requires jurisdictions to implement measures to detect 
and prevent the physical cross-border transportation of currency and other bearer 
instruments. The ensuing ‘Guidance Document’ which advocates the development of 
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intelligence based typologies to map trends in the ML/TF environment, is supplemented 
with a suite of ‘Red Flag’ Indicators to highlight suspicion and includes various profiles in 
respect of jurisdictions, travellers, currency and documents455 These typically focus on false 
declarations, suspicious behaviour, unjustified frequency of travel and the carriage of bulk 
cash amounts.  
 
 “We need to accept that trying to disrupt all the TF that goes through MSB’s and cash couriers is 
going to be extremely difficult. Couriers will continue to frustrate us. With couriers there is no footprint, their 
MO often involves multiple [staged] journeys, deflecting suspicion. We are also likely to face problems with 
‘value’ transfers, high value commodities which look inauspicious but can be converted later and used for 
TF. The UKBA have done some work here, work on indicators, some of it is pretty straight forward, obvious 
discrepancies in travel arrangements, that sort of thing, late arrival for check in, paying in cash, using or 
carrying multiple currencies.”456 
 
Home-grown Threat and Low Cost Terrorism 
 
The threat from radicalised UK nationals was universally considered the most potent short 
to medium term threat facing CTF practitioners when allied with the transition to 'low cost 
terrorism'. Particular concern was expressed in terms of identifying ‘home–grown’ groups 
from those with no discernible financing or criminal profiles. The threat from professional 
classes with the capacity to self-finance inspired terrorist operations was seen as 
particularly problematic.457  
 
 “The main problem then is dealing with radicalised UK nationals. This is the 'elephant in the room', 
its going to be a major problem in the future if we are not picking up any indicators, if its all very discreet, 
non visible. We have always relied on multiple sources of intelligence to provide a trigger, some indication 
financial or otherwise to look for investigative and disruption opportunities. The self financing issue will be a 
problem however this is not likely to be sustainable for all those involved. It might now be the preferred 
option, but even though the operational costs are diminishing, the training, travelling and procurement costs 
should provide the right indicators when assessed with other intelligence. We will simply continue to review 
and refresh, to understand these developments and frame our operations to reflect the changes in MO [modus 
operandi].”458   
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“... the obvious one is dealing with our own radicalised groups, and how we see this panning out in the future 
and how we attack the funding. This is more of a PREVENT initiative 459 but is likely to be difficult from a TF 
point of view, although we did see some indications of cooperation between some of the groups recently. I 
suppose the emergence of 'low cost terrorism' will provide the main challenge to those of us involved in this 
type of work. Let’s face it, if you reduce your [financial] footprint, then you reduce the opportunities 
available to law enforcement, whether that’s in terms of intelligence or disruption.460  
 
It was recognised that terrorist financing was a fluid and dynamic phenomenon and thus 
subject to constant mutation and evolution.  As such, it was suggested that consideration 
should be given to reviewing the funding methodologies of Irish groups to determine 
whether any parallels were evident in terms of low level and discreet funding mechanisms 
which might be applied to impact the financing of domestic Islamic attack cells. 461 
 
 “There must be some lessons from the TF work done in Northern Ireland which are transferable. 
These things are often cyclical, in the end the ethos and ideological drivers might be different, but it's about 
raising funds for terrorism. So as we become more sophisticated, groups will look at new low key, low profile 
ways of raising money either independently or through low-level crime. We could benefit from an 
understanding of whether there are lessons to be learnt here.” 462 
 
There was further appreciation and understanding that vulnerabilities were omnipresent 
given the corresponding commercial progress around the developments in virtual payment 
systems, digital currencies, e-money and financial products generally.463 
 
 “New payments methods and the threat that these pose will inevitably feature.  Clearly organised 
crime tends to lead on these things and our view is that terrorist groups are probably slightly behind the 
curve on these at the moment and are not currently exploiting new payment methods, but this will 
change, it's only a matter of time of course. We have seen an increase recently in the use of virtual 
payment systems, digital currencies, e-money and e-gold, mobile phone enabled banking, although 
again more work is needed in terms of their use for the purposes of TF.  But there are vulnerabilities 
there that we should address.” 464  
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Though acknowledged that new payments methods and the threat that these potentially 
pose will inevitably feature as a means of financing terrorism, the use of digital 
methodologies is at present confined largely to organised crime syndicates. However, the 
likelihood of these cascading to terrorist financing is therefore strongly anticipated.465 
There was also recognition that pre-pay cards in particular have emerged as a major threat, 
given the advantages which they offer to the 'unbanked' population and the Simplified Due 
Diligence (SDD) regulations which govern their issue. Indeed, it was suggested that the 
SDD arrangements are clearly at variance with the FATF risk based approach. The threats 
from prepaid e-money cards merely highlight the ever changing financial landscape and the 
emerging challenges facing CTF practitioners. 
 
 “Everything is vulnerable, but it’s the swiftness of counter measures which is important, and possibly 
what overlays that is tighter EU regulation. There are vulnerabilities still. Look at the issues around pre-pay 
cards. These are not covered under POCA [The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002] so there is little we can do here 
in terms of [cash] seizures.  You can go into a retail outlet and buy a pre-pay card without any real due 
diligence being conducted. This is clearly at variance with the 'risk based approach'. This opens up options of 
internet procurement and anonymous means of payment so this is a major problem for TF and ML in that the 
money can simply be couriered using multiple pre-pay cards. Secondary cards can be issued which can then 
be posted abroad, cash can then be moved across borders and we have the further difficulties of conducting 
electronic identity verification.  In terms of the TF threat, you can simply stockpile prepaid cards for use by 
sleepers when the need arises. How do you deal with that? 466  
 
It was suggested that one of the growing concerns at the moment, is the lack of 
understanding regarding the scale of monies donated to bona fide charities in the UK, 
which is in turn being used unwittingly to support extremism overseas.467 
 
 “One of the main concerns at the moment is charities and donations raised in the UK being used 
to support extremism overseas. We need more visibility on this. We are doing some work around this. 
Part of the problem here is that people are giving freely in the belief that it is for a legitimate cause 
however, clearly a portion or some if not a considerable amount may be used overseas. We simply don’t 
know. This is a real problem. We are hoping to address this through a series of initiatives, - safer giving 
campaigns and other awareness projects.  The issue of illegitimate funds or illicit money is the big 
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problem, but it’s one I’m not sure we can ever totally crack.”468 
 
There was strong acknowledgement that there were significant intelligence gaps around 
charitable giving by diaspora communities generally and this was a matter likely to attract 
greater attention in the future. It is recognised that UK donors are routinely giving freely to 
domestic charities based on cultural or religious practice, yet remain unaware that monies 
may be remitted overseas.469 As such it was anticipated that public policy would focus 
increasingly on charitable giving in the years ahead as a means of combating both TF and 
UK donations supporting extremist Madrassas in Pakistan.  Whilst there has been recent 
political pressure from the Pakistan authorities for the UK to address this more effectively, 
it was suggested that the matter sits more appropriately under the 'Prevent' rather than the 
'Pursue' strand of CONTEST.470   
 
 “We need further outreach work here regionally with our [CT] partners to really understand the scale 
of the problem, although this is being addressed, the ‘Safer Giving’ work 471 should help in terms of increased 
profile and getting the message across. I don’t really think we can comment with much confidence on the 
amount of money donated to charities, we need a better understanding here still. There are huge sums 
donated unwittingly which are used for TF, so we are focusing our messaging campaign here to deal with 
this.”472  
 
Gulf Donors 
 
The issue of donations from Gulf States was highlighted as an area of continued concern. 
This draws on the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission Report in 2004.473 More recently 
though, whilst there has been a general acknowledgment that the Saudi's have been 
cooperating more actively on CTF than at any previous point, 474 terrorist financing 
emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern and constitutes a key source of 
funding to Sunni extremist groups worldwide.  
                                                
468 Ibid 
469 Interview with CTF practitioner No.3  
470 Interview with CTF practitioner No.1  
471 The ‘Safer Giving’ project aims to provide advice on charitable giving to prevent abuse of charitable donations   for 
terrorist purposes. See Charity Commission Counter Terrorism Strategy, Revised April 2012. www.charity-
commission.gov.uk 
472 Interview with CTF practitioner No.3  
473 Comros, V., ‘Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups’, Giraldo, J & Trinkunus, H A,  Op. Cit., p116 
474 See www.threatfinance.org, ‘Kuwait, Qatar Criticized as Terror Finance Hubs’ 16 September 2011, accessed 
14/10/2011 
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  “The big question will always be the Palestinian issue, so long as it remains unresolved, AQ will be 
relevant, it will tap into that and find an audience for its anti-western propaganda and require funding and 
this is why the Gulf is such a key issue. In the end it still comes back to money and donors. There is still more 
we can do in the Gulf, but the difficulty here is lack of visibility around the [volume of] monies going to 
jihadi’s. I’m not sure anybody really knows. Things have improved but we are some way off. There is still a 
shed load of money going to the Taliban and Pakistan from the Gulf. Everybody knows it, but we are now 
taking a more diplomatic approach, there is a balance between not squeezing too hard, allowing the Saudi’s 
to do things at their own pace without it looking like its coming from Washington. It’s an improvement, 
definitely but we could be doing more here. So Gulf Donors is the big problem for us, but we also need to see 
how things develop across the region, the Arab Spring isn’t finished yet and there may be a few surprises.” 
475  
 
Indeed, some estimates suggest that donors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
have provided funding in the region of $100m to extremist South Asian Madrassas.476 Not 
surprisingly, considerable diplomatic, and security efforts have been focused on targeting 
the Gulf in order to impact the flow of monies designated to these threats.  
 
 “We see the Gulf as an area of real strategic importance, we are looking to engage more here with 
our key partners in the Gulf, although this will take some time to get the right systems and the diplomatic 
measures up and running, this feeds into our role to target donors, facilitators and financial infrastructure 
and will continue to be an area where we focus attention over the next few years. The issue of Gulf Donors is 
difficult politically as such the focus here is more on using diplomatic channels to deliver results. We have 
excellent relations across the region, we simply have to respect the customs and traditions of the host states 
yet manage the issue in terms of ensuring that systems are in place to satisfy some of the most basic standards 
necessary to deal with criminal finance never mind TF. Our objective here is really about promoting strong 
regulatory and supervisory regimes across the region as a means of dealing with the funding chain. This is an 
area led by the FCO who can advise better on progress to date.”477  
 
However, a diplomatic cable dated 30 December 2009 from the US Secretary of State, 
Hilary Clinton published by Wikileaks in November 2010 suggested that despite 
membership of the Egmont Group and being signatory's to the United Nation’s’ 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. [21], Saudi 
Arabia remains a critical financial support base for Al Qaeda, the Taliban, LeT and other 
                                                
475 Interview with CTF practitioner No.4 
476 IPT News 23 May 2011 www.investigative project.org/2893/wikileaks-gulf-donors accessed 19 April 2012  
477 Interview with CTF practitioner No.3  
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terrorist groups including Hamas.478 This explains why there is still continued emphasis by 
the UK in assisting with capacity building projects in the region. This complements US 
Treasury efforts which have seen the establishment of an Illicit Finance Task Force and the 
deployment of US practitioners in Riyadh and Kabul.479  
 
  “There has been more of a focus recently on the international side, engaging more with our 
international partners to disrupt money flows. Some of the Gulf States still turn a blind eye to extremist 
fundraising, the US are certainly focused on diplomatic efforts in the Gulf and we are have been following 
this up as well. There are difficulties here, lets be realistic, some of the problems are cultural, but there’s a 
reluctance still in some States to implement the sort of arrangements we in the West see as a basic minimum 
[CTF] framework, if you are genuinely serious about dealing with TF. I think the Saudi's and the UAE have 
made big improvements, but there is a lot more to be done as they are not moving as fast as we would like..480   
    
Aside from diplomatic efforts in the Gulf, evidence from interviews also advocated 
enhanced international engagement, judicial cooperation and capacity building within 
Europe and in particular, the harmonisation of CTF architecture across the European 
Union.481  
 
  “We have been very strong working between and across agencies and Ministries in the UK.  
Where we are less strong, is in working internationally. Whilst FATF has created a framework for 
international engagement, the operational reality however is that we still have some way to go.  When 
we are looking for international restraint or judicial co-operation at a basic level from our European 
partners or even wider from targets that travel abroad or who operate abroad, it is often exceptionally 
difficult to obtain that data. I accept that there are often operational difficulties in speaking about this 
material in the first place, but I honestly believe that this can be worked through, but even if it’s a Court 
Order to target funds, we often see the money moving on from that jurisdiction before law enforcement 
in the UK have had a chance to interdict.  It’s not just about different values or mind-sets or even 
corruption, my gut feeling is that even with organisations such as Interpol or Europol, information 
sharing is still at a reasonably low level which is unfortunate for us in the UK as TF often has a huge 
international dimension. If you do not stop the money moving from a UK border, then we have 
problems.” 482 
                                                
478 Ehrenfeld, R., ‘Their Oil is Thicker than Our Blood’ ACD, 14 December 2011, published in ‘Saudi Arabia and 
Global Islamic Terror Networks, 10, pp123-151, Palgrave Macmillan, November 2011    
479 CNN World, 6 December 2010 
480 Interview with CTF practitioner No.2   
481 Interviewee’s 1,3&5 
482 Interview with CTF practitioner No.1   
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Greater use of financial profiling and modelling was championed to really understand the 
continuing evolution, mutations and developments around criminal and terrorist 
financing.483 There were still perceived shortcomings in terms of full access to financial and 
tax data which is considered vital for intelligence development and target profiles.  
 
 “There is still a problem getting full access to tax information in particular. If we had access to this 
data, to investments, shares, relationships to financial advisors and accountants, real estate etc. in one hit, 
then this would be hugely beneficial, however, as things stand, this is almost prohibited. It’s difficult and 
limited because of the policies, procedures and portals, the way institutions develop, this is not a criticism of 
HMRC necessarily, but this sort of data from an intelligence perspective, would make a key difference to law 
enforcement and CT practitioners. If you look at the new TF tracking programme in The Hague, that’s an 
open programme, there are transparent procedures, if they meet the threshold, requests are actioned, 
otherwise they are rejected. So it’s not the Orwellian society that some suggest. Whatever the progress, there 
are still huge obstacles in place in terms of accessing financial data.” 484  
 
Finally, it was acknowledged that whilst CTF interventions should be policy led, a strong 
consensus nonetheless existed between policy officials and CT practitioners in terms of 
agreed future priorities. 485  
 
 “Look the officials always have the loudest voice and that’s probably right. I’m not sure it’s about 
agreeing on everything anyway. It’s about understanding each other’s positions and looking for workable 
solutions. There will always be different degrees of emphasis, that’s the way it’s always been. It’s natural that 
different perspectives emerge when you start off from a different base. In the end though it’s about getting the 
big things right and I am reasonably confident that we have generally got the big things right. TF is about 
context, so different solutions are required depending on the threat. It’s about mitigating risk, so you need to 
choose the right tools for the right threat.  The officials are right to look at the bigger strategic picture, 
whereas police should focus on the tactical options, consider the threat and look for ways of dealing with that 
both pre and post incident,  I mean in terms of prevention and intelligence development and also in terms of 
prosecution. If you look at Insurgent financing, the officials have a key role to play, we need the engagement 
of the FCO, we need the diplomatic efforts in the Gulf, we need the training work around regulation and 
compliance. Officials are naturally more inclined to look for neatly packaged frameworks with milestones and 
the like, but this is what is required, ministers love this stuff. So they will do their vision scanning and try to 
identify some of the newly emerging threats and help us to maximise our impact through legislation, 
                                                
483 Ibid 
484 Ibid 
485 Interviewee's 1,2, & 5 
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education and funding.” 486 
 
 “We’re very much aware of our role to facilitate and support and to leave the operational decisions 
to the experts.  So whilst we take the lead in terms of framing policy, the strategy is informed by the 
intelligence and the input from police. So in terms of agreed priorities around future challenges, I'm happy 
that we have the right structures and strategy. We have strong collaborative arrangements between officials 
and practitioners, we are fortunate to have this level of consensus, though the structures clearly support and 
encourage this.” 487  
 
Summary 
 
The results from the interview sessions acknowledged several key assumptions and 
orthodoxies and highlighted further new areas and emerging themes that warrant further 
consideration. These will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five. On the whole 
however, the continued use of CTF interventions to degrade terrorist group capability was 
acknowledged, although this was caveated with concerns regarding the value of CTF long 
term to deliver results, given the trend towards more frugal financing by attack cells in 
recent years. A reaffirmation of Cicero's assertion that money is central to waging war and 
that finance was the enduring 'oxygen of terror', was thus challenged given recent changes 
in terrorist group structure and resourcing.  Whilst recognising that finance remained a  
“key enabler to capability”, it was suggested that those CTF interventions that focused 
overwhelmingly on curbing funding streams specifically, would at best merely delay and 
frustrate terror attacks rather than eliminate these entirely.  
 
As regards current UK ‘Structures Policy and Strategy ', CTF was seen as a cross cutting 
tool bringing tri-ministerial endorsement across the portfolio. This in turn enhanced the 
accountability, status and significance attached to these interventions.  Whilst the UK 
Counter Terrorist Finance Strategy and the Terrorist Finance Delivery Plan were generally 
considered effective in addressing domestic and international threats around the generation 
and movement of funds, greater targeting of facilitation networks was also encouraged.  
Similarly, concerns were raised that the current Strategy suffered from intelligence gaps on 
radicalised UK nationals in particular. As a result, it was suggested that greater emphasis 
                                                
486  Interview with CTF practitioner No.2  
487  Interview with CTFpractitioner No.5  
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should be given to objectives that focused on low level and micro financing methodologies, 
given the recent shift in the funding template. Those interviewed, also affirmed the extent 
to which UK CTF Strategy has been influenced by US public policy on the subject.  It was 
acknowledged however, that this might simply be consistent with the UK's wider advocacy 
of multilateralism and international engagement on counter terrorism generally to deliver 
effect. Finally on the issue of whether future CTF Strategy might also include counter 
radicalisation objectives, there was almost universal agreement that CTF should maintain 
its primary focus on degrading attack planning and targeting organisational infrastructure 
and that counter-radicalisation should be addressed as a social intervention through 
community projects under the PREVENT strand of 'CONTEST'.  
 
In terms of 'Operational Effectiveness', it was established that CTF as a specific discipline 
remained a viable and credible asset that could be applied both domestically and 
internationally. Moreover the results from interview confirmed the value of finance 
interventions to deliver operational impact despite recent changes in the financial economy 
of terror. Whilst recognising that increasing financial self sufficiency and low levels of 
funding where more difficult to target, greater opportunities had emerged for post blast 
'follow the money' intelligence dividends, given the difficulties in identifying patterns and 
trends during the conspiracy phase.   
 
Indeed, arguably the most significant theme emerging from the research was an almost 
universal acknowledgement of the emergence of financial intelligence (FININT) as a key 
'CTF Asset”. Rather than attacking the financing and procurement activities of terrorist 
groups using the financial provisions contained within statutory instruments,488 the 
increasing use and utility of financial intelligence as a fundamental aspect of counter 
terrorism practise generally was strongly endorsed. FININT thus emerged as an important 
intelligence asset and hugely powerful investigative tool, particularly when used in 
conjunction with other intelligence assets and reporting.  However, the interview sessions 
also acknowledged the likely challenges that may ensue, given the intrusive nature of this 
material and the public's concern regarding erosions to personal liberty. As a result, the 
sensitive handling of financial data was considered essential in maintaining and developing 
                                                
488  The Terrorism Act 2000 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
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relationships with financial institutions.  Whilst these Public/Private Partnerships where 
deemed crucial to combat the terrorist threat, there was no endorsement that the institutions 
had assumed “proxy sovereign status” on behalf of the state. Moreover, their commitment 
to the SARs regime was acknowledged as a central pillar in creating a hostile environment 
for financial crime generally.  
 
Finally, as regards “Future Challenges and Vulnerabilities” the emergence of home-grown 
attack cells with increasingly discreet financial footprints was overwhelmingly identified as 
the area of most concern with Gulf Donors and UK funding to extremist Madrassas in 
Pakistan acknowledged as the main international challenges. Indeed, greater visibility was 
sought regarding donations from the UK generally to fund extremism overseas, together 
with new initiatives aimed at curbing the abuse of charitable giving. The dedicated and 
enhanced targeting of remittance systems, whether Money Service Businesses, Hawala or 
Cash Couriers was considered an operational priority. Resolution and progress in 
addressing these challenges and vulnerabilities was advocated through a series of measures. 
These included enhanced judicial cooperation and capacity building, even greater access to 
financial and tax data and more emphasis on terrorist financing typology and modelling, to 
shape and inform both public policy and operational strategy. 
 
 149 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Key Themes from Empirical Research 
 
CTF is a collective suite of measures comprising various actors and elements which have 
the capacity to impact the resourcing of terrorist groups or cells. This thesis has focused on 
the multifaceted, multilateral and multidisciplinary nature of CTF and the shifting 
operational elevation of individual elements, depending on the threat. It documents the 
evolution and flexibility of CTF to respond to changes in the operational environment and 
evaluates these measures in the broadest terms by considering the dominant narratives that 
have shaped current policy, strategy and current UK CTF architecture. It further challenges 
the centrality of money in the terrorism equation and the visceral defaulting to finance 
interventions to combat new international and domestic terror threats. This thesis also 
considers the continued relevance of CTF to respond to recent changes in the financial 
dynamics of terrorist organisations and particularly the shift from highly integrated 
transnational entities to decentralised loosely networked cells.  
 
This chapter therefore reflects on the key themes that have been distilled from the interview 
sessions with CTF policy officials and practitioners. It is the discourse around these themes 
and ideas that contributes to our understanding of the current UK approach to combating 
the financing of terrorism.  These themes can be summarised as follows: 
 
• The emergence of financially discreet home-grown cells in the UK.  
• Greater focus on combating micro financing methodologies in future CTF 
Strategy to reflect acknowledged changes in the 'economy of terror'. 
• Embracing 'whole of government' approaches to CTF and specifically emerging 
military perspectives on 'threat' finance interventions. 
• Reviewing existing UK corporate knowledge from previous CTF methodologies 
for combating Irish terrorist financing and their relevance in combating new 
domestic and international threats. 
• The emergence of financial intelligence (FININT) as a core element of future 
CTF practice and the anticipated challenge of future enhanced regulation 
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governing its collection and use. 
 
This chapter addresses each of these five themes in turn and begins by highlighting the 
unique challenges posed for CTF practitioners by home-grown attack cells and 
contemplates a scenario where operational impact from CTF may in the future be 
increasingly confined to financial intelligence dividends derived from post incident 
evaluations, rather than tactical interventions at the conspiracy phase.  Indeed, this thesis 
contemplates what measures might be deployed in the future by CTF practitioners to close 
down the operational space for home-grown extremists through the evaluation of four 
major terrorist finance investigations in the UK.489  The analysis of the funding 
methodologies employed by attack cells in each of these cases further informs the second 
key theme from the empirical research; the implications of changes in the economy of 
terror and the trend towards 'low cost terrorism' and the primacy of financial independence 
and the prospect of 'non criminal' or even legitimate funding.  
 
In this chapter we will consider the continued operational utility of CTF to combat 
autonomous self-financing terror cells and changes in the economy of terror as a result of 
new 'discreet' sources of finance. In view of these developments, it stresses the need for 
new measures that require to be employed to combat the increasing use of micro financing 
methodologies by these cells. These include more 'joined up' initiatives across government 
and the regulated sector that target low level frauds and outreach programmes with private 
industry partners that focus on the abuse of financial products to fund terror.  It thus 
advocates a combination of strategic 'macro' interventions to address the international 
threat, allied with the increasing use of criminal justice interventions targeting  'micro 
financing methodologies ' to shape future CTF strategy and combat the threat from 
domestic attack cells. This thesis also urges greater consideration of military perspectives 
on 'threat' finance interventions, particularly the transferability of US Threat Finance Cell 
methodologies to inform the future approach to CTF in the UK, including greater use of 
quantitative analytical tools for intelligence analysis. In addition, this chapter will address a 
further key theme highlighted repeatedly during the empirical phase of the research, namely 
                                                
489 This refers to Operation Crevice, a conspiracy to attack several locations in the UK in 2004, Operation Theseus; the 
7/7 London Bombings in 2005, Operation Overt; the London Transatlantic Airline plot in 2006 and Operation 
Seagram; the Glasgow Airport Attack in June 2007. 
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the extent to which current domestic jihadist threats might be considered against the 
operational practices and modus operandi developed previously to combat the financing of 
Irish terrorist groups.   
 
Most significantly however, this chapter discusses the increasingly limited operational 
terrain for CTF practitioners and the reliance on financial intelligence as a key asset and 
predicts the future primacy and significance of FININT as a core asset to impact counter 
terrorism generally.  Finally, given that FININT has evolved in recent years from 
developments in data surveillance and digital technology, questions are now emerging 
regarding the utility of financial surveillance as a means to counter terrorism and whether 
such measures can influence counter terrorist operations across different phases of the 
investigative spectrum.  It is the extension of financial intelligence collection by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies however, that has resulted in unintended 
consequences for the individual and their relationship with the state.  This thesis addresses 
these issues and considers the operational value of FININT generally, whilst 
acknowledging the underlying challenges in reconciling liberty and security as a 
consequence of more intrusive data harvesting and financial surveillance. 
 
Theme 1 - The Threat from Financially Discreet Home-Grown Cells in the UK 
 
Prior to the 7/7 London bombings, the template for Islamist terrorism was conceived in 
terms of the 9/11 attacks. As such, the principal threat was foreign, with strong 
organisational and operational links to a host domiciled overseas. From a UK perspective, 
however, the events of 7/7 saw a shift in threat conception. In short, the terrorist threat 
changed from external to domestic and in the context of terrorist financing, from 'donor 
recipient' to one exhibiting greater independence and autonomy.  Shortly afterwards, this 
was conceptualised as “homegrown terrorism”490 and highlights the transformational nature 
of terrorism and a shift once again towards a 'newer' manifestation of this phenomenon.  
 
Crone and Harrow point to a steady increase in both domestic and autonomous terrorism 
since 2003. Though concluding that most plots were internal but not autonomous, the 
                                                
490  Crone M., & Harrow, M., ‘Homegrown Terrorism in the West’, Terrorism and Political Violence, (23) 2011, p521  
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home-grown concept quickly gathered momentum and was applied regularly by academics, 
journalists, officials and practitioners. To address this seemingly new threat phenomenon, 
they sought to dissect the concept of home-grown terrorism, drawing a distinction between 
two dimensions: “belonging” and “autonomy”, to create four main types of terrorism 
manifest in the West.491 Crucially they suggest that autonomous terrorism is a transitory 
phenomenon, and whilst for the foreseeable future, terrorism in the West is likely to remain 
internal, it is anticipated that it will be increasingly affiliated in the future. Thus CTF 
interventions should be sufficiently dynamic and applied as necessary from a suite of 
options depending on the threat. Whilst acknowledging the wider definitional and 
analytical debate, this chapter will consider the concept of the home-grown phenomenon in 
the widest sense to determine the validity of these conclusions and the implications for 
officials and practitioners in delivering appropriate CTF responses long term.  
 
In the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks, a new breed of home-grown terrorists emerged that were 
largely self-recruited, self-radicalised and crucially self-financing.492 In the context of this 
thesis, it is financial autonomy which is clearly of most interest. Aside from developing a 
greater understanding of the circumstances which give rise to group formation, it is the 
extent to which these groups have been resourced independently which is of most concern. 
The terrorist attacks in Madrid, London and Glasgow in particular and the further attempts 
in Milan, Copenhagen and Stockholm 493 have highlighted the nature of the threat facing 
Western governments today, with affiliates and home-grown groups now emerging as the 
key protagonists.  Keeping pace with the fluid and dynamic nature of how terror cells fund 
themselves is one of the main challenges for police and security services. This chapter 
therefore examines a number of recent terrorist incidents in the UK and the modest levels 
of finance now required to fund these operations. It also advocates the need for new 
discourses to address the potential challenges which non criminal and micro financing 
methodologies pose to fund these entities and the wider implications of financial autonomy 
exercised by these groups.  
 
                                                
491 Crone M., & Harrow, M. Op. Cit., p522 which identified the 4 types of terrorism as 'Internal Autonomous', 'Internal 
Affiliated', 'External Affiliated' and 'External Autonomous'. 
492 Nesser, P., ‘How Did Europe’s Global Jihadi’s Obtain Training for Their Militant Causes? Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 2008:20 p234-256  
493 Three unsuccessful European attacks took place on the following dates; Milan, 12 October 2009 at Santa Barbara 
Military Base. Copenhagen, 29 December 2010 and Stockholm on 12 December 2010. 
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This chapter also considers what measures might be invoked by CTF practitioners to 
address the shift towards low level acquisitive crime, debt defaulting and even state welfare 
abuse as potential future funding platforms for such groups.  As such it discusses the 
choices available to CTF practitioners and whether current strategy reflects the right 
balance of macro and micro CTF options to combat the threat from both autonomous and 
affiliated groups. It acknowledges that the trend towards legitimate financial independence 
may ultimately prevent the opportunity for effective CTF interventions at the conspiracy 
phase. Finally and perhaps more disturbingly, it contemplates a scenario where operational 
impact from CTF may in the future be increasingly confined to financial intelligence 
dividends derived from post incident evaluations, rather than proactive tactical 
interventions to disrupt attacks. 
 
Post 9/11, the overwhelming threat narrative emphasised Al-Qaeda's promulgation of a 
centralised global terrorist strategy.  It is primarily the dominance and simplicity of this 
narrative that accounts for the public policy response on CTF, with its emphasis on macro 
interventions such as asset freezing and sanctions. However, Croft & Moore494 argue that 
this commitment to a single threat narrative fails to adequately explain the spectrum of 
terrorist attacks directed against the West. As such they advocate several distinct though 
overlapping notions of these threats, focusing on the nature of Al Qaeda and migrating 
from conventional perspectives of hierarchy to radicalised home-grown groups. It is 
precisely this recognition that new manifestations of terrorism have evolved that may 
require new counter measures, that shapes the central argument of this thesis.   
 
Recent years have seen a shift in the nature of the terrorist threat with affiliates emerging as 
the key protagonists. Developing Crone & Harrow’s suggestion that terrorism is likely to 
be increasingly affiliated in the future and determining the continuing influence of Al 
Qaeda to support the preparation and planning of attacks by home-grown groups, is 
therefore of great significance to CTF practitioners. Indeed recent terrorist trials in the UK 
have highlighted the variety of domestic threats which the authorities now face, with key 
distinctions emerging between groups established through direct physical contact and those 
                                                
494 Croft S. & Moore, C., ‘ The Evolution of Threat Narratives in the Age of Terror: Understanding Terrorist Threats in 
Britain’, International Affairs, Vol. 86 No 4 July 2010 p821-835 
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spawned from virtual and web based interactions.495 It is however with regard to a further 
category, those groups which form independently of external direction and sanction and 
specifically those which require no external financial support that most concerns CTF 
practitioners. The Glasgow bombing of 30th June 2007 is the most obvious example of this 
development and highlights the limitations of CTF interventions at the conspiracy phase. 
  
As indicated previously in this thesis, counter terrorist financing templates typically 
comprise three distinct yet related pillars.496  They generally involve what this author 
designates as 'macro' interventions, formal government programmes such as asset freezing, 
sanctions and compliance regimes affected in the UK and Europe under the Third EU ML 
Directive 2007.497 This pillar is supplemented further by FININT interventions and 
specifically financial data mining as a tool for pre-emptive security action, network 
analysis, targeting money flows and surveillance.498  Finally law enforcement interventions 
complete the final component of the CTF template. These typically include criminal justice 
interventions and target the exploitation of criminal commodities used to fund terrorist 
groups and also focus on charities abuse, minor financial crime, revenue offences and 
welfare fraud.499 It is precisely the low- maintenance requirements of these cells that mark 
new developments in terrorist financing. Indeed the United Kingdom was considered 
uniquely prepared for the challenge of an Islamic terrorist attack, having established 
integrated intelligence architecture, whilst simultaneously pursuing a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy that hinged on making British society resilient and in minimising 
the risks of terrorism.500  
 
Given that recent terror attacks have been characterised by relatively small scale funding 
requirements, the key question emerging is the extent to which money remains critical to 
terrorist group capability. What emphasis should law enforcement attach to the generation, 
                                                
495 Strategic Comments, ‘The Evolving Terrorist Threat: UK Trials Reveal New Types of Networks’, Vol 15, Issue 1 
March 2009 
496 See p11 of this thesis regarding Buckley P. D. & Meese M. J. ‘The Financial Front in the Global war on Terrorism’, 
2004, West Point, New York , www.au.af.mil accessed 5 November 2012 
497 EU Third Money Laundering Directive required member states to align the EEA regulatory regime on money 
laundering and terrorist financing with the FATF recommendations and implement the Directive by 15 December 
2007. 
498 Parker M. & Taylor, M., ‘Financial Intelligence: A Price Worth Paying’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 33, 
2010 
499  www.octf.gov.uk/ See Archive publications and Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Forth Report, ‘The 
Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ www.publications.parliament.uk accessed 5 November 2012 
500 Ranstorp, M. ‘The London Bombings and the Broader Strategic Context’, Real Instituto Elcano, 20/7/2005   
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laundering, movement and storage of funds to support terrorist groups?  Should the focus 
on home-grown groups be the dominant operational objective or should we contemplate a 
further resurgence in Al Qaeda Core and thus target both “corporate” terrorism and 
autonomous attack cells with equal vigour?501 Whatever the response, it is clear that CTF 
strategy must respond to the polymorphic threat of Al Qaeda and home-grown jihadists and 
demonstrate an ability to mutate and transform if it is to remain an effective intervention 
option in the wider quest to counter terrorism. CTF operational strategy must acknowledge 
changes in the economy of terror and focus increasingly on the new ways of combating the 
financing terrorism. 
  
Whilst much has been written about the home-grown threat in recent years, this chapter 
does not intend to proffer explanations for its emergence. It is however important to 
highlight the key characteristics of this phenomenon to provide context for addressing the 
CTF challenges which these groups now pose. The most obvious manifestations of the 
home-grown threat naturally focus on the attacks in London on the 7th and 21st July 2005. 
However, precedents were set in December 2001 when Richard Reid attempted to ignite 
triacetone triperoxide (TATP) on American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami.502  This 
was followed in January 2003 by the “Ricin Plot” which was uncovered in Wood Green 
London and several months later by the events in Israel when two British nationals, Asif 
Muhammad Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif were responsible for a bomb attack in Tel Aviv 
in which 3 people were killed and over fifty injured. 503  The cases of Omar Altimimi, 
Abdul Rahman and Rangzeib Ahmed provide further evidence of momentum from home-
grown subjects or groups.504 It is however, the events of July 2005, the London Airline 
bombing plots in 2006 and the Glasgow Airport attack in June 2007 in particular, to which 
most attention has focused.  
 
The narrative that emerged from each of these incidents focused on autonomous 
disaffected, Al Qaeda inspired, home-grown self-radicalised groups. This gathered 
momentum as Al Qaeda was assessed to lack operational bite, constrained by the success of 
Western military endeavours. As indicated previously in Chapter 3, Hoffman questions this 
                                                
501 Leiter, M. ‘Looming Challenges in the War on Terror’ 13 February 2008, www. washingtoninstitute.org  
502 Clarke M., & Soria V. Op. Cit. 
503 ‘Details of April 30, 2003 Tel Aviv Suicide Bombings’, www.mfa.gov.il 
504 See Leiter M. Op. Cit. 
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assessment and cautions against Al Qaeda's evisceration operationally and suggests that 
these events serve to illustrate its capacity to inspire, reform and endure.505 He specifically 
points to the extent to which some of those behind the 7/7 attacks had visited Pakistan 
between 2004 and 2005 and suggests contact with radicals and extremists in both Pakistan 
and the UK in the weeks preceding the attack. For Hoffman, therefore, Al Qaeda's 
influence and involvement is clear, citing further compelling evidence in the martyrdom 
videos of Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shazad Tanweer recorded during their time in 
Pakistan and produced in accordance with the AQ media template.506  
 
Hoffman draws further parallels from the 2006 Airline Bombings Plot and from the 
subsequent trial in 2008, which clearly hinted at AQ involvement, as some of the 
conspirators, most notably Abdullah Ahmed Ali and Assad Ali Sarwar were traced as 
having travelled to Pakistan. Further financial contacts between Mohammed Gulzar and 
Mohammed al-Ghabra served to reinforce this assessment. Moreover, in December 2006, 
the U.S Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), noted Al-Ghabra as having 
consorted with the Al Qaeda leadership, and providing logistical and financial support to Al 
Qaeda and other jihadist groups in Pakistan.507  For Hoffman, both these incidents clearly 
confirm a “connecting thread directly linking Pakistan to Britain and [to] Al Qaeda.” Thus 
rather than the product of self-radicalised, independent terror cells, the events of July 2005 
and August 2006 might instead be considered as Al Qaeda sanctioned operations. Whilst 
the post 9/11 environment saw a diminution in the capacity of Al Qaeda to operate freely 
and unfettered, following a resurgence, it sought to expand its reach through partnerships 
primarily in the Middle East and North Africa in the quest for a wider global insurgency.  
 
For Kirby,508 of all the post 9/11 radical islamist threats, it is the emergence of the 'self 
starter' cells that is of most interest. Indeed, he sees this as a unique and distinct 
phenomenon and whilst autonomous groups have an affinity with the Al Qaeda network, it 
is the lack of institutionalised training or recruitment which is most distinctive. As such, he 
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suggests that conventional conceptions of networks are ill suited to analyse and understand 
groups of this nature. He is critical of the implicit reliance on organisational theory based 
models used to investigate these threats and advocates a more sophisticated and nuanced 
approach which acknowledges the dynamic and unique characteristics of 'self starter' 
cells.509 He suggests that this phenomenon should be interpreted as a development that 
reaches a new threshold within a pre-existing environment, rather than a break with 
previous patterns. Whilst this echoes previous analyses on the transformational nature of 
terrorism510 it is the level of autonomy which provides the crucial distinction. It is the 
extent to which operational autonomy includes a migration to financial autonomy which is 
of most interest in the context of this thesis.  
 
Despite considerable experience in dealing with domestic terrorist threats, it is clear that the 
UK significantly underestimated the likelihood of indigenous jihadist suicide attacks in 
2005.511 This merely serves to highlight the shifting nature of the threat and the challenges 
posed to national security and public safety from disaffected UK citizens.  Irrespective of 
whether recent events in the UK fit the Kirby template 512 or point to some element of Al 
Qaeda sanction and control, they have considerable implications for counter terrorist 
finance strategy, particularly in the weight accorded to Al Qaeda's current influence, 
direction and control of home-grown groups and the range of measures employed to target 
sources of finance and ultimately finance terror. It should be noted however, that prior to 
the events of July 2005 and in response to the developing threat from home-grown groups, 
the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) 513had already established a three-tier model to 
prioritise investigations. Tier 1 comprised those individuals or networks thought to have 
direct links to Al Qaeda. Tier 2 addressed those individuals or networks loosely affiliated 
with Al Qaeda whilst Tier 3 focused on those simply inspired by Al Qaeda ideology.514  It 
is in this context, that of 'franchising' jihad, that is arguably of most interest to CTF 
practitioners. As a result, this model must inevitably inform future CTF interventions.  
Insofar as the financing of jihad operations is concerned, three possible scenarios should be 
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considered to frame/explain UK CTF efforts. 
 
1. Central sanction and direction from Al Qaeda Core, with logistical and funding 
support. 
2. Central sanction and direction from Al Qaeda Core but with little or no 
logistical or funding support. 
3. No operational direction from Al Qaeda Core, with no logistical or funding 
support. 
 
Not surprisingly most operational attention in recent years has focused on scenarios 2 and 
3. That being the case, one might expect that UK CTF Strategy should focus increasingly 
on the micro financing of terrorism and be informed by the shift towards autonomy and 
operational independence and those new financing methodologies, which have 
characterised recent terror, attacks in the UK. 
 
The Challenge of Financial Autonomy  
 
This shift towards operational independence and financial autonomy is clearly one of the 
most significant developments to have emerged in recent years. Moreover, the scale of 
monies now required for attack planning is so modest that CTF investigations can no longer 
rely on financial indicators to identify such plots without specific intelligence or further 
grounds for suspicion. In response to these developments and perceptions, the National 
Terrorist Finance Investigation Unit (NTFIU), based within the Counter Terrorism 
Command of the Metropolitan Police Service, was commissioned to undertake formal 
reviews of those major attacks or attempted attacks in the UK since 2004.515  The primary 
objective was to inform senior police management of the financial activities of the main 
suspects in each of these incidents and crucially to “explore any trends that have emerged 
from the investigations and to identify any weaknesses in the current UK CTF structure and 
strategy.” 516 As such, the financial profile of each of these attacks will be examined briefly 
to determine the key sources of finance employed by each cell and whether new 
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methodologies emerge in response to recent structural developments and perceived changes 
in modus operandi. Indeed, it should be noted that counter terrorist financial investigators 
routinely review such incidents to elicit behaviours or modus operandi that might suggest 
the origins of a terrorist conspiracy and to identify key indicators for post incident 
exploitation. Such data can in turn be fed back to partners in the financial sector from 
which intervention or disruption activities can be considered.  
 
Typically post incident reviews include comprehensive transaction analysis focusing on 
deposits, withdrawals, transfers and cash movements that might be identified as indicative 
of terrorist planning and financing.  These reviews seek to determine the costs associated 
with all aspects of an attack. They typically focus on the identification and selection of 
participants, subsequent radicalisation, training and reconnaissance. These reviews also 
consider the conspiracy and planning relating to the attack itself and any logistics required 
to support escape and relocation.517 Whilst the financial profile of each of these attack cells 
will be examined briefly, the dominant theme emerging from these analyses is a 
confirmation of the nominal funding now required by home-grown cells and an 
endorsement of the shift towards greater financial autonomy and independence. Whilst no 
external financial support was identified in any of the investigations reviewed, this does not 
preclude the possibility of diaspora benefactors, however, the ensuing forensic evaluations 
failed to identify a need for such funding.518  
 
Operation Crevice 2004 
 
Operation Crevice resulted in the successful convictions of Omar Khyam, Jawad Akbar, 
Salhunddin Amin, Waheed Mahmood and Anthony Garcia in April 2007 on terrorism 
charges. The operation focused on the conspiracy by seven British citizens to attack various 
locations in the UK in 2004, including the Bluewater Shopping Centre in Kent and the 
Ministry of Sound nightclub in London using explosives manufactured from 600kg of 
ammonium nitrate.519  Despite operational links to Pakistan,520 the Crevice cell was deemed 
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to be financially independent. Indeed, cell members who obtained monies secured through 
personal loans and credit cards that were later subject to default funded the entire operation. 
Cash was subsequently drawn down from these loans to fund operational expenditure.521 
Furthermore the modus operandi of this group included the use of multiple addresses, a 
tactic which further served to frustrate the efforts of debt collection agencies to recoup 
funds. Crucially, this action also delayed credit status evaluations and in all likelihood 
prolonged the fraud, although it is difficult to establish whether this was a deliberate 
tactical ploy. The group thus opted for a self-financing model, with core funding generated 
through a combination of income from employment and by means of defaulting on lines of 
credit, principally on accounts set up with Builders Merchants. These monies were in turn 
used to cover operational expenses incurred for the conspiracy and attack phases. This 
included accommodation, travel and rental costs for the storage facility to house the 
fertiliser and other sundries such as clothing and equipment.522  
 
Operation Theseus 2005 
 
An analysis of the NTFIU Report 523 confirms that financial independence was again the 
chosen modus operandi employed by Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay, the subjects 
behind the 7/7 London bombings. The various media accounts of these attacks however, 
provide an insight into the hypotheses that framed the investigation. Several assumptions 
were apparent, not least the notion that the bombers relied on extensive external support 
networks to provide money, shelter, munitions and training. For Kirby the prevailing 
discourse at this time highlights the mindset of the police and intelligence services as they 
contemplated an attack, later acknowledged as conceived, planned, financed and executed 
by British nationals. Yet the default position for investigators at the outset, was that these 
attacks had a foreign dimension and that establishing this support network and the key 
financial donors were critical operational priorities. The press in turn focused heavily on 
this element of the investigation.524 However, the “Report of the Official Account of the 
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Bombings in London on 7th July 2005”525 offered no evidence that either Khan or Tanweer 
had received formal training or met Al Qaeda operatives whilst in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.526 Moreover, it concluded that the planning was “deceptively simple” and that the 
operation “did not cost much and was financed by methods that would arouse little 
suspicion”.527 Over time, it became apparent that the London bombers had acted 
autonomously, both operationally and financially. 
 
Financial investigators attached to Operation Theseus, had sought to establish whether 
assessed operational links to Pakistan also extended to primary financial resourcing and 
other material support. They concluded however, that expenditure incurred for travel, 
training, accommodation and supplementary expenses did not reveal donor support. 528  
Again, parallels can be drawn from the funding template used by those involved in 
Operation Crevice, with trading accounts established at Builder’s Merchants, from which 
materials were subsequently purchased and resold for profit. Like the Crevice cell, the 
outstanding debt on the trade credit facility was never repaid. The forensic examination of 
the finances of each of the four principals failed to indicate use of personal bank accounts 
to fund their activities.529 The main funding stream appears to have been monies obtained 
by Mohammed Siddique Khan from an HSBC loan of £10,000 in March 2004, 
subsequently withdrawn in cash thereafter. A further £4,000 was secured from credit cards. 
Furthermore, during the conspiracy phase, Khan defaulted on the HSBC loan and other 
lines of credit. This modus operandi therefore limits the accuracy of any subsequent 
forensic attribution of monies. Significantly, there was no engagement in criminal activity 
to fund the events of 7 July 2005. Finance was generated by loans obtained legitimately, 
albeit never repaid.530 Clearly one cannot discount the sharing of finance methodology 
amongst home-grown groups, given that the 'Crevice' surveillance operation had previously 
identified contact between Omar Khyam, Khan and Tanweer.531   
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Crucially however, as an indication of emerging changes in the economy of terror, the 
financial costs incurred by the four bombers, was assessed at £7,240.00. However, this 
could be reduced even further to circa £4,000, if costs associated with international travel in 
March 2003 and November 2004 are deemed superfluous to the attack.532 The police 
investigation did not identify additional sponsors or domestic financiers, but instead 
concluded that under the strong leadership of Khan, the group was able to independently 
finance its own activities by defaulting on personal loans.533 This again underscores the 
preference for an autonomous funding template, as home-grown groups had again sought to 
finance their activities independently, without engaging in acquisitive crime. Unfortunately 
for CTF practitioners, financial independence is a poor indicator of a potential terrorist plot. 
Indeed, only when mapped over other intelligence might such behaviour indicate the 
origins of a terrorist conspiracy. 
 
Operation Overt 2006 
 
Operation Overt successfully disrupted the plot by British nationals to detonate liquid 
explosives on several flights departing from the UK in 2006 and resulted in the subsequent 
conviction on terrorism charges of Abdulla Ahmed Ali, Assad Sarwar and Tanvir Hussain.  
Whilst during the trial of the conspirators in 2008, the scale and sophistication of the 
planned attack may have hinted at Al Qaeda support, the NTFIU investigation pointed 
again to financial independence by those involved.  Indeed a review of the financial 
activities of the conspirators confirmed that cash was the principal means used for the 
purchase of commodities to facilitate the plot, thus depriving investigators of key financial 
transaction data and frustrating further efforts by investigators to attribute specific 
purchases to particular individuals. Numerous cash receipts were uncovered for various 
items used to facilitate the conspiracy phase, including clothing, equipment and general 
supplies. Subsequent analyses of bank accounts confirmed periods of financial inactivity 
that correlated with assessed periods of absence in which known overseas travel had taken 
place.534 However, the requirement to initiate an early arrest operation of the main 'Overt' 
suspects prevented a more accurate overview of the funding process, particularly regarding 
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the proportion of funds designated specifically for attack planning.535  
 
What is unique about this case however is that several of the conspirators had successfully 
applied for Career Development Loans (CDL's). These were in turn paid into their personal 
bank accounts. The dissemination of this modus operandi; the use of legitimate financial 
products to acquire personal finance, appears to have been shared across the network as a 
source of easily accessible ‘non criminal’ funding. Whilst early law enforcement 
intervention precluded any definitive conclusion, the similarities with Operation Crevice 
cannot be ignored, as legitimate sources of supplementary funding had again been secured 
through personal loan agreements. 
 
As regards the collective investigative outcomes from the analysis of the Operations cited 
above, it is clear that each attack cell exploited the opportunities afforded by the retail 
banking system by targeting legitimate financial products to access funds. During both the 
conspiracy and attack phases, no attempts were made to establish bogus bank accounts, 
with account opening documentation furnished under genuine identities. Moreover, the 
routine concealment of purchases using cash was a common feature across these operations 
and the nominal values transacted ensured that any purchases remained below those 
thresholds that might result in Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR's). The fact that a more 
relaxed regime of personal credit existed during this period guaranteed that the funding was 
readily available and relatively risk free. Indeed, rather than resort to criminality to fund 
these attacks, securing finance through personal credit arrangements and subsequently 
defaulting on loans, removed the potential for law enforcement disruption and interdiction. 
Indeed, such activity is not considered an act of dishonesty, but rather a routine commercial 
risk on the part of the lender. Defaulting on personal credit simply amounts to a business 
risk and is accordingly written of as 'bad debt' by the institutions. As such, no obvious 
triggers would incur either interest or action by law enforcement or private actors in the 
short term. Thus despite strong parallels across each of these plots, most notably the use of 
personal credit facilities and the absence of key financial donors or overseas fundraising, no 
single indicator emerges to heighten suspicion.  
 
                                                
535 Ibid 
 164 
Operation Seagram 2007 
 
Whilst there are strong similarities around the funding methodologies employed by the 
conspirators in each of the above incidents, no such parallels exist with the subjects of the 
failed Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks London attacks of 29th 
June 2007 and the Glasgow bombing of 30th June 2007. The NTFIU was again 
commissioned to report separately on the specific funding of the attacks and to profile the 
financial activities of the key suspects. Whilst originally, this aspect of the investigation 
focused on multiple subjects, three core suspects were identified, Dr Bilal Abdullah, a 
British national though later educated in Bagdad, Kafeel Ahmed, who subsequently died 
from injuries sustained in the attacks and Dr Mohammed Asha who was later acquitted of 
all charges.536  
 
Abdullah, an Iraqi Sunni Wahabist, seemingly influenced by the Iraq war and by the 
writings and speeches of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Mousab al-Zarqa-wi 537  was assessed 
as the principal financier. At the time of his arrest, he was employed as a medical 
practitioner in Paisley, Scotland and had held a bank account in the UK since October 
1999. A forensic analysis of his accounts confirmed that a significant number of 
transactions related to attack planning. Indeed, it is assessed that Abdullah was the central 
player in the coordination of the vehicle purchases and the sundry materials used in the 
attacks.538  What is notable and distinct from the funding template employed in the three 
previous case studies, is that the conspirators in this case did not secure funding through 
personal loans, nor did they engage in fraud or use third party benefactors to finance the 
attacks. These attacks were exclusively financed from personal income streams and the 
conspirators professional status and financial liquidity may have accounted in part for this 
choice of methodology. As such they were assessed as having sufficient personal financial 
capacity to fund these attacks, eschewing typical sources of terrorist financing such as 
donor funding and opting instead for a model based exclusively on self sufficiency and 
financial autonomy. 
 
                                                
536 ‘Dr Bilal Abdulla Guilty of Glasgow Bomb Plot’ www.cps.gov.uk, 16/12/08, accessed 12/11/10   
537 Clarke M.,& Soria V., ‘Terrorism in the UK: Confirming its Modus Operandi’, RUSI Journal, Vol 154, Issue 3, June 
2009  
538 Statement of Evidence WH Gordon 18/1/2008 - REGINA  -v- Abdulla, Asha & Ahmed  
 165 
These attacks assume a compelling significance when assessed in the context of terrorist 
financing and challenge the prevailing CTF investigative templates and their relevance in 
curbing the funding of such attacks. Abdulla, and his co-accused Mohammed Asha, was 
initially assessed as the key financial sponsors for these incidents and for funding the rental 
of 6 Neuk Crescent, Glasgow that in effect became the bomb factory and operations base in 
the months preceding the attacks. Further expenditure of £3,450 paid for 5 vehicles to 
facilitate the reconnaissance and detonation phase and a further £50.60 to purchase nine 
packets of assorted nails and screws to act as shrapnel for the devices.539  Further nominal 
expenditure was incurred for the purchase of propane gas cylinders, 38 gallons of petrol 
and mobile phones to detonate the VBIED's.540 The use of multiple cash transactions 
highlights the impotence of counter terrorism professionals in uncovering the origins of 
such a plot. In the absence of reasonable suspicion, further supporting intelligence or 
suspicious activity reports (SAR's) to heighten concerns, the likelihood of impacting the 
conspiracy and planning phase are greatly reduced. Thus no key triggers where 
immediately apparent in this case. Furthermore, the pre-incident transaction analysis would 
have yielded little regarding the vehicle purchases as these where affected in cash and the 
purchase of basic commodities such as petrol, gas and DIY products only assume 
significance post incident.  
 
Whilst the UK's counter terrorism response, strategies and structures are considered 
dynamic in character, and reflective of lessons learnt from previous attacks,541 several 
questions have emerged regarding the review outcomes from post incident evaluations of 
these attacks. Aside from the opportunities which these events present to shape future 
counter terrorism policy, further issues have come to light regarding the likely direction of 
CTF strategy given the trend towards operational independence and autonomous funding 
models in particular. On a general level, Gregory notes that the UK has implemented 
significant changes to its counter terrorism governance structures in recent years and whilst 
the impetus for these changes pre-dated the events of June 2007, the attacks nonetheless 
ensured greater momentum and focus.  He acknowledges that the UK's counter terrorism 
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efforts required greater cohesion, integration and accountability and a more consensual and 
bi-partisan approach to counter terrorism policy generally.542  
 
It is against this backdrop of structural and systemic change in the delivery of counter 
terrorism policy, that Gregory examined the impact the June 2007 attacks. He cites the 
emergence of disclosures from trial documentation regarding possible law enforcement pre-
emption opportunities that were either overlooked or incapable of further development or 
exploitation.543  However, from a CTF perspective, one must conclude that the modus 
operandi employed by this cell significantly undermines the likelihood of impacting 
conspiracies which are both strictly independent and financially autonomous.  Gregory 
notes that no reference was made to the Glasgow incident in the Prime Ministers comments 
to Parliament on the suspected scale of the domestic threat delivered in the wake of the 
attack.544 Such comments clearly reflect concerns arising from a variety of home -grown 
plots in the preceding years. Whilst much emphasis has been placed on structural reform, 
greater data sharing with EU member states and various legislative proposals, these 
initiatives failed to offer new ideas in addressing the unique problems which counter 
terrorism professionals now face when confronting independent and autonomous terror 
cells.   
 
Clearly the challenges posed by home-grown groups transcend terrorist financing 
programmes, as Western governments seek to confront a broad spectrum of domestic 
threats, whether indigenous nationals, resident non- nationals or migrants. Whilst 
acknowledging that the Glasgow template; the trend towards legitimate independent 
financing, may ultimately prevent the opportunity for effective interventions at the 
conspiracy phase, the operational impact from CTF in this context may in the future be 
confined to financial intelligence dividends derived from post incident evaluations, rather 
than proactive tactical interventions to disrupt attacks.  These threats represent a watershed 
for CTF practice. As such, wider counter terrorism strategy should acknowledge the trend 
towards legitimate self-financing models and look for other indicators from typology 
analysis to identify potential conspiracies. CTF as a discipline should therefore supplement 
                                                
542 Ibid, p2 
543 Ibid, p4 
544 See Prime Minister Gordon Browns 'Statement on Security', 25th July 2007 citing 30 known plots, the monitoring of 
200 + groupings or networks and approximately 2000 terrorist subjects of interest.  
 167 
this approach by targeting low level acquisitive crime as a more credible and risk averse 
source of funding for autonomous home-grown groups and contemplate greater use of 
micro interventions to combat jihadist financing.  
 
Theme 2 - The Case for Micro CTF Interventions 
 
Conventional wisdom attests to the symbiosis between terrorism and money545 and this has 
been addressed in the main through a range of macro CTF interventions in the form of 
government initiatives such as greater regulation, compliance regimes, asset freezing and 
sanctions. The impact of these macro programmes, particularly those aimed at addressing 
the threats inherent within Informal Transfer Value Systems and those seeking to impose 
universal standards around compliance, have prompted a shift in how terrorist groups 
finance their activities. This is manifest by a departure from centralised financial controls 
towards greater proliferation and emphasis on more modest funding streams.  Indeed, the 
commonly acknowledged decline in the economy of terror in recent years546 is arguably in 
part a response to these macro developments.  
 
Yet whilst global CTF measures may have had some impact in reducing the overall sums of 
money available for terrorist action, further research is required to determine whether these 
measures have been more effective in thwarting either the volume or lethality of recent 
terrorist incidents. Ironically, such measures may have exacerbated the problem by 
displacing conventional funding models and replacing these instead with a more discreet 
funding template, thus limiting the scope for effective interventions. These measures have 
resulted in fundamental changes to the financial structure of UK and European terror 
networks in particular and rather than erode the jihadist threat, such policies may have been 
the stimulus behind the emergence of new self-funded terror cells in Europe and the Middle 
East.547  
 
Clearly modern jihadist terrorist financing is a dynamic phenomenon and one of the most 
challenging aspects of modern terrorism. Central to this challenge therefore are the 
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unfolding choices around CTF strategy and specifically the balance struck in the use of 
macro and law enforcement led micro interventions. As highlighted in the various case 
studies above, micro financing and legitimate ‘non criminal’ self-financing have emerged 
as key features in the funding of 'new' terrorism. It is precisely the threat from small scale, 
self -funded cells that is particularly problematic for CTF practitioners, given that the 
terrorist finance indicators are more difficult to discern. In response to these developments, 
questions have emerged regarding whether CTF strategies should be revised to include 
greater emphasis on combating micro financing methodologies.  
 
The current model of disaffected radicalised nationals, operating autonomously, vastly 
reduces the scale of logistical, tactical and financial support required. Indeed, the funding 
model for 'new' terrorism differs dramatically from that employed by 'traditional' 
hierarchical groups such as ETA or PIRA, where the costs of maintaining organisational 
infrastructure vastly exceeded those now required by home-grown cells.548 Given that cell 
survival, planning and terror attacks can be funded modestly, locally and even 
autonomously, logic dictates that greater emphasis should now be given to targeting micro-
financing methodologies. Assuming that cognisance is given to the latent threat from Al 
Qaeda Core, the central debate now is the currency attached to macro interventions. This 
debate lays challenge to the impact which the grandiose architecture of account monitoring, 
sanctions, asset freezing and peer reviewed compliance evaluations, established under the 
UNSCR 1373 and the FATF (9SR) regime549 can deliver in this new dispensation. It 
questions whether this apparatus remains relevant and ‘fit for purpose' and whether these 
measures can combat the funding to affiliate groups.  The limitations of macro 
interventions as a means of effecting procedural change, has been acknowledged with such 
measures now seen as a “secondary tool” for action against these new threats. 550  
 
Indeed there is a dearth of evidence generally on the effectiveness of financial sanctions in 
particular to achieve their stated objectives.551  The self-funding, self-sustaining 
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autonomous template which characterises current attack cells, is clearly less suited to 
targeted sanctions. The continued utility of these macro interventions in this context is 
further questioned by Bures 552 who considers the EU's fight against terrorist finances and 
questions whether the current programme of measures is capable of delivering the required 
operational impact. Whilst his analysis is constrained by the lack of publically available 
data on asset freezing in particular, citing the European Strategic Intelligence and Security 
Center Assessment, Bures nonetheless concludes that “the real impact of asset freezing has 
often been overestimated because the preparation of a terrorist attack can be financed by 
micro-financing of much more complex tracing.”553 As such, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion, that whilst the macro approach is perhaps more appropriate in confronting state 
sponsored terrorism, it is considered to be less effective when countering transnational 
jihadist groups and particularly the nascent threat of home-grown terrorism.554  
 
It is on this basis therefore that greater significance should be given to micro CTF 
interventions. Success in the future may therefore depend on the development of new 
measures to deal with financially independent cells. That said, success in combating the 
financing of terrorism will require a suite of measures which includes both macro and 
micro options from which the appropriate tools can be selected. Indeed the recent rise in 
terrorist activity from groups such as Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), Al Shaabab and the Tehrik-e 
Taliban (TTP) affirm the need for macro interventions. Given that governments in the UK 
and EU member states are mandated to demonstrate their commitment to CTF through the 
Third European Union Money Laundering Directive555 political utility alone will almost 
certainly ensure the continued use and longevity of macro programmes.   
 
Whilst greater emphasis should be given to the micro financing of terrorism, the Glasgow 
bombing highlights the impotence of CTF measures to combat 'no trace' independent attack 
cells. Indeed, it is only at the post incident phase where CTF tools such as retrospective 
financial surveillance and intelligence development are likely to add value. This attack 
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however is significant on a number of levels. First there was seemingly no tangible link to 
Pakistan in the shape of Al Qaeda Core military training, logistical or financial support, 
thus highlighting the threat posed by financially independent Tier 3 cells. 556 More 
significantly however, the Glasgow attack underscores a further mutation of the home- 
grown threat; the shift towards personal sources of finance. Thus future interventions must 
consider financial autonomy and self-reliance as key indicators when typologies are 
mapped over other criteria. Not all terror cells however, can generate funding through 
personal financial liquidity or non-criminal means. As highlighted in October 2012 during 
the trial of Irfan Naseer, Irfan Khalid and Ashik Ali on explosives and terrorist financing 
charges, the financing for the planned suicide bombing campaign had been acquired 
through bogus charity collections.557 There are obvious parallels here with Irish related 
terrorist financing and these will be addressed as a separate discussion later in this Chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The prevailing view is that terrorist groups like commercial organisations require funds for 
a variety of purposes. Recent changes in the structure of terrorist groups however, demand 
that the symbiosis between terror and money be revisited. The current threat from 
financially autonomous cells, questions many of the assumptions on which UK CTF 
strategy is based. The use of sterile, personal, legitimate finances by disaffected individuals 
complicates matters further. Central to this development are the decisions required in 
deciding on the use of macro and micro interventions. The financial resilience and strength 
of Al Qaeda derives from its ability to transform and mutate. It is further bolstered by its 
network structure and doctrine, which targets wealthy donors and charities for funding, as 
well as encouraging affiliates and operatives to develop self-funding strategies. Whilst there 
has been an increase in autonomous groups, CTF may in the future focus increasingly on 
affiliates as Crone and Harrow suggest.558 Like PIRA previously, Al Qaeda has relied on 
several mutations and multiple sources of finance to fund its operations; however, it is the 
scale of this activity that differentiates the Al Qaeda funding model. These sources have 
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557 The ‘Daily Telegraph’, 24 October 2012 reports that a Birmingham based Jihadist terror cell raised £13,500 through 
bogus 'Muslim Aid' collections to fund a planned suicide bombing campaign in September 2011. 
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included a global canvas of legitimate and illicit companies, government sponsors and 
religious charities to fund its operations.559 Further funding opportunities existed through 
the Islamic Banking sector which along with the use of cash couriers remains one of the 
most effective means of concealing and moving funds.  
 
The implementation of various financial measures post 9/11, allied with the US and 
coalition military successes, have resulted in major changes to the financial structure of 
terror networks.  Despite the recent trend towards greater financial autonomy and 
independence, external funding through donor programmes remains a key source of 
financing terrorism. Indeed, despite improved Saudi efforts to the contrary, the Gulf 
remains one of the major sources of terrorist financing, with significant streams of donor 
funding routinely remitted to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Laskhar-eTaiba (LET).560  Future 
CTF interventions must therefore be sufficiently flexible to simultaneously address 
strategic threats geared to the proliferation of Wahabist ideology overseas and the growth 
of financially autonomous domestic terror cells spawned from these programmes. 
 
Modern jihadist terrorist financing is therefore an increasingly dynamic phenomenon. As 
the terror attacks in the UK illustrate, legitimate access to monies in the shape of personal 
loans [later defaulted] may play an increasingly important role in funding 'new' terrorism in 
future years. This trend towards enhanced financial efficiency and legitimacy is the 
defining challenge for CTF practitioners. However at best, CTF will merely limit the 
operational environment for illicit actors and disrupt their activities. It will not by itself 
eradicate emerging transnational threats or indeed home-grown terror cells. That said, CTF 
as an intervention option is now sufficiently mature and its value universally acknowledged 
that new configurations and procedures would evolve to challenge new threats. CTF must 
in the short term, target the shift towards greater financial efficiency and autonomy and 
impact the funding methodologies of home-grown groups by focusing increasingly on the 
micro financing of terrorism and the operational utility of financial intelligence generally to 
target terrorist conspiracies.  
 
                                                
559 Basile, M., p169, ‘Going to Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network is Likely to Withstand the Current War on 
Terrorist Financing’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, p169-185, 2004 
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More than a decade after the events of 9/11, CTF is at a cross roads in both policy and 
operational terms. It is clear that the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat and the challenge 
from 'fifth columnists' in recent years will require a shift in counter terrorism policy to keep 
pace with these developments.  CTF strategy should therefore be reviewed in light of the 
challenges posed from home-grown Tier 2 & 3 jihadist groups that question the relevance 
of many of those options available from the macro interventions template. As such, 
operational effectiveness in confronting the home-grown threat requires a greater emphasis 
on the micro-financing of terrorism and a focus on micro methodologies to deliver 
operational impact.  
 
Theme 3 - Military Perspectives on Threat Finance  
 
This chapter considers the merits of embracing wider 'whole of government' approaches to 
CTF and specifically emerging military perspectives on 'threat' finance interventions. This 
thinking borrows heavily from the United States 'Threat Finance' Model and advocates a 
paradigm shift on the basis of perceived operational outcomes from new UK military 
contributions in shaping future CTF strategy.  The current absence of a UK military 
perspective on terrorist financing is doubtless based on the prevailing narrative which 
criminalises the financing of terror. This theme is addressed by evaluating the recent 
involvement of UK Ministry of Defence personnel in Threat Finance programmes around 
insurgent financing in Afghanistan in particular and whether as a result, new perspectives 
are likely to emerge from wider inter agency facilitation and integration to shape future 
CTF Strategy in the UK.  
 
Before focusing on the structures that are required to support this 'whole of government' 
approach, it is necessary to reflect on the nature and key sources of insurgent funding 
generally and to determine whether the counter measures adopted can be applied to the 
current UK CTF policy and strategy template. Understanding how the insurgency in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is financed is a key aspect of US and UK foreign policy as well 
as ISAF operational strategy. Yet whilst there is a lack of clarity and consensus on the scale 
of funding generated for the insurgency, there is nonetheless agreement that combating 
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money flows is an essential element of the counterinsurgency campaign.561 The 
'transferability' of counter threat finance interventions is dependent on the extent to which 
parallels exist in the modus operandi employed by the Taliban and insurgents.  
 
Indeed, on closer examination, the Taliban financing model is not dissimilar to the funding 
template employed by a variety of Irish terrorist groups. Whilst distinct from the 
Provisional IRA in the sense that the Afghan insurgency is not monolithic, this proliferation 
and factionalisation is best expressed in the variety of methods employed to generate 
finance. Here strong similarities prevail.562 Indeed, it is widely acknowledged, that the 
Taliban has been financed largely through drug trafficking, with its affiliates, the Haqqani 
Network in western Pakistan resorting to kidnapping, extortion and other criminality.563  
 
 “To fund their activities, insurgents may foster an illicit economy, sometimes of international scope, 
eluding government monitoring, taxation and interdiction. Such illicit financial activities diminish 
government revenues, increase corruption among local officials, and weaken the control and legitimacy of the 
government. Criminal activities may include theft, extortion, trafficking (of narcotics, arms and people) 
money laundering, piracy, document fraud, bribery, kidnapping and black market activity. These funding 
streams will often drive insurgents into alliances of convenience with organized crime. In some cases long 
standing insurgencies morph into gangs or organised criminal networks that are motivated by profit and 
economic self interest, rather than ideology.”564  
 
The Taliban's reliance on exploiting opportunities afforded by the drugs trade provides the 
key focus for threat finance practitioners, where counter threat finance is fused with counter 
insurgency and counter narcotics intervention programmes.565 All of the insurgent groups in 
Afghanistan are deemed to benefit from narcotics trafficking,566 however, accurate 
estimates of the scale of revenue generation are difficult to establish, given the absence of 
formal banking apparatus beyond the major cities and the overwhelming reliance on hawala 
which dominates approximately 80-90% of all trading underpinning Afghanistan's 
                                                
561 Collins C. & Ashraf A, ‘Financing the Taliban: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and 
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economy.567 Indeed, 60% of those informal transfers are deemed to be drug related. A 
recent UNODC Report estimated that trafficking generated an estimated $70-100 million 
per year for insurgents,568 Irrespective of these amounts; the threat finance response is still 
predicated on the requirement to target the raising, storage and transfer of funds. 
Interestingly, some commentators acknowledge the criminal crossover between the Taliban 
and the drug trade and anticipate the eventual morphing of the Afghan insurgency into a 
criminal syndicate.569 This again highlights the parallels with Irish terrorist groups and the 
shift from terrorism to organised crime.570  
 
These similarities extend beyond drug trafficking571 with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network 
and other affiliated groups having exploited other criminal enterprises. Military 
commanders have recently noted this “blurring of the line” between the Taliban and 
criminal groups.572 Kidnapping in particular has emerged as a significant source of finance, 
particularly for Taliban factions domiciled in Pakistan. The Pakistani Intelligence Services 
estimate that kidnapping for ransom, through the targeting of foreign aid workers, 
journalists and wealthy Pakistani nationals provides a significant source of ancillary 
funding for insurgency operations.573 Recourse to smuggling thus provides further echoes 
of Irish terrorist financing. Whilst Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
of Pakistan (FATA) are economically deprived, these possess a wealth of natural resources, 
most notably exotic woods, marble and emerald mines, all of which have been exploited by 
militants in both jurisdictions.  Indeed approximately $100 million of timber was stripped 
from the Swat Valley when the area was ceded to the Pakistani Taliban.574 Whilst analysts 
routinely cite ideology as the chief factor responsible for enhanced militancy in the region, 
it is suggested that greater attention should be paid to the nexus between militants and the 
black economy. It is through this process of “Talibanisation” that smugglers protect illegal 
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businesses at the expense of the state and in turn further contribute to resourcing the 
insurgency.575  
 
Again drawing parallels with the Irish financing model, the Taliban practice of demanding 
a 'levy' from legitimate commercial enterprises under its control provides a further lucrative 
funding stream. The Taliban generally exploit the absence of central government control in 
the tribal areas of North West Pakistan, although this de facto taxation regime also extends 
to urban areas such as Lahore, Karachi and Quetta.576 The system of monthly dues and 
encumbrances was also a traditional feature of Irish terrorist financing.577 Likewise the 
Taliban like Irish groups previously, benefits hugely from donor and diaspora funding. 
Moreover, Richard Holbrooke, the former US Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 2010, was keen to stress 
the scale of donations from the Gulf in funding the insurgency.578 Again, as with the Irish 
campaign, substantial sums are generated from sympathetic diaspora communities and 
charitable groups, often under the under the guise of 'welfare' programmes.579  
 
There are clearly strong similarities between the Irish terrorist financing model and those 
methodologies used for Taliban and insurgent financing. This poses significant questions 
around lessons to be drawn from UK corporate knowledge on previous CTF operational 
practices. Moreover, a review of insurgent financing also confirms the tactical emphasis 
placed in tracing money flows and the continued centrality of finance in broader counter 
terrorism and counter insurgency programmes. The creation of the Afghan Threat Finance 
Cell (ATFC) in 2008, replicating the Iraq Threat Finance Cell further endorses the 
emphasis on non-kinetic 'finance' interventions. The creation of inter agency Threat 
Finance Cells, rapidly institutionalised threat finance analysis as a key operational asset.  
Indeed in the United States, all major intelligence and law enforcement agencies now 
maintain a specific counter threat finance mission. This is largely defined as the 
“identification and degradation of financial networks used by militant groups.”580  
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Within the US Department of Defense (DOD), Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
was given lead coordination status to synchronise efforts to choke off funds to terrorists and 
degrade their finance networks.581 Moreover, this emphasis on finance was further 
reinforced when in December 2009, several prominent members of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee encouraged the Pentagon to commit further resources to simultaneously target 
money flows and attack enemy funding networks.582 The ensuing analysis by the ATFC has 
provided the US authorities with a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the various 
sources of funding used to support the insurgency. Of most interest perhaps from a UK 
CTF perspective, is the emerging reliance on regionalised, geographically specific low-
level criminal activities, whether cedar or gem smuggling, extortion or 'security 
licensing'.583 Of greatest concern however is the widespread extortion of US development 
and logistics contracts, pay offs from NGO's and 'skimming' from poorly overseen Afghan 
government projects under the National Solidarity Programme.584  
 
Given that the UK and its coalition partners are presently reducing the military presence in 
Afghanistan in preparation for eventual combat cessation by 2015, the capacity of 
Afghanistan to protect its fragile democracy will be determined in large part by the 
challenge of such widespread corruption, which for many is considered the biggest single 
challenge facing the country today. Not surprisingly, given the scale of international aid 
and development funding to the Region, the Taliban has sought to target these 
opportunities.585 Indeed US officials586 and Congress have long been concerned that the 
Taliban have siphoned off contractual funding from the international community and 
exploited the “toxic, opportunistic system that connects distracted American careerists, 
private US corporations and corrupt Afghan klepocrats.”587   
 
Roston documents at length the dynamics of commercial interactions between contractors 
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and the Taliban, in which military contractors are forced to pay suspected insurgents to 
protect American supply routes.  
 
 “Welcome to the wartime contracting bazaar in Afghanistan. It is a virtual carnival of improbable 
characters and shady connections, with former CIA officials and ex-military officers joining hands with 
former Taliban and Mujahadeen to collect US government funds in the name of the war effort.”588 
 
Alarmingly, US Officials in Kabul estimated that a minimum of 10% of the Pentagon's 
logistics contracts consists of payments to insurgents.  To understand how and why this 
occurs requires an appreciation of Afghan culture and tribal dynamics. This is sanctioned 
largely on the basis that there are few other ways to bring goods and supplies to the combat 
outposts and forward operating bases where they are most needed. The terrain in Southern 
Afghanistan is logistically difficult and hostile and security contractors must rely on the 
imprimatur of the Taliban. 
 
 “It is the layers upon layers of contracts and subcontracts that make the whole process opaque, 
susceptible to fraud and nearly impossible to quantify.” 589 
 
In summary, insurgent financing is supported by a variety of sources, many of which are 
similar to those methods traditionally employed by Western terrorist groups and organised 
crime syndicates. It is the notion that US taxpayers may have been unwittingly bankrolling 
the Taliban through systemic and cultural corruption590 that provides the key distinction 
when considering in comparative terms, insurgent financing methodologies.  Western CTF 
interventions have not had to contend with overseeing a dysfunctional and uncoordinated 
regime of logistics and development contracts on the scale administered in Afghanistan. 
Successful threat finance measures targeting the Afghan insurgency will however similarly 
require a combination of macro and micro interventions. Whilst the military is naturally 
predisposed to kinetic warfare, non-kinetic finance interventions are increasingly 
recognised as significant counter insurgency assets. Whilst considerable Afghan Threat 
Finance Cell efforts have been directed towards narcotics interventions as the primary and 
most obvious source of funding, this has been supported with further diplomatic efforts to 
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improve the regulation of financial transactions in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and 
capacity building efforts in the Gulf to stymie the flow of donor finances. 
 
Having documented the scale and key characteristics of financing the Afghan insurgency, it 
is necessary to evaluate the US military response to insurgent funding sources through 
structured non kinetic threat finance interventions and whether this approach might in turn 
be embraced by British military commanders and contribute ultimately to new perspectives 
in shaping future UK CTF policy and strategy. The obvious starting point is to consider key 
aspects of the “Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders Handbook for Counter Threat Finance”, 
September 2011591 that charts the shift in US military thinking and practice.  This shift 
towards 'softer' interventions underscores the US military commitment to exploring 
opportunities beyond conventional military responses, by embracing wider interagency 
programmes aimed at degrading terrorist capability and support through targeted counter 
threat finance efforts. The DOD has multiple supporting roles in the CTF arena and has 
acknowledged both the strategic and tactical significance of a “robust and capable CTF 
posture”592 and its contribution in supporting a whole-of-government, full spectrum 
approach to CTF by assisting the National Security Council to counter threat finance that 
might potentially or directly impact the US.593  
 
This approach coincides with greater global and domestic economic austerity, new security 
threats and acute fiscal constraints. As such the US military has been forced to look beyond 
traditional kinetic responses and utilise the full repertoire of diplomatic, information, 
military and economic assets to track, monitor, exploit and disrupt emerging threats to US 
national security.594 It should be noted however, that the genesis for this approach emerged 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom with the establishment of the Iraq Threat Finance Cell 
(ITFC) in 2005 which consolidated the degree of integration threat finance played within 
the Pentagon's intelligence and military operations and emerged as the foundation model 
for Western counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare officials.595 The purpose of the 
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ITFC was to disrupt the flow of funds to insurgents and assist the intelligence gathering 
efforts in Iraq through collaborative interagency means. The key stakeholders included 
personnel from the Department of the Treasury, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, Department 
of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency and US SOCOM. This template was in turn 
applied to Afghanistan in 2008. 
 
The Afghan Threat Finance Cell focused on three core lines of operation. First it undertook 
criminal investigations into high-level narcotics trafficking. Second it was charged with 
implementing intelligence driven drug flow attack strategy aimed at identifying and 
severing the connection between the Taliban insurgents and their finances. Finally it was a 
key player in participating with the interagency community to develop Afghan capacity.596 
With the accelerated withdrawal of US Troops from Afghanistan, further budgetary 
constraints and eventually transfer of primacy to the National Afghan Army by 2014, the 
key issue in the context of this thesis, is the extent to which the DOD and the US Military 
will continue to engage, contribute to and shape future counter threat finance interventions. 
 
Following a strategic guidance paper published by the DOD in January 2012,597 it is 
anticipated that the US military will continue to play a key role in Countering Threat 
Finance. Indeed in reference to future “Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency 
Operations”, US forces will increasingly utilise non-military means to address instability 
and continue to “retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise and specialized 
capabilities that have been developed [from] counterinsurgency and stability operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.”598  By implication the utility of non-kinetic interventions such as 
threat finance programmes, are likely to feature prominently in this new dispensation, given 
the requirement to maintain “agile and capable military forces whose actions are 
harmonized with other elements of US national power.”599 Moreover, given the need to 
gather intelligence on State Department designated terrorists and organisations, targeting 
finance support networks allied with wider intelligence dividends was acknowledged as a 
core asset in combating the Taliban and the insurgency. It is the transferability of finance 
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interventions to other operational domains that is most significant. Indeed, Counter Threat 
Finance remains an important aspect of wider intelligence gathering in support of terrorist 
targeting.600 Though predating the January 2012 publication, DOD Directive 5205.14601 
consolidates the role required of the US military in contributing to the denial, disruption, 
defeat and degradation of licit and illicit global financial networks to negatively affect US 
interests. The real message inherent within this directive however, is to extend, enhance and 
codify the DOD's on-going commitment to threat finance strategy. 
 
Carter602 acknowledges that future CTF requires a balancing of national security resources 
as well as a shared understanding and responsibility regarding the contributions required 
from law enforcement, policy officials, the military and intelligence services.  
 
 “The primary contributions of DOD towards combating terrorist finance include incorporation of 
CTF operations into joint campaign plans; collection, analysis and interagency sharing of signal, financial 
and human intelligence; and military target/indication actions required to attack or block financial lines of 
communication and disrupt networks” 603 
 
The centrality accorded to finance by the DOD for US counterinsurgency, intelligence 
gathering and joint targeting operations has most notably been addressed and reinforced in 
the “Commanders Handbook for Counter Threat Finance”604 In short, the document 
provides an understanding of the various processes required from Joint Force Commanders 
(JFC's) to plan, execute and assess CTF activities and the integration of these activities into 
their respective operational plans.605 Whilst JFC's have long acknowledged the necessity 
and value of attacking an enemy's military supply lines, CTF simply constitutes another 
analogous means of attacking modern, irregular adversaries.606  
 
 “Finances are the lifeblood of adversary networks. Denying the adversary its finances makes it 
harder, maybe impossible for the adversary to pay, train, arm,  feed, cloth and gather information and 
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produce propaganda which supports the fighters. Countering any adversary’s  finances can have a significant 
impact on the organisation's morale. CTF can increase costs and risk for the adversary.”607  
 
In view of the fiscal pressures on the US military budget, CTF interventions are likely to 
increase rather than diminish. Indeed it is recognised that DOD best engages some targets 
kinetically, whilst some CTF targets are more appropriate for engagement through 
interagency, multinational or host nation organisations.608  Whether some of these 
structures can be replicated by the Ministry of Defence and UK military perspectives 
subsequently shape future approaches to counter terrorist financing, will depend on a 
variety of factors, not least the maturity and operationalisation of UK military threat finance 
programmes.  
 
Other challenges prevail, in particular the distinctions between military and law 
enforcement/interagency perspectives regarding planning and operational timelines. 
Significant operational differences include event/action focused versus system/process 
focused approaches. Contrasts in tactics and techniques require consideration as do 
operational templates which emphasise procedures and doctrine rather than 'rules of 
evidence'.609 Notwithstanding these difficulties, different operational perspectives can add 
value to CTF. Perhaps most encouragingly, US Military support to CTF is not a distinct 
type of military operation. Rather it is now acknowledged as a core intervention against an 
adversaries’ specific capability. It is now fully integrated rather than an adjunct to 
conventional military responses. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the military in general, 
centres on organisational metrics. Agreeing outcomes on threat finance will in the short-
term illuminate significant distinctions in organisational culture and practice. As the 
“Handbook” acknowledges, preparing and agreeing a consolidated ‘whole of government’ 
set of strategic metrics for threat finance will be extremely challenging.610 Law 
enforcement is perhaps more predisposed to the protracted and often convoluted nature of 
financial investigations from which intelligence outcomes often emerge. Actions against 
financial networks often take months to develop due to the difficulty of collecting data and 
the subsequent processes around assessment and analysis.  
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It is perhaps the enhanced use of Threat Finance Analysis by the military, consolidated 
through the Threat Finance Cells (TFC's) in Iraq and Afghanistan however, from which the 
greatest operational dividends may emerge.  Conway charts the institutional development 
of threat finance analysis within combat zones and the unique combination of qualitative 
and quantitative methods that emerged within the TFC's.611 During the course of its 5-year 
tenure in Iraq, the TFC focused on enhancing the breadth and depth of FININT collection 
as well as processing FININT to provide “course of action recommendations to military 
commanders.” 612 The personal endorsement of these structures by General Petraeus 
(Congressional Hearing in April 2009 at House of Representatives) and their replication 
and ability to add value in Afghanistan, doubtless heightened the profile of threat finance 
analysis more generally.  In essence, the TFC's challenged the conventional intelligence 
collection template with its emphasis on human intelligence assets (HUMINT) targeting 
key individuals, emphasising instead the need for detailed intelligence on financial 
processes and logistics chains and the sources and methods of financial support. 
 
Conway specifically highlights the innovative approaches that developed in analysing 
insurgent networks. Whereas traditional intelligence analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan was 
“highly qualitative and loosely structured”, analysts within the TFCs deployed quantitative 
methods such as social network analysis, (SNA) multi-objective decision analysis (MODA) 
and influence network modelling (INM). It was the fusion of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches that is most significant.  
 
 “Social network analysis became the preferred method for identifying network vulnerabilities – 
whether those networks were based on individual relationships or the flow of financial sources within an 
illicit organisation. Inserting multi objective decision analysis techniques into daily intelligence analysis was 
perhaps the most successful application of quantitative methods within the TFCs. Leveraging private sector 
methods for assessing alternative decision paths, TFC analysts designed a series of hierarchies to prioritize 
financial targets within an insurgent group or prioritize hawala offices within an informal money exchange 
network” 613  
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The key question that emerges is the longevity of the TFC model to shape and inform US 
military responses beyond the drawdown and post 2014 combat role. For Conway, the 
imperative to deploy Threat Finance Analysts may evaporate as the national security 
community look beyond Afghanistan. He thus cautions against their evisceration 
operationally.  
 
 “Though the TFCs represent a fraction of the deployed civilian analyst population, great progress 
has been made in influencing intelligence collections, in fusing quantitative and qualitative methods for 
solving complex, multifaceted problems and in becoming more active in recommending courses of action on 
the battlefield.” 614  
 
It is the distillation of the outcomes from the TFC model and the use of emerging analytical 
tools to migrate from US military 'threat' finance perspectives to UK counter terrorist 
finance applications that requires further research.  Given the significant changes in 
domestic terror group financing in recent years, it is difficult to determine whether existing 
UK financial intelligence collection and analysis processes might benefit from additional 
quantitative approaches and in particular, the use of social network analysis algorithms to 
combat domestic jihadist terror cells. Ultimately, however, CTF as an operational discipline 
is an organic phenomenon and has morphed overtime to embrace new approaches and 
developments. Advances in technology have traditionally shaped the threat environment 
and the ensuing operational responses. As their 'threat' finance portfolio responsibilities 
intensify, the degree of Ministry of Defence engagement in future UK CTF strategy 
requires to be determined.  It is the military's propensity however, to leverage the outputs 
from a variety of intelligence assets, HUMINT, MASINT and SIGINT,615 that may most 
influence future law enforcement responses to CTF.  Doubtless influenced to some extent 
by the technical lexicon that dominates military intelligence collection, CTF interventions 
in the UK will in future be shaped less by focusing on criminalising the financing of terror, 
and more by harvesting the emerging digital and financial intelligence opportunities to 
provide a more granular view of key protagonists and networks and national security 
threats.  
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Theme 4 - Lessons from CTF Interventions in Northern Ireland 
 
Given the clear similarities between aspects of Irish terrorist and Afghan insurgent 
financing, it is necessary to consider previous UK CTF methodologies in order that current 
corporate knowledge from previous interventions might further inform our response to 
insurgent financing as well as those micro-financing methodologies employed in recent 
years by domestic terror cells in the UK. Indeed, in view of the rather limited terrain which 
terrorist groups, insurgents and organised crime syndicates might exploit to generate 
funding, the UK law enforcement, security and intelligence community has a distinct 
advantage in determining 'lessons learnt' from previous campaigns. The current UK 
approach to counter terrorism has been shaped in particular by the battle between 
successive British governments and the Provisional IRA (PIRA) prior to its ceasefire in 
1994.   Given the shift in the domestic threat towards jihadist cell based attack structures in 
the UK in recent years, it is obvious that the key terrorist financing characteristics from the 
Irish campaign should be considered to determine obvious parallels with the current 
funding methodologies employed by these groups.  
 
Before examining the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing in Northern Ireland 
and its relevance in addressing recent home-grown threats, it is necessary to consider the 
current counter terrorism policy response.  Terror prevention practice in the UK has been 
the subject of review by several commentators with some challenging those core 
assumptions made by police and the intelligence services regarding the risks posed by 
affiliate jihadist groups.616 Indeed, for some, the prevention process has been undermined 
by too rigid an adherence to out-dated investigative templates that are disproportionately 
influenced by hierarchical adversarial models. As a result, key opportunities were missed to 
develop information regarding the 7/7 and 21/7 terrorist plots in London because the 
prevailing risk management strategy failed to use a networked conception of terrorist 
cells.617 The 'Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) Report into the London Terrorist 
Attacks on 7 July 2005' (2006) and the reciprocal government report further highlighted 
shortcomings in the terror prevention process and particularly the significance given to the 
                                                
616 Irons L. R. ‘Recent Patterns of Terror Prevention in the UK’, Homeland Security Affairs Vol: IV , No1 January 2008, 
p3 
617 Ibid 
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use of suicide attacks.618 Acknowledging that there were clear deficiencies in threat 
recognition on the part of the intelligence services, it is thus easy to conclude that 
preoccupation with Irish related terrorism and particularly the modus operandi of PIRA 
continued to shape UK counter terrorism thinking and practices.  The notion of martyrdom 
operations being undertaken in the UK by British nationals was not given much weight; 
indeed the shift towards greater lethality in this context was simply neither contemplated 
nor addressed with any vigour at this time. This begs the question of whether our current 
thinking around CTF is similarly outmoded and likewise fails to recognise the paradigm 
shift in terrorist funding for 'new' terrorist groups. 
 
It is clear, that the experience of dealing with PIRA influenced and conditioned the 
subsequent UK risk management strategy used to investigate those emerging threats posed 
by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.  In light of this assessment, several questions emerge, most 
notably the extent to which public policy on CT generally and CTF in particular has been 
suitably revised to take account of the shifts in operational practice, structure and 
resourcing by such groups.  Of key interest however, is the extent to which the 
development of CTF policy has reflected networked terrorism and the changes in the 
economy of terror. Implicit within the question is the proposition that combating the 
financing of such groups requires an approach which to a greater extent considers micro-
financing methodology and the shift to greater levels of financial autonomy and 
independence. Indeed, rather than lead to closer engagement with crime syndicates as was 
the case in Northern Ireland,619 funding terrorism is now more likely to involve minor 
financial crime such as credit card fraud and welfare abuse given the modest sums required 
for attack planning and execution. Moreover, the notion that terror cells may in the future 
fund their operations independently without the need to engage in criminality is now a very 
real possibility.  
 
The link between the funding of terrorism and the exploitation of criminal commodities is 
well documented in Northern Ireland. The developing relationships between Northern Irish 
terrorist groups and transnational organised crime generally are unsurprising given their 
similarities. By the late 1990's the nature of Irish terrorist fundraising had undergone 
                                                
618 ISC Report May 2006, para 102, p28 
619 ‘Third Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission’, November 2004, p26 
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significant change with traditional fundraising activities such as extortion and armed 
robbery superseded by more complex and sophisticated forms of organised crime such as 
tobacco smuggling and counterfeiting with identifiable links to Asia, Europe and Africa.620 
Police highlighted significant changes in the nature of terrorist financing and the 
relationship with organised crime in 2002. 
 
 “An increased linkage or continuum [has emerged] between criminal activity engaged in by 
terrorists for ideologically driven fundraising and serious organised crime. The lines between the two have 
become increasingly blurred as paramilitaries share activities and profits with organised criminal gangs.” 621   
 
By 2004, paramilitary groups had extended their activities into a widening range of non-
terrorist crime. As a result, organised crime in Northern Ireland was deemed significantly 
greater in scale, impact and complexity than it would otherwise have been.622  
 
Indeed the ‘crime-terror nexus’ has emerged as an area of interest to policy makers in 
understanding the contemporary financing of terrorism generally.623 'New terrorism' 
whether in the form of diffuse, autonomous or home-grown groups' is increasingly reliant 
on network and cell based structures and thus borrows heavily from the prevailing 
structural configurations of organised crime groups. These networks are largely multi-
ethnic, multi-jurisdictional and increasingly willing to forge strategic alliances in pursuit of 
a common profit goal. Whilst the desire for finance has prompted closer alliances and the 
operational plagiarism of funding mechanisms through crime, the most sophisticated 
organised crime groups have borrowed heavily from terrorist methodology, employing 
military discipline and tradecraft to shore up their own operational practices. 
 
Whilst cooperation between organised crime and terrorist groups is well documented, it is 
perhaps the ‘appropriation’ of organised crime methodology and practices by terrorist 
groups that attracted most interest.624 As outlined previously625 the case for appropriation is 
                                                
620 House of Commons NIAC Report- ‘The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ Fourth Report Vol.1, July 2002, 
p. v and ‘Third Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission’,  2004, p28 
621 Ibid, p14 
622 Ibid p26 
623 Makerenko, T., ‘A model of terrorist criminal relations’ Janes Security News, 30 July 2003 
624 Williams, P. ‘Terrorist financing and organized crime: nexus appropriation or transformation?’ p137, qtd in 
Biersteker, Thomas J, and Sue Eckert (Eds), ‘Countering the Financing of Terrorism’ Routledge Publishers, 2008 
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625 See Thesis, Chapter Two, p56 
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particularly compelling in respect of Northern Ireland. Whilst historically relying on a 
variety of funding mechanisms, paramilitary organisations in the province overwhelmingly 
sought to exploit those opportunities that emerged through the targeting of various criminal 
commodities.   Indeed, the involvement of both Loyalist and Republican groups in 
generating finance primarily through criminality has been the subject of academic interest 
and wider political discussion.626  
 
One interesting feature of the Northern Ireland situation however, is that the relationship 
between paramilitary groups and organised crime more latterly was spawned more as a 
transformational development from the terrorist campaign. Historically involvement in 
crime was fostered to secure adequate funding platforms for attack planning and 
maintaining organisational infrastructure. Those national and transnational networks that 
previously facilitated weapons procurement and military operations are now being used 
almost exclusively for personal financial gain rather than organisational resourcing. The 
prevailing view is that recent years have seen a shift from paramilitary terrorism to 
paramilitary crime.627  Whilst crime has been the major source of funding for all 
paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, the micro financing of terrorism however, through 
minor financial fraud and state welfare abuse also emerged as significant platforms to 
bolster the coffers of such groups.628 It is in this context that parallels are most likely to be 
drawn, when assessing those micro-financing methodologies likely to be engaged, by 
home-grown jihadist groups.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter Two,629 the various Northern Ireland crime groups ranged from 
close-knit structures, often based on family or ideological affiliation, to loose networks 
engaging with others in pursuit of criminal profit. Whilst there are clearly similarities in 
terms of structural composition, the primacy of ideology on the part of jihadist home-grown 
groups is likely to constrain and contain any formal relationship with external criminal 
enterprises. As such, it is more likely that funding will be sought from discreet and 
increasingly benign micro enterprises where the risks of law enforcement intervention are 
lessened, yet the funds are still adequate to finance their operations and planning.  
                                                
626  Horgan, J & Taylor, M., Op. Cit., p1-38 and OCTF ‘Threat Assessment 2003’, www.octf.gov.uk 
627  Northern Ireland Affairs Committee ‘Organised Crime in Northern Ireland 2005/06’ Third Report, p11, 5th July 2006 
628  OCTF ‘Serious Organised Crime in N. Ireland, Threat Assessment 2003, p11, www.octf.gov.uk   
629  See Thesis Chapter 2, p56. 
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It is worth noting, that the funding of terrorism in Northern Ireland took various forms and 
included both macro and micro financing. On the one hand, it was estimated that in 2001, 
PIRA required approximately £1.5 million annually to run the organisation, from an 
estimated fundraising capacity of £5-8 million.  The remaining terrorist organisations 
required more modest amounts with some as low as £50k annually. Most notably, however, 
some Brigades were expected to be self-financing, though this was likely to be funded 
through a combination of personal donations, legitimate commercial ventures and minor 
criminality.630 Whilst considerable efforts were directed against money laundering, 
hydrocarbon fuel fraud, tobacco smuggling and intellectual property crime etc., it was 
around the micro financing of these organisations through loan sharking, charities, gaming 
machine and social security fraud that sustained the operations of many of the smaller 
terrorist groups.631 The most obvious conclusion to be drawn when considering lessons 
from the financing of terrorism in Northern Ireland is that the degree to which money is 
required varies from organisation, group or indeed cell, depending on their needs and level 
of sophistication.632    
 
As demonstrated by the most recent attacks in the UK, the level of finance required to fund 
these plots is minimal. Financial penury however is nothing new. Low levels of terrorist 
financing was also a feature of the loyalist campaign in Northern Ireland in the late 
1990's.633 Moreover, the House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
concluded that “very little money is in fact required to maintain a rudimentary but effective 
terrorist campaign” with terrorist groups having at times gained a significant return on 
their investment from monies expended when compared to government counter action and 
repair.634 Such comments again highlight the need for both macro and micro elements of 
CTF strategy.  The key however to operational impact, is in determining where the 
emphasis should be. From a 'lessons learnt' perspective, greater consideration should clearly 
be given to the targeting of minor financial and social welfare fraud and charities abuse, 
                                                
630 House of Commons NIAC Report- ‘The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ Fourth Report Vol.1, July 2002, 
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632 Ibid, p12, para, 14 
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long acknowledged as a key sources of financing to support those involved in paramilitary 
activity in Northern Ireland.635  
 
That being the case, some of the challenges to core assumptions around CTF may require to 
be revisited. Indeed in recent years, questions have arisen regarding the relevance and 
indeed logic of applying an anti-money laundering (AML) template to combat terrorist 
financing, given that 'crime for profit' logic636 was seen as contrary to the funding of 
politically and ideologically driven terrorism. The recent emergence of increasingly 
independent home-grown groups, perhaps enhances the relevance of an AML template to 
counter future terrorist financing predicated increasingly on fraud and debt defaulting. 
Thus, 'crime for profit' logic may be central to new funding regimes where the micro-
financing of terrorism is derived increasingly from low level crime. Therefore, as the focus 
shifts to ‘new terrorism’, globalisation and the self-sufficiency status of terror group 
networks, the AML template may by default, prove to be particularly valuable in this new 
dispensation. 
 
In assessing the 'lessons learnt' from previous UK CTF interventions and their relevance in 
combating current threats, perhaps the most important contribution is structural rather than 
tactical. The notion of employing a 'Whole of Government' approach to combating Irish 
terrorist group financing can be traced to the late1980's. Indeed, it was recognised that 
delivering operational impact required multiple stakeholders and multi-disciplinary teams 
drawn from various government agencies to combat the multiple funding sources routinely 
exploited by Irish terrorist groups.  As a precursor to the Threat Finance cells recently 
established in Iraq and Afghanistan, the composition of the RUC Terrorist Finance Unit in 
1988 637 included personnel drawn from a broad spectrum of government agencies 
including MOD Intelligence Analysts.  
 
 “If you consider how things have evolved, then we were well ahead of the game. We understood that 
the monies were being raised from several sources, although I suppose our main concern was in 
concentrating on the crimes. So we pulled together a team from various agencies. We had police, customs and 
tax investigators as well as lawyers, forensic accountants and officials. It was very much intelligence led, 
                                                
635 Interviewee with Retired RUC Terrorist Finance Officer, March 2013 
636 Warde, I., Op. Cit. 
637 House of Commons Report- ‘The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ Fourth Report Vol.1, July 2002, p10 
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which I suppose accounts for the role of Special Branch in setting the [CTF] agenda. But the big thing now 
when you look back, is how progressive this all was at the time. We had Defence [MOD] analysts on 
secondment to the Unit, this was 25 years ago. I know that Analysts are pretty much the norm now, but this 
was progressive stuff. The legislation was important here as well, we had strong, draconian powers I 
suppose, but these were needed and government should get the credit for putting this in place.”638   
 
Whilst these structures are clearly important in acknowledging the multi-dimensional 
nature of the various sources of terrorist funding, it was also on the tactical side were there 
had been a significant appreciation of the need to include both macro and micro CTF 
interventions, given the breadth of the financing spectrum servicing both Loyalist and 
Republican groups. Indeed the micro sources of Irish terrorist financing included profits 
from the use of gaming machines, loan sharking, charities abuse as well as social security 
and construction sub-contractor tax fraud. These were supplemented with macro financing 
ventures such as extortion/protection rackets, drug trafficking, intellectual property crime, 
alcohol and tobacco smuggling as well as monies generated from various legitimate 
commercial enterprises and donations from diaspora communities.639 It is primarily the 
operational methodologies developed by RUC and PSNI CTF practitioners to understand 
and target small scale 'micro' financing initiatives that are perhaps most relevant and 
transferable in combating 'new' domestic threats and from which valuable operational 
lessons can be applied in dealing with emerging cell based entities. 
 
Finally, however, just as there has been significant debate regarding the 'newness' of 'new' 
terrorism, so to have discussions emerged regarding the provenance of key aspects of 
current CTF practice. Contemporary UK responses to terrorist financing continue to draw 
heavily from a practitioner’s toolkit, informed and conditioned by the effects of confronting 
the funding challenge from Irish terrorist groups. Ultimately, successful CTF is predicated 
on achieving the right policy, strategy, structures and partnerships to support the 
operational response.  The Governments response to the financing of terrorism in Northern 
Ireland moved beyond a conventional law enforcement approach, based largely on 
detection, arrest, prosecution and punishment towards a new counter terrorism paradigm. 
This included the primacy of 'intelligence' to provide insight into the activities of 
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paramilitary groups, urging greater use of technology to analyse and predict terrorist 
behaviour. It also included a commitment to 'joint working' between law enforcement and 
other government agencies and with the private sector, together with 'combined strategies' 
and an emphasis on 'legitimacy'; ensuring that government actions are ethical, accountable 
and supported in law.640  The continued relevance of each of these themes has been 
addressed in this thesis, including the ensuing debate on FININT which seeks to fuse the 
emphasis on both 'intelligence' and 'legitimacy'. 
 
Whilst more than a decade has passed since this framework was developed to combat Irish 
terrorist groups, the current UK CTF policy, structural and operational response borrows 
heavily from this template. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the principles that 
underpin the practice remain unchanged. CTF is ultimately based on denying an adversary 
the means to fund acts of terrorism or wage war.  What has emerged therefore is a sense 
that we have been here before. The operational terrain looks strikingly familiar. Clearly 
technology has shaped and informed recent operational practice, it is still about 
understanding how funds are raised, stored and moved and framing strategies to inhibit 
supply. What is distinct and unique of course is the emphasis counter terrorism 
investigators now place on the value of financial intelligence. This is arguably where 
developments in CTF practice spawned from intelligence interventions in Northern Ireland 
are most relevant in combating current UK domestic threats. 
 
 “Because terrorist financing has always sat with Special Branch and more recently Intelligence 
Branch, we have always been more interested in looking at the intelligence opportunities available. It’s just 
how things are. I suppose it’s in our DNA. So whilst our [UK] colleagues have adopted more of a hybrid 
approach to terrorist financing, with more of a focus on criminal justice solutions I would say, we have been 
leading the way in using financial intelligence for a whole variety of purposes linked to covert work. So for 
us, it’s about collection, about widening our reach to collect financial and open source material and now 
social media material to compliment other assets. It’s how we now use this material that I suppose is of most 
interest to the [UK] CTFI [Counter Terrorist Financial Investigation] community. So I would say that it is 
here that we can contribute most and pass on our experiences in dealing with TF.641     
 
Theme 5 - Financial Intelligence (FININT) 642  
                                                
640  Ibid p28 
641 Interview with Police Service of Northern Ireland Officer, 11 March 2013 
642 This section borrows heavily from previous research undertaken by the author for the article ‘Financial Intelligence: 
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The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether CTF remains a viable operational asset in 
combating new terror threats and in this case, to consider how recent developments in CTF 
practice and primarily the emphasis on financial intelligence collection, can add value to 
national security and public safety. Whilst evidence from the interview sessions clearly 
endorsed financial intelligence (FININT) as a key operational tool, it also captured the 
concerns that are emerging from practitioners regarding the prospect of enhanced 
regulation of financial data collection.643 This is reflected in the momentum for additional 
scrutiny from those commentators opposed to the increasing reliance on digital surveillance 
and financial data mining for security interventions generally. Indeed, it is acknowledged 
that the pace of technological development has prompted a wider ethical and legal debate 
around information surveillance and its impact on privacy and individual liberty. Critics are 
concerned that crime control values tend to predominate where law enforcement seeks to 
influence public policy and as such greater cognisance should be taken of the creeping 
intrusion of digital data mining as a cornerstone of UK security policy. By acknowledging 
the intrusive nature of financial intelligence collection, any consideration of the emergence 
of FININT to inform future CTF practice must therefore be considered from a surveillance 
studies perspective.  
 
New threats and challenges inevitably spawn new responses. As such, greater emphasis has 
been placed on emerging digital technologies and risk based calculative models as key 
assets to counter terrorism. These techniques rely heavily on technology and mathematical 
modelling to mine data and map normal patterns of behaviour in order that deviations can 
be identified and targeted accordingly. For Amoore and De Goede,644 the imperative to 
harvest public and private sector data and to “join the dots” of terrorism risk, raises 
important questions for both social scientists and counter terrorism practitioners alike. 
Lyon645 proffers some explanation for why surveillance has emerged as an area for 
sociological study and sees this expansion as the product of four key themes; coordination, 
risk, privacy and power. It is with regard to risk however, that the linkages with exploiting 
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644 Amoore L.,  & de Goede, M., Op. Cit. 
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FININT are most relevant. By definition, the harvesting of financial intelligence by law 
enforcement and intelligence services is now so prevalent that it is a core feature of 
contemporary security practice.  
 
The emphasis on the collection of personal information including financial data is rooted in 
the notion that security interventions should be 'intelligence led'.646 Given that the pursuit of 
personal data and the pace of development around its collection and sharing now exceed 
our understanding of the consequences, several key research questions emerge. It is 
primarily the capacity of these new knowledge based economies and particularly their 
digital information infrastructures and their potential for networking that require further 
examination. Confronting the terrorist threat now routinely involves the collection, 
classification and analysis of financial information and other personal data. However, it is 
precisely this access to data analysis programmes which focus on financial risk 
assessments, automated screening and telecom link analysis which raise much wider 
questions around sovereignty and governmentality.647 Questions also arise around the 
increasing emphasis on information surveillance generally, new intelligence collection 
methodologies and the implications of exploiting digital technology and using private 
information for the purposes of governance and national security. 
 
Several core themes have emerged in recent years in the quest to counter the funding of 
terrorism which challenge the notion of liberal governance. These include the increasing 
reliance on, and use of personal information by the state as a tool for subsequent risk 
analysis. In addition, pre-emption and the precautionary principle have now evolved within 
broader counter terrorism policy. Given that CTF as a concept has evolved in recent years 
from developments in data surveillance, questions are now emerging regarding the utility of 
financial surveillance as a means to counter terrorism and whether such measures can 
influence terrorist operations and fundamentally impact their organisational apparatus.648 
This Chapter addresses the emphasis now given to FININT and financial surveillance for 
CTF, whilst acknowledging the underlying challenges to liberty and privacy as a 
consequence of enhanced data surveillance generally. 
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Digital Surveillance and Intrusion 
 
Significant surveillance opportunities have emerged from developments in information 
technology and the capacity of networked systems. Just as social media has transformed 
social protest movements649 law enforcement and intelligence agencies have benefited 
enormously from these new digital opportunities by accessing those flows of personal data 
that regulate and monitor a variety of human interactions and activities. With the advent of 
globalisation, these modes of surveillance are now sufficiently flexible to track the 
movements, and general lifestyle preferences of individuals. 
 
In this context therefore, surveillance refers to the “collection and processing of personal 
data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose 
data have been garnered.”650 Thus in contemporary terms, surveillance is more likely to 
involve automation and encompasses not only the use of monitoring and recording 
technology, but also the record of our communications in the digital age – the “electronic 
footprint” which defines our daily lives. 651 Whilst data mining technologies have emerged 
as a key feature of contemporary society, there remains a visceral sense that their full scope 
and potential are deeply intrusive. The public’s unease with data mining is perhaps best 
understood as the expression of some intuitive understanding that their privacy is under 
threat.652 Every electronic interaction, financial transaction, and search string on a Web 
browser is capable of being audited and time stamped for future exploitation by both the 
state and private organisations. Data mining underscores the central role that surveillance 
technologies now play for law enforcement around risk and security. For some 
commentators, surveillance technologies are the backbone of data mining, providing those 
disparate streams of information which populate data sets and which are in turn fed into 
various algorithms from which the quest for patterns, trends and typologies begins.653  
 
                                                
649 The use of Social Media was established as a feature of the Arab Spring 2011 and the Loyalist Union Flag Protests in 
Northern Ireland in December 2012. 
650 Lyon D., ‘Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life’, Issues in Society, Open University Press USA, 2001, p14 
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There are two broad categories of data mining: descriptive and predictive data mining. 
Whereas the former is concerned with describing the general properties of the existing data, 
the latter seeks to make predictions based on inference from the original dataset. It is 
predictive data mining that is most relevant to law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
and used routinely for risk profiling and from which opportunities to counter terrorist 
financing through FININT may develop. When new information platforms emerge, it often 
takes time before suitable infrastructure evolves to capture, analyse and interpret the data. 
Analysing FININT; seeking to draw meaning and understanding from the data itself, now 
presents a considerable challenge. Typically new forms of data collection focus on 
establishing situational awareness; 'what' is happening, 'when, 'where' and to 'whom'.  This 
should then be used to consider hypotheses and to elicit explanations and lead to predictive 
judgements and modelling of 'what if' scenarios.654 From a law enforcement and 
intelligence collection perspective, it is the intrusive harvesting of financial data and more 
recently social media intelligence to which most attention is now focused. Given 
practitioner concerns regarding anticipated future regulation of financial intelligence 
collection, any evaluation of FININT must acknowledge the impact of the data revolution 
on liberty, justice and individual privacy.  
 
The concept of a ‘surveillance society' is typically considered in pejorative terms, invoking 
a sinister perception in which the authority and reach of the state is considered all 
pervasive. Yet contemporary society is suffused with surveillance in the sense that the 
acquisition and use of personal data is a by-product of the digital age.  As such, the 
surveillance society is best thought of as a response to the growth of bureaucracies; the 
outcome of modern organisational practices, businesses and government, rather than a 
convert conspiracy.655 In the context of this thesis, surveillance is considered in narrower 
law enforcement or intelligence terms, with an emphasis on the focused collection, storage 
and analysis of data on specific nominals, rather than the use of aggregated data. The 
collection of personal data is a product of governance and how contemporary society is 
now ordered and regulated. This inevitably throws up ethical and human rights concerns on 
how such data is managed, stored and used. The data revolution has spawned many 
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unintended consequences and there is a gap emerging in our understanding of the long-term 
implications of the pace and outcome of these developments. We are simply unsighted on 
the consequences of networked surveillance.  It is precisely this capture of personal data, 
which in turn is used to map individuals according to defined criteria whether income, 
attributes, behaviours or preferences that is the focus of recent interest.656   
 
For Lyon, those societies that are dependent on communication and information 
technologies for administrative and control processes are intrinsically surveillance 
societies.657  Indeed, contemporary society is now characterised by a programme of 
systematic and routinised surveillance from a variety of platforms. Such surveillance has 
emerged as a core characteristic of modern society and is wedded to the pace of 
technological developments around the collection, storage, and retrieval and processing of 
information generally. There has been a significant shift in recent years in the tactics used 
to combat terrorist financing, away from a reliance on 'macro' technocratic measures such 
as account monitoring or asset freezing towards an increasing emphasis on the “electronic 
and digital footprint” and access to vast reserves of personal data. The commercial sector 
has been the stimulus for these developments, recognising the competitive advantage which 
such data affords to target customers and enhance marketing opportunities. Similarly, 
government has not been slow in embracing these developments in its pursuit of greater 
effectiveness, not least in the fight against crime and terrorism. The net result of these 
developments has been an increase in the volume of personal data collected, analysed and 
stored. 
 
The pace of technological development in terms of the collection storage and use of 
personal information has enabled the private sector to tailor its marketing and 
communications at particular groups of consumers. This has led to an increasing reliance on 
digitally supported means of decision-making generally658 and created expectations for 
government from the public, regarding the ability to process information and deliver 
personalised services similar to those in the private sector, particularly in the context of 
healthcare, border control, crime prevention and harm reduction. The 'Information Sharing 
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Vision Statement'659 acknowledged the need for safeguards around data collection 
generally. The foundation for surveillance technologies is the database and the financial 
sector provides a key dataset for exploitation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
The scale of data collection and storage has expanded exponentially in recent years. The 
emphasis on e-banking, electronic transfers and credit reference agencies has intensified the 
interest in financial information as a primary intelligence asset. The “digital footprint” in 
CTF terms is best understood in the context of the “financial footprint” with more 
payments transacted in the UK using debit or credit cards than cash.660  Whilst each of these 
account holders represents a potential intelligence dividend in itself, when mapped over 
credit reference and other commercial data, they provide a key starting point for 
investigators.  
 
Government has been quick to exploit the opportunities afforded by technology661 by 
capitalising on those private sector developments and applying them to transactional 
activities and reforming corporate services and infrastructure.662 However, in response to 
these developments, the Home Affairs Committee embarked on a wide-ranging enquiry 
into the growth of both public and private sector databases and those forms of surveillance 
directly related to the remit of the Home Office.663 The focus of the Inquiry was in 
addressing the parameters of legitimate state activity and what constituted unacceptable 
levels of intrusion. Indeed the Committee examined the wider benefits of surveillance in 
terms of public services and public safety vis-à-vis the inherent risks in terms of data error, 
mis-identification and the stewardship and security of sensitive personal information.664   
 
Whilst FININT can be exploited as a key intelligence asset, its real value is as part of a 
suite of surveillance technologies which are available to law enforcement, intelligence 
services and the military. Indeed database development is now a key feature of public 
services infrastructure enhancement.  The Surveillance Studies Network Report665 
highlighted the overlapping advances in telecommunications, audio-visual recording, 
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digitisation and tracking technologies. It is the synergy derived from these interactions and 
exchanges which give real weight and context to financial data and the capacity for 
financial surveillance. The ubiquity of the database has revolutionised surveillance 
potential. Strategic partnerships between state agencies and the private sector have 
strengthened in recent years and increasing emphasis is placed on the utility of 
“dataveillance”. 666 The harvesting of data now extends to financial transactions, Internet 
shopping, television viewing preferences and telecommunications. Further information can 
be extracted from web site cookies, customer loyalty programmes and most significantly 
perhaps, from social networking platforms. The collation, use and storage of personal data 
have now resulted in the emergence of a personal information economy.667  
 
Law enforcement understands the opportunities that exist in mapping private sector 3rd 
party information over data extracted from government databases, NGO’s and specialist 
data collection companies. There are however, inherent dangers in relying too heavily on 
consumer data, particularly were the data has been refined, processed and categorised for 
commercial purposes. Whilst geographic and demographic data are often most relevant to 
law enforcement in establishing locations, internet URL’s and domain names, lifestyle data 
and consumer behaviour information whilst valuable in certain contexts, require a more 
cautious approach. Whilst this thesis is concerned with understanding how financial 
intelligence is used to target 'Subjects of Interest', obvious research questions emerge from 
the use of private sector data, not least the extent to which surveillance which historically 
had a narrow targeting spectrum has now been extended to include the majority of citizens. 
The implications for the subsequent stratification, categorisation and social sorting, 
therefore requires further examination. Research opportunities also exist in exploring the 
applications for law enforcement of new data-mining techniques developed for commercial 
purposes, particularly those developed to extract ‘clusters’ of data indicating patterns and 
linkages within a particular data set. In addition, greater understanding is required of the 
potential application by law enforcement and intelligence services of ‘heuristic’ processes 
of data mining or Knowledge Discovery Databases (KDD) and their role in discovering 
previously unknown or non-obvious relationships.668 It is assessed that these techniques 
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highlight patterns of behaviour and predictions of future behaviour within a reasonable 
range of accuracy.669  
 
The Operational Value of Financial Intelligence 
 
Financial data mining is used increasingly by investigators to shape their understanding of 
events and incidents. It has proven to be particularly useful to map the various phases of 
terrorist incidents and to establish identity and lifestyle for risk identification and 
categorisation purposes. The question of whether FININT and financial surveillance are 
effective in combating the financing of terrorism is complex.  Technocratic solutions such 
as asset freezing, account monitoring, sanctions lists and enhanced regulation, all have a 
role to play, however the emphasis on criminalising the financing of terror using AML 
templates can obscure the impact of such programmes as the collection methods are not in 
themselves distinctive. Only by linking the sources of funding to the final act can any 
viable assessment be made. Current UK public policy on CTF must contend with 
significant changes in terror cell funding in recent years and the real value of financial data 
and financial surveillance in this context is present uncertain.  
 
What is clear however, is that financial data has long been endorsed by the UK Treasury, 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies,670 and that this has resulted in the emergence of 
a new security paradigm in which financial borders are best understood as a “complex 
assemblage” in which private institutions in conjunction with government regulators and 
law enforcement are in effect authorised to make security decisions.671 It is increasingly the 
former to whom most responsibility falls with the banking sector for some commentators, 
having assumed proxy sovereign status on behalf of the state.672  Others chart the emerging 
relationships between private data and technology companies and government security 
programmes and the emergence of a de facto intelligence infrastructure in which private 
companies play a full and active role.673  
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Within the UK, it is the widespread promulgation of the “risk based approach” that has 
placed the financial institutions at the centre of efforts to combat the financing of terrorism. 
This role has recently been formalised with the 3rd European Union Money Laundering 
Directive. De Goede attributes this extension of authority to financial institutions, as part of 
a wider process of engaging various societal groups to combat terrorism through proscribed 
security action.674 The information acquired by financial institutions under this regime, 
particularly in respect of “customer due diligence” (CDD) and “know your customer” 
(KYC) provisions, provides a rich resource of first phase investigative data that can now be 
fused with security mandates to progress CTF interventions. As a result, de Goede is 
particularly critical of the shift in recent years from the primary objective of CTF; that of 
restraining the flow of funds for the purpose of terrorism, to the emerging emphasis on the 
mining of financial data for wider security interventions.675    
 
The developing methodologies around the ordering and assessment of money flows through 
automated risk modelling and the designation of financial associations through social 
network analysis have become the focus of recent criticism.676 There is little doubt that 
social network analysis has been used increasingly in recent years to mine financial data 
and map terrorist networks. Such data has the capacity to link people to people, people to 
places and people to events. It often provides low classification corroboration material for 
more sensitive forms of intelligence and the veracity of the data is seldom disputed. 
Furthermore, it affords investigators, the possibility of mapping both pre and post-incident 
hypotheses. Whereas the utility of this data has largely been considered beneficial for 
retrospective evaluation and investigation, the focus in using this type of data has now 
shifted to pre-emptive targeting and disruption. The goal now is to target the planning 
phase, thwart the incident and prosecute the conspirators. This however needs to be set 
against the increasingly sterile financial ‘footprint’ used by the most recent attack cells. 
 
The current emphasis on financial data is linked in part to the nature of the current terrorist 
threat. New perceptions and categorisations of the threat have inevitably resulted in the 
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quest for a new set of countermeasures. Whereas the emergence networked structures has 
highlighted the value of social network theory and network analysis to assist investigations, 
further quantitative methods for intelligence analysis have as indicated been used by 
military analysts deployed within Threat Finance Cells to combat insurgent financing. It is 
however, the organisation and structural configuration of “new terrorism” that stimulates 
most discussion regarding future counter terrorist finance initiatives. The UK CTF policy 
template confirms that the mandates typically governing these interventions have largely 
focused on the funding of military operations, weapons procurement, and the maintenance 
of organisational infrastructure. Thus any significant changes to how terror groups or cells 
are structured and financed must be factored into those strategies seeking to impact new 
mutations of the threat and includes the use of new digital assets and analytical methods.  
 
Concerns have been expressed regarding the over extension of these data mining practices 
and suggestions that they have in recent years exceeded their stated objectives by 
contributing to extra judicial security action.677 The crux of the argument centres on the fact 
that pursuing terrorist finances through targeted money flows enables specific persons to be 
pre-emptively targeted and disrupted. CTF practice has seemingly evolved to include 
executive action against those who whilst not necessarily guilty of criminal behaviour or 
against whom there exists sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution, an extra judicial 
opportunity to frustrate their endeavours where a perceived threat to public safety exists. De 
Goede678 further examines the practices and politics that govern the pursuit of terrorist 
financing and focuses on the “finance-security assemblage” the ensuing transnational 
architecture of laws, institutions, treaties and private initiatives that contribute to CTF.679 
Revisiting the themes from her previous research, 680 she again focuses on the pre-emptive 
logic as the heart of this “assemblage”. This is supplemented by examining the concept of 
criminalising “association” and those networks developed through financial data to target 
people, organisations and spaces. It is difficult to endorse some of the conceptual claims 
derived from her empirical research, not least the notion that the West’s pursuit of 
suspected terrorist finances is predicated on broadening the “temporal and spatial range of 
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their techno-militaristic governmental apparatus”681 by affording governments greater 
control over individuals, organisations and the routine activities of every day life. 
Ultimately however, those financial practices and interventions of which she is most critical 
are from a CTF practitioner’s perspective, spawned more by concerns to identify threats, 
assess probabilities and to develop control and disruption counter strategies.682  
 
Privacy: Reconciling Liberty and Security 
 
Clearly, any consideration of the operational utility of FININT and financial surveillance to 
assist CTF interventions is inevitably bound up with questions regarding the impact which 
collection technologies pose for liberal governance and the balance required in reconciling 
liberty with security. However, as indicated previously, these concepts are inextricably 
linked and important questions have emerged regarding the impact which these 
technologies pose for privacy and human rights generally, including proprietary ownership 
of such data and the limitations on its use for state and commercial purposes. There is 
recognition that privacy plays an important role in the social contract between the citizen 
and the state. Indeed the relationship which exists between the collection of personal data 
and the trust of the public is recognised by both public and private sectors and somewhat 
disturbingly, there has perhaps been a greater incentive in the past to have more robust 
arrangements in place to protect private sector information where breaches of confidence 
and trust can be evidenced tangibly through loss of revenue and trading.683  
 
More recently in addition to the concerns regarding the intrusive nature of FININT 
collection, attention has shifted to the digital intelligence opportunities from social media 
monitoring. As social media becomes an increasingly important form of communication, 
this has enhanced the debate on collection methodology and prompted calls for new 
relationships with industry, academia and legislators.  The digital revolution has 
transformed the ways in which we engage and interact, with more of our lives and activities 
transferred to new digital social spaces.  Like FININT, social media intelligence now 
challenges current notions of privacy and consent. These technologies resonate more with 
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the public given their visceral understanding of the capabilities of these platforms more so 
than financial audits. Furthermore like FININT, analysis of social media for intelligence 
purposes does not fit easily into the policy and legal frameworks that guarantees that such 
activity is proportionate, necessary and accountable.”684     
 
The authors of the Demos Report685 offer a new framework for how UK law enforcement 
and security authorities can collect and use social media intelligence in a way that is both 
effective and ethical, whilst simultaneously serving the public and respecting the right to 
privacy.  Acknowledging that social media intelligence (SOCMINT) can play a key role in 
keeping the public safe, the authors argue that this should now be a permanent part of the 
intelligence framework, albeit based on “a publicly argued legal footing, with clarity and 
transparency over its use, storage, purpose, regulation and accountability.”686 They 
advocate a ‘dual-route’ approach which distinguishes between open source, non intrusive 
SOCMINT that would not allow for the identification of individuals or as a means of 
facilitating criminal investigation and intrusive or surveillance SOCMINT that conversely 
would be intended for the purposes of accessing private information. The spectrum of 
access would therefore range from the collection of publicly available information to the 
interception and analysis of personal communications. Given developments in digital 
surveillance, it is suggested that access to SOCMINT now needs to be governed by a new 
legal framework that regulates the association between harm, privacy, authorisation, agency 
and cause.687 In the context of potential future constraints on the collection of financial 
data, CTF practitioners are similarly concerned that the current debate regarding new legal 
frameworks for SOCMINT may in in due course lead to greater regulation of FININT for 
insight and intelligence purposes.   
 
 “Consistent with Britain's modern approach towards national security, the work of the intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement is made easier when the public broadly understands and accepts why, when 
and with what restrictions intelligence and police work is undertaken.” 688   
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CTF Data Mining  
 
In practical terms, what then is the scale and scope of this data mining? Financial 
surveillance affects individuals in a number of ways. These include basic account opening 
procedures, access to financial services and the transfer of funds, whether domestically or 
internationally. Much of the enhanced due diligence exercised by the institutions is the 
product of previous money laundering regulations enacted to address serious and organised 
crime.  In an effort to target the proceeds of crime, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)689 set international standards for the governance of financial institutions and 
published its core recommendations in 1990, subsequently revised again in 1996 and 2003. 
These recommendations have had a significant impact on financial surveillance. Central to 
these recommendations are the concepts of “customer due diligence (CDD) and “know 
your customer” (KYC) which requires financial and relevant non financial institutions to 
maintain verifiable data on customer identity, business relationships, transaction 
information and sources of funding.   
 
In October 2001, FATF extended its remit to include further recommendations on terrorist 
financing which primarily sought to criminalise the financing of terrorism and to freeze and 
confiscate terrorist assets. Crucially however, FATF also advocated measures to strengthen 
customer identification measures in international and domestic wire transfers. This was 
supplemented further in April 2002 with “Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting 
Terrorist Financing” which contained lists of characteristics of financial scrutiny that may 
be cause for increased monitoring and attention. These focused on accounts, withdrawals 
and deposits, wire transfers, characteristics of the customer and transactions linked to 
locations of concern.690 Subsequent FATF Typologies Reports provided further material for 
law enforcement and intelligence services to identify trends and methods of money 
laundering and terrorist financing in an effort to develop effective counter strategies and 
inform public policy generally. Collectively these measures have contributed to a de facto 
regime of global financial governance that emerged post 9/11 and illuminated the potential 
intelligence opportunities provided by financial data and financial surveillance.  
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Indeed, in June 2006, the New York Times published an article uncovering an international 
financial surveillance programme sanctioned by the US government in which international 
wire transfer data was acquired by federal agencies for the purposes of investigating 
terrorist activity.691 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunication (SWIFT), 
which provides a messaging infrastructure to the global banking community, acknowledged 
its role in responding to compulsory subpoenas from the US Treasury and cooperating to 
prevent illegal uses of the international financial system. The potential scale of financial 
surveillance, which can be now exploited by law enforcement, is best understood when 
considering the scope and reach of the SWIFT's remit. The organisation currently provides 
financial messaging services and information software to more than 10,000 institutions in 
210 countries and territories and audits in excess of 2.6 billion messages annually linked to 
payments, securities and trade.692  
 
Concerns were inevitably expressed within Europe over the possible levels of intrusion 
from these developments and US Treasury officials were quick to clarify the nature of these 
requests. On 23 June 2006, Stuart Levy, US Under Secretary for the Office of Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence confirmed the narrow counter terrorism parameters and legal 
basis on which the information was sought.693 The civil liberties organisation, 'Privacy 
International' stated that the disclosure of this data also affected the United Kingdom with 
an estimated 4.6 million financial records sent annually to the US security services via 
secret agreement over the duration of the programme.694  
 
Law enforcement agencies traditionally work from a data collection template which is 
tiered depending on the nature of the investigation. Vast amounts of information are now 
readily accessible through credit reference agencies; financial institutions, retail sector 
loyalty schemes and Internet trading which collectively document consumer behaviour and 
lifestyle preferences. When this data is then mapped over information from organisations 
which operate search engines and which can in turn link individual users, there are huge 
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dividends for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Such benefits now typically 
include “smart borders”, passenger profiling which in turn is used to create government 
“watch lists” for specific targeting and monitoring. The 'data revolution' has thus enabled 
information from various databases to be matched to create data- sets and mined to link 
information on individuals and to create subject profiles using algorithms to sort groups and 
individuals according to behaviour, activity or preferences.695  
 
It is acknowledged that a government’s primary duty is to protect the lives and property of 
its citizens. However when subject to security threats, government must seek to balance the 
provision of adequate security and counter terrorism measures with respect for and 
compliance with, its civil liberties and human rights obligations. When threatened by acts 
of terrorism, the default position of many democracies however, is the adoption and 
implementation of a range of measures which often lay challenge to these wider libertarian 
and societal values. Striking the balance is often a crucible for government with legislative 
exuberance and overreaction a greater threat to democracy rather than specific acts of 
terrorism per se.696 These measures typically involve tightening existing security 
bureaucracies and supplementing its legislative provisions. Crucially however, counter 
terrorist programmes now involve a range of actors including private sector organisations 
and CTF programmes that focus increasingly on harvesting financial information have 
emerged in recent years as significant intelligence contributors. Engagement with the 
private sector in the UK is now increasingly the norm, with financial institutions in 
particular seen as key partners in confronting these new security threats and assisting law 
enforcement accordingly.  
 
As with most phenomena, surveillance from financial data mining can be categorised in 
terms of risks and benefits. The process of surveillance can both enable and constrain and 
can simultaneously involve care and control. It can be both benevolent and discriminating. 
The benefits of surveillance for the citizen are often real, palpable and undeniable.697  The 
real challenge therefore is in reconciling liberty with new security interventions, a cry 
echoed in Dominic Raab's lament for Britain’s lost liberal democracy.698 For Raab, the 
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growth of data surveillance has contributed to the erosion of civil liberties generally and 
further challenges the relationship between the state and the individual. These themes also 
find expression in the United States, where the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
cautions against growing surveillance capacity, and cite the “erosions in protections against 
government spying, the increasing amount of tracking being carried out by the private 
sector and the growing intersection between the two.”699 Yet surveillance is now 
proliferating in every sphere of social activity at a pace that inevitably results in breaches of 
security around the control of personal data. Those organisations that monitor and record 
our daily activities, do so largely in the context of managing and mitigating risk. The 
current emphasis on risk management now requires greater access to personal data in an 
effort to target resources more effectively.  Forecasting trends and future behaviours is now 
a fundamental aspect of both the commercial and public security domains. Surveillance in 
all its forms, including access to financial data, is the means by which knowledge is 
collected for the purpose of managing risk.  
 
Commercial and government infrastructures have enhanced their surveillance capacities in 
recent years as a result of technological developments around data collection generally.  
Surveillance capacities have expanded at an exponential rate which is now outstripping 
those legal and political efforts to understand their wider social implications.700 This has 
prompted renewed discussions on privacy-invasion, privacy-protection and existing data 
protection legislation. More importantly perhaps, there is now a renewed focus on the 
accountability of data handlers. The chief concern is that individual citizens have little 
control over the collection and use of personal data and are seriously disadvantaged at 
limiting the impact of surveillance. Government databases, like those in the commercial 
sector, are now routinely used to target risk through social sorting. Categorising individuals 
or groups or 'social sorting' is crucial to understanding information surveillance.  In the 
context of the former, these are used increasingly for crime control and national security, 
however they are often accompanied by unintended consequences, often the product of 
joined-up government, utility and services outsourcing and the emerging ascendency of 
actuarial practices.701   
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Conclusion 
 
As the volume of raw data about our lives continues to grow exponentially, so too does the 
need to mitigate potential intrusions on privacy and consent. CTF operational practice has 
encouraged the use of financial intelligence collection to establish identity, behaviour, 
lifestyle and networks as many of the CTF FININT practices are merely an extension of the 
tradecraft refined from financial crime investigation and intelligence procedures developed 
under previous AML frameworks. Data collection by law enforcement is a natural 
consequence of the changing financial and technological landscape. The opportunities 
provided by the Internet and the ensuing vulnerability experienced by state agencies has 
enhanced the focus on data collection. From a financial crime perspective, opportunities 
have migrated from the substantive physical to the “cyber” environment as law 
enforcement now contends with e-banking and e-commerce abuses. 
 
Whilst the evidence in Chapter Four indicates increasing reliance on financial intelligence 
collection, not only for CTF, but also for counter terrorism and serious crime investigations 
generally, it is anticipated that FININT will evolve in tandem with the emphasis on 'Big 
Data' generally. The pattern and trend analysis derived from 'Big Data' which currently 
shapes our understanding of behaviours, preferences and intentions, will be central to 
effective law enforcement and assist in identifying new threats and keeping communities 
safe. Those techniques which are presently being developed and refined for retail and 
marketing purposes through systems that allow data to be collected by multiple sources and 
used in multiple data layers, will increasingly migrate to police and intelligence work. It is 
likely therefore, that FININT will complement new forms of data collection by 
triangulating social media and more traditional sources of intelligence.702 Whilst there has 
been some criticism that public safety and law enforcement communities are using social 
media analytics in a vacuum,703 the real value to future interventions is in fusing emerging 
FININT and SOCMINT with traditional platforms but also with incident management 
systems, intelligence analysis software and geographic information systems than can 
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interpret and illustrate the connectivity and relevance of the data. This will require a shift in 
the skills of those analysing and using the data in order that valid inferences and 
conclusions might be drawn. 
 
The “observation architecture” that is developing around private citizens now exceeds 
financial data alone. The US in particular has been at the forefront of seeking to exploit the 
data surveillance opportunities also provided by commercial data. Within Europe, however, 
the European Union Data Privacy Directive704 established a regime of data privacy for EU 
nationals including limits on the use of their personal information by private actors.  
Vlcek705 stresses however that this is rooted more in the lack of commodification of 
personal data rather than any absence of collection. Indeed Europe has not been slow to 
promote data collection as a means to enhance its security apparatus and the threat from 
‘new terrorism’ has arguably accelerated the intrusion by state agencies.706  The sense of 
public outrage and vulnerability particularly in the wake of recent domestic attacks in the 
UK has perhaps resulted in less scrutiny of legislative measures and the extension of 
financial surveillance. The ensuing expansion of the reporting and compliance obligations 
on financial institutions was expanded to include those quasi financial actors; the 
professions and businesses that could theoretically facilitate money laundering beyond the 
parameters of the formal banking sector. The underlying narrative for these developments 
was that combating the financing of terrorism was inevitably wedded to more stringent 
controls governing money laundering generally. 
 
For some, the recent proliferation of risk techniques in confronting terror is therefore rooted 
in a particular mode of governance and has more to do with making an uncertain future 
amenable to intervention and management.707 The concept of risk is now central to counter 
terrorism, yet the specifics of how we address risk in this context is unclear and has far 
reaching implications for how we apply it to public safety and national security. Are we 
now witnessing targeted governance with a focus on risk rather than discipline in which 
risk management templates consider individual citizens in the context of measurable risk 
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factors that can be sorted, categorised and analysed accordingly?708  For Vlcek,709 the 
response of the state in addressing these developments has been overwhelmingly geared to 
benefiting law enforcement and intelligence services rather than permitting individual 
assessments of risk. This conceptualisation of reconciling liberty and security thus 
underscores the dilemma in shaping public policy, where value systems which are more 
individual centric, compete with notions of the collective good. Similarly those actors 
charged with protecting public safety and national security, are less inclined to consider the 
wider societal impact of these surveillance methodologies. Thus the net result of these 
exchanges is that the security imperative tends to predominate and the Panopticon vision 
articulated by Bentham prevails. In this environment, “pre-emptive security” has flourished 
and policy is formulated increasingly on the basis of suspicion and supposition.710  
 
Pre-emptive security by its nature, will require a radical reconfiguration of the law and the 
enactment of new legislation that seeks to legitimise supposition and suspicion.711 In 
addition, new surveillance infrastructures will be required and existing networks extended.  
Current practices now feature surveillance technologies and data-mining which are focused 
on pre-emption and accordingly, pre-emptive risk modelling and profiling now shifts 
surveillance practices towards screening the actions, behaviours and transactions of the 
wider population which is then applied for targeted interventions.712 Nowhere has risk 
become more prominent, than in the context of criminal justice where the current raft of 
police and Home Office strategies is underpinned by a commitment to utilise surveillance 
and emerging data technology to tackle crime and assist with harm reduction.713  Indeed, in 
a contemporary sense, enhanced surveillance has emerged as a by-product of risk, which in 
turn is further, addressed through safety and security.  
 
It is clear that public norms regarding privacy and consent have shifted in recent years. 
Many of the conclusions and recommendations in the Demos Report714 regarding ethics, 
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law and public acceptability, can likewise be applied to the intrusive collection and use of 
financial intelligence. Though strictly regulated at present through judicial scrutiny when 
collecting financial information for evidential purposes, it is the harvesting of financial data 
for intelligence and insight purposes that is most vulnerable to enhanced regulation. The 
level of public debate about privacy and growing state intrusion varies across jurisdictions. 
Given that the public sector in the UK is increasingly making use of ‘Big Data’, a new data 
protection Code of Practice was published recently to advise on how to protect the privacy 
rights of individuals while dealing with ever larger and richer datasets.715 Thus more 
understanding is required of how we can best harness the advantages which data collection 
and surveillance technologies now hold for public safety and security, whilst cognisant of 
erosions to privacy. The growth in these technologies will inevitably require new 
discourses on collection ethics to more fully understand these developments. Subsequent 
discussions regarding regulation must extend beyond the narrow confines of personal 
liberty and established notions of the 'public interest’, which have defined the parameters of 
the debate to date. Intelligence gathering and the opportunities afforded through data 
collection are fundamental to effective law enforcement and public safety. The test 
therefore is to construct a collection template that adds investigative value and operational 
impact, yet recognises the attendant challenges posed to privacy, informed consent and 
justice.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
In light of emerging security threats, new structural configurations and most significantly, 
recent changes in the “economy of terror”, this thesis has sought to establish the 
contemporary relevance of finance in the terrorism equation, beyond its ‘key enabler’ 
status. The relationship between war and money is well documented, with Cicero’s 
aphorism716 strongly resonant in Western responses to the financing of terrorism. Whilst the 
centrality of money in resourcing war has a rich heritage and been endorsed historically by 
Trivulzio717 and Davenant,718 recent changes in financing methodologies have challenged 
the continued relevance of CTF to combat these new international and domestic security 
threats. The objective of this thesis therefore, is to determine the efficacy of the UK 
approach to counter terrorist financing in light of these new threats and challenges. This 
invariably poses questions regarding the metrics used to determine the impact of these 
interventions.  
 
The 'litmus test' for success and the goal set previously by the UK government's CTF 
community, is whether the “financial aspects of the terrorist threat are better understood 
and whether the financial tools deployed [are] increasingly effective in tackling them”.719 
The research question therefore has sought to understand the nature and scope of the 
terrorist finance threat to the UK.  It has focused on eliciting greater clarity on current 
domestic and international terrorist finance requirements and on highlighting key 
challenges and future vulnerabilities. It also considers whether the public policy response 
and the state's intelligence, investigation and disruption techniques are delivering the 
required operational impact. As such, this thesis has examined the UK approach to counter 
terrorist financing in the broadest terms by considering the structures, strategy and 
narratives that have shaped UK policy and operational strategy.720  
 
                                                
716 See 'Introduction and Thesis Outline' and Cicero, M. T., Op. Cit., p249 
717 Trivulzio, G, Marshall of France, 1499, in Munkler H., ‘The New Wars’, Polity Press, 2005, p54 and Zubrin, R ‘How 
to Destroy OPEC’ Infocus Quarterly, Fall 2008 
718 Davenant, C (1656-1714) ‘An Essay Upon Ways and Means of Supplying the War’ 1695, Jacob Tonson, 1701 
719 HM Treasury, Op. Cit., p39 
720 See Thesis Chapter 3, p76 and Chapter 4, p94 
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It is acknowledged that the research design may be subject to criticism and accusations of 
ideological weakness and limitation given that it is based exclusively on an ‘insider’s’ 
perspective.721 Moreover, it is also recognised that further concerns may emerge regarding 
perceived professional bias, prejudice and the pursuit of vested interests on the part of those 
sampled. Insofar as the author is concerned, further caution is anticipated regarding notions 
of a strong professional empathy with the participants and a perceived lack of objectivity.722 
This however, should be considered against the ensuing trade-off that facilitates access to 
this ‘closed’ constituency of practitioners and the clear understanding of the need to guard 
against researcher bias and maintain the highest ethical standards. 
 
In pursuing this approach, cognisance was given to four key ethical issues. First, who owns 
the data and how will it be disseminated? Second, what is the relationship between the 
researcher and those researched? Further acknowledgement was given to the protocols 
around informed consent. Finally and crucially, in the semi structured interview sessions in 
particular, due consideration was given to the nature of anonymity and the confidentiality 
accorded for participating individuals and their respective parent organisations.723   
 
Clearly, insider research has attracted its share of adverse comment due primarily, to the 
issue of ‘insider’ as an ‘actor’ within the research setting. Indeed the notion of validity is 
complicated precisely by the relationship between the researcher and those researched.724 
Concerns are often expressed on a number of levels. Will the researcher’s inherent 
knowledge of the subject lead them to misinterpret data or make erroneous assumptions? 
Will the relationship with the subject impact negatively on the subject’s behaviour? Further 
issues arise regarding whether the researcher’s moral, political and cultural views may 
subconsciously distort the data.725  
 
Brannick and Coghlan726 however, provide ample justification for the validity of insider 
                                                
721 De Lyser, D, ‘Do you really live here? Thoughts on insider research’ Geographical Review 91(1), 2001.  
722 Unler, S, ‘Being an Inside Researcher While Conducting Case Study Research’, The Qualitative Report Vol.17, 2012 
723 Hoolihan, R., & Brooks, R. ‘The Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research: application and  
Implementation for ‘Insider’ Research in Business ‘ 2004, qtd in Galea, A., Op Cit  
724 Galea, A, ‘Breaking the Barriers of Insider Research in Occupational Health and Safety’, Journal of Health and Safety  
Research & Practice, Vol 1, Issue 1, October 2009 
725 Rooney, P, ‘Researching from the Inside - Does it Compromise Validity?’ A  Discussion. See http://  
level3.dit.iehtml/issue3/rooney 
726 Brannick, T., and Coghlan, D. ‘In Defense of Being “Native”: The Case for Insider Academic Research.’  
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research through recognised methods of reflexivity. They bolster this argument by 
highlighting the dividends that emerge from employing this method. In particular, they cite 
the benefits of articulating tacit knowledge that is often rich, deep and contextual. Whilst 
such knowledge is prone to becoming deeply segmented as a result of socialisation in an 
organisational system, it can in turn be reframed as theoretical knowledge.727 As such, this 
approach was considered particularly suitable in addressing the core research objectives in 
determining the efficacy of the current UK model for CTF.  
 
Action to combat terrorism through financial tools has been an integral part of the “Pursue” 
strand of the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy.728 These finance interventions contribute to 
the Government’s wider understanding of the terrorist threat and support its efforts to 
“create a more hostile environment for terrorists” and to “disrupt terrorist networks.”729 
Any assessment of impact must acknowledge the desire on the part of Her Majesty's 
Government to promote “the effective disruption of specific terrorist targets (including 
financial facilitators of terrorism by developing the UK's capability to use financial tools to 
optimum effect”.730 This thesis contends that using financial tools to optimum effect should 
now involve new approaches specifically around the exploitation of financial data and will 
therefore require a new suite of evaluation metrics.  
 
Few articles have been published on counter terrorist finance policies in the UK and “fewer 
still have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness”.731 Sproat 732 in particular bemoans the 
lack of qualitative and quantitative data on all aspects of the UK's CTF policies generally 
and highlights the dearth of convictions under the Part III provisions of the Terrorism Act 
2000. Traditional evaluations typically focus on persons convicted under Sections 15-18 of 
the legislation733 as well as assets frozen or monies seized. However, focusing on these 
metrics alone is somewhat narrow and underestimates the full lexicon of CTF practice. Just 
                                                                                                                                               
Organisational Research Methods, 10 (1) pp59-74, 2007 
727 Ibid, p60 
728 ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ Op. Cit. 
729 HM Treasury 2007, Op. Cit., p38  
730 Ibid, p39 
731 Sproat, P ‘Counter-terrorist finance in the UK: a quantitative and qualitative commentary based on open source 
materials’. Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol 13, Issue 4, 2010, p315-335 
732 Ibid 
733 Part III, Sections 15-18 of the Terrorism Act 2000 deal specifically with terrorist financing and include fundraising, 
use and possession, funding arrangements and the laundering and concealment of terrorist property.  
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as Wittig734 argues for a wider approach to the study of terrorism related financial activity 
beyond the emphasis on the transit of monies, stressing instead value-chains and terror 
group interaction with benign socio-economic communities and evaluating terrorists as 
socio-political actors, the empirical evidence from this thesis similarly challenges the 
orthodoxies around CTF practice. Thus rather than focus on conventional approaches that 
address the generation, storage and movement of money per se, this thesis strongly 
advocates the operational value of financial intelligence and suggests that financial data 
will increasingly emerge as a key asset within CTF practice in combating terrorism more 
generally.735  
 
This thesis adds to our existing knowledge through qualitative research derived from 
interviews with key policy officials and experienced CTF practitioners in the UK, 
specifically addressing current government responses, intelligence gathering and law 
enforcement interventions. It focuses on each of these areas and develops the theoretical 
framework on which this thesis is based, by considering 'Structures, Policy and Strategy', 
'Operational Effectiveness' and the current suite of 'CTF Assets' typically invoked to 
support these efforts. Finally the thesis charts those anticipated 'Future Challenges, and 
Vulnerabilities' that are likely to emerge and shape the CTF agenda in the years ahead.  
 
It sets the context by framing those key security challenges facing counter terrorism 
practitioners and considers the reliance on traditional responses to terrorist financing and 
the orthodoxy of using anti money laundering techniques for CTF. It also considers 
whether globalisation and enhanced multilateralism and international cooperation has 
forced terrorist groups to react to more robust regulation and scrutiny and by default, 
accelerated changes in structural configuration. Crucially, it acknowledges in Chapter 3, 
that structure is central to understanding the financing of terrorism and that choices 
governing organisational design, adaptation and composition are heavily influenced and 
determined by the sources and volume of funding available. Indeed, it is primarily the 
structural organisation of 'new terrorism' and the emergence of autonomous, financially 
independent cells and new micro-financing methodologies that pose significant challenges 
                                                
734  Wittig, T ‘ Understanding Terrorist Finance’, p2, July 2011, Palgrave Macmillan 
735 See Thesis Chapter 4, p119 
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and should therefore be included in future CTF impact assessments.736 As such, future CTF 
evaluation must include Key Performance Indicators around the collection and operational 
exploitation of financial intelligence assets in particular, as well as evaluating the use of 
strategic 'micro' finance interventions, given recent changes in terror group structure and 
financing.  
 
This thesis thus acknowledges the decentralisation and mutation of the terrorist threat, the 
evolution and impact of technology and developments in globalisation and international 
cooperation that collectively offer both risks and rewards for CTF practitioners. Whilst 
developments in digital technology have transformed the financial landscape, principally 
through e-banking, retail foreign exchange and virtual payment systems, CTF nonetheless 
remains a key intervention in this new dispensation. CTF, as a discipline has evolved in 
scope and now comprises a matrix of criminal justice, intelligence and law enforcement 
intervention options. Crucially, emerging aspects of CTF practice have embraced these 
digital developments and will in future increasingly exploit the intelligence opportunities 
which this new environment affords.  
 
This thesis therefore highlights the evolution of CTF practice beyond the narrow confines 
of an anti money laundering template to include a developing suite of measures that can be 
deployed to combat terrorist threats. CTF operational procedures in the UK now 
increasingly focus on the value of financial data to provide intelligence insight into persons 
of interest and to provide context for known conspiracies as well as post incident 
evaluations. When mapped over other digital intelligence platforms, financial information 
is fundamental to counter terrorism practice. The evidence from this study strongly 
endorses the emphasis now given by practitioners to financial data collection for wider 
counter terrorism application. It is the potential operational outcomes that have emerged 
from the harvesting of financial information that consolidates and contributes to our 
collective understanding of CTF as an enduring and viable operational asset and a “critical 
inhibitor” to terrorism. This thesis endorses CTF as a collective action issue, requiring high 
levels of coordination and cooperation among different agencies, and advocates enhanced 
partnership working with both public and private institutions at both national and 
                                                
736 See Thesis Chapter 3, p77 
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international level. It therefore encourages the notion of a “seamless continuum” between 
law enforcement, intelligence agencies, government and the banking and commercial 
sectors to deliver operational impact.737 However, crucially, it also notes the limitations of 
those aspects of core CTF practice that directly target the interdiction of monies or value.  
In doing so, it clearly affirms that such efforts are largely disruptive and will at best merely 
frustrate and delay, rather than eradicate terror attacks completely.   
 
Whilst this accords with the rather limited and one dimensional efficacy assessments that 
have questioned the impact of the wider financial 'war on terror'738and the prognosis for 
future impact, this ignores recent developments in the digital landscape which have huge 
implications for financial intelligence collection and analysis. Indeed, Donohue's (2006)739 
withering assessment of the impact of CTF efforts in the UK to undermine terrorist 
operations, now seems rather myopic given more recent developments in CTF practice.  
The “dirty little secret”740 from these efforts, may now be the considerable dividends that 
await from a more lateral and holistic application of measures from the CTF compendium 
that focus on financial intelligence collection and its use across all aspects of counter 
terrorism practice. 
 
This thesis, whilst written from a UK perspective, further develops several themes posited 
in the 9/11 Commission Report almost a decade earlier.741 The anticipated shift to “smaller 
decentralized terrorist groups” and the fact that “some terrorist operations do not rely on 
outside sources of money and may now be self funding either through legitimate 
employment or low level criminality”742 clearly finds expression and endorsement in the 
empirical research in Chapter Four. What is significant however is that whilst the options 
for resourcing terrorism and insurgency continue to evolve, significant elements of the 
contemporary funding template can be traced to previous incarnations. This thesis 
advocates lessons learned from CTF practices used to combat the challenge from Irish 
Terrorist groups. In particular, it highlights the choices in targeting the terrorist financing 
                                                
737 See Thesis Chapter 4, p122 
738 See Heng, Yee-Kuang & Ken McDonagh, Op. Cit., p553 
739 Donohue, L. K. Op. Cit, p390  
740 Ibid 
741 ‘The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States’, 
W W Norton & Co, (US) July 2004. 
742 Ibid, p382 
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spectrum by advocating a more focused classification of 'macro' or 'micro' CTF options, 
depending on the nature of the threat. It champions the need for a greater understanding of 
emerging micro-financing methodologies and greater emphasis on micro-financing 
interventions in particular to address the challenge from new 'discreet' finance generation 
methods. 
 
As highlighted in the preceding Chapter, there are surprising similarities between the Irish 
terrorist financing model and those methodologies used for Taliban and insurgent 
financing. This poses significant questions around lessons to be drawn from previous UK 
corporate knowledge and operational practices and their application for wider 'threat' 
finance interventions. Whilst recognising the need for further development and research, 
this thesis advocates greater consideration of military perspectives from 'Threat Finance 
Cell' modelling and greater use of emerging qualitative and quantitative tools for 
intelligence analysis and insight. Current UK CTF structures and strategy and specifically 
the governments principal CTF forum, the Terrorist Finance Action Group (TFAG), would 
doubtless benefit from Ministry of Defence perspectives in addressing both domestic and 
international terrorist financing threats. 
 
Therefore, having considered the value added to overarching UK counter terrorist 
strategies, this thesis strongly advocates greater emphasis on intelligence-based strategies 
and financial intelligence collection specifically. It encourages continued emphasis and 
investment in financial and digital data collection to provide visibility on future potential 
funding platforms, behaviours and intentions, but primarily for impacting counter terrorism 
generally. Going forward, CTF practice is therefore likely to focus less on traditional anti 
money laundering approaches to terrorist financing and instead consolidate the intelligence 
windfalls that emerge from enhanced data streams.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis affirms the elevation of financial intelligence as key aspect of 
contemporary CTF practice. The emphasis and increasing reliance on FININT, particularly 
when fused with SOCMINT and other digital platforms, will inevitably heighten privacy 
concerns. The challenge therefore is to construct an investigative and intelligence collection 
template that adds operational value, yet recognises the attendant challenges posed in 
reconciling liberty and security. Achieving this balance is vital if law enforcement and 
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intelligence services are to preserve their ability to integrate data streams with more 
conventional intelligence assets for the purpose of maintaining national security and public 
safety. Crucially however, this thesis also acknowledges the limitations of FININT to target 
the planning phase of terror plots. It is also cognisant of the futility of focusing on 
surveilling the financial system in the hope of detecting such conspiracies, given recent 
changes in funding methodology. Having considered orthodox approaches to CTF, 
predicated on an anti money laundering template and the centrality of transaction activity, 
this thesis advocates new lateral approaches to improve current CTF efforts and greater 
resilience testing of emerging financial products to include loans and credit facilities given 
the elevation of these facilities in resourcing UK domestic attack cells in recent years. 743  
 
Finally, this thesis, drawing on the empirical research into the most recent high profile 
terror attacks in the UK, confirms a notable shift in terrorist financing methodology in 
recent years. This underscores the trend towards increasing operational independence and 
financial autonomy. Most disturbingly perhaps, the scale of monies now required for attack 
planning is so modest that CTF investigations can no longer rely on financial indicators to 
identify such plots without specific intelligence or further grounds for suspicion. Indeed, 
the trend towards financial autonomy and more discreet and ‘criminally sterile' funding 
methodologies, constitutes a watershed for CTF practitioners. Notwithstanding these 
challenges, this thesis strongly attests to the continued relevance of finance or more 
specifically, the 'financial footprint' to inform and provide intelligence insight for counter 
terrorism responses generally.  
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743 See Thesis Chapter 5, p159-163. Operation Crevice 2004, Operation Theseus 2005 and Operation Overt 2006 
confirmed the use of personal credit/ loans to fund these conspiracies.  
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